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Kinkel, UK Minister Comment on Bosnia Crisis

LD1306222994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2219 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Luxembourg, June 13 (TANJUG)—German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said on Monday that Germany would try, as president of the European Union in the second half of this year, to have the Yugoslav crisis brought as close as possible to a resolution.

Presenting the objectives of Germany's mandate to the press, Kinkel was asked by the TANJUG correspondent if there were real possibilities for the crisis to be resolved during Germany's term in office, Kinkel said that it would be wonderful if this happened. Kinkel observed, however, that because of the complications of the Yugoslav crisis, it would be too much to pledge to do this. In any case Germany will, together with its international partners, wholeheartedly act for the Yugoslav crisis to be fully resolved as soon as possible, he said.

To confirm his thesis that much has already been done in that respect, Kinkel listed the ceasefire (between Croats and Serbs) in Krajina and the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the agreement on a one-month cessation of hostilities, the establishment of safe areas, including Sarajevo, the placing of Mostar under European Union [EU] administration, the founding of the Moslem-Croat federation and the joint actions by international negotiators within the contact group for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There is the intention in the international community, Kinkel said, for the one-month ceasefire in Bosnia, which became effective on Friday, to be used as an incentive for seeking a lasting peace solution.

Interpreting the E.U. policy, Minister at Britain's Foreign Office Heathcoat Amory said that the E.U. plan for resolving the Yugoslav and Bosnian crises remains the pillar around which all peace talks are based. Asked by TANJUG to comment statements that the plan had been somewhat altered, the British minister said that the changes were in the sense of negotiations on maps of the territorial delimitation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but did not explain if this meant that the E.U. plan could be interpreted differently by each side and accepted only up to a certain, suitable, point.

Asked if the international contact group for Bosnia could still be considered as a united body following a United States House of Representatives decision to exempt Moslems from the international arms embargo on former Yugoslavia, since the group's unity was underscored as its main asset in the talks, Amory answered with a general statement that the international community was using all available means which could, in his assessment, contribute to a peace solution.

Meetings With Serb Representatives Examined

AU1306112194 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 Jun 94 pp 3-4

[Article by Andi Bejtja: "What Did the Albanian Socialists Discuss with the Serbian Representatives in Sofia?"]

[Text] "Secret" meetings to solve the Kosova question are coming into fashion on both sides of the border, and there is in the meantime every possibility that official Albanian-Serbian meetings will also become fashionable. As was reported last week, it was the Serbian side that announced a new proposal for a possible Albanian-Serbian dialogue at the foreign minister level. Meanwhile, the media reported a short time ago a secret meeting between Albanian representatives of Kosova and Serbian representatives in the Swiss Embassy in Belgrade. The participants in the meeting in a way denied this report, leaving the Albanian mass media to fight it out with the Serbian mass media.

The center of fashion has this time shifted from Prishtina to Tirana. The Democratic Party [PD] newspaper reports a secret meeting between the Albanian Socialists and representatives of Milosevic in Sofia, during an academic seminar on the topic of peace in the Balkans. RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE cites the Belgrade papers POLITIKA and NOVOSTI on this, specifically a statement issued by Keslanin, one of the main leaders of the Serbian Socialist Party. He is quoted as having said, "We reached an understanding with the Albanian Socialists, who are undergoing the consequences of the ruling party's right-wing revanchism dictated from abroad (they have their chairman in prison as the result of a show trial), and in spite of this won the local elections in 54 percent of the communes. This understanding is to continue dialogue and to cooperate in the interests of our two neighboring peoples and of general stability in the Balkans."

But what did the Albanian Socialists discuss with the Serbian representatives in Sofia? This question arouses a lot of curiosity even among the ordinary membership of the Socialist Party [PS], while the PS leaders are quite calm and ready to give an answer. Two of the PS leaders, Deputy Chairman Luan Hajdaraga and Bashkim Zeneli, head of foreign relations, are two of the Socialist personalities who have held many meetings with foreign diplomatic representatives in Tirana and who appear to be entrusted with the PS's foreign policy. They did not hesitate to talk to KOHA JONE about the aforementioned meeting.

"A PS delegation took part in an academic conference about the problem of peace in the Balkans. At this conference, there were also representatives from 13 other countries, with whom views were exchanged over the situation in the Balkans and the possibility of avoiding a conflict. In this context, our delegation presented our well-known standpoints. As far as we know, these standpoints were reported to the Serbian delegation. This seems to us utterly normal, especially at an academic conference," the Socialist leaders concluded, trying to demonstrate moderation in connection with questions put to them over the Kosova issue. Bashkim Zeneli recalled his article of one year ago, which mentioned the first and last Nano-Rugova meeting in Villa Number Two in Tirana, at which, according to Zeneli, the PS chairman made it clear to Rugova that dialogue is the only means for solving the issue. Likewise according to Zeneli, Rugova agreed with Nano's views.

It is also Zeneli and Hajdaraga who a short time ago held a meeting with representatives of the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana, at which the problem of Kosova was particularly discussed.

However, what does the PS think about solving the issue of Kosova?

Deputy Chairman Hajdaraga replies:

[Bejtja] Mr. Hajdaraga, at a news conference, you called the PD's policy in connection with the Kosova question a failure. Could you be more specific about this conclusion that your party has drawn?

[Hajdaraga] If we look back at the PD's attitudes to the national question, there is in general terms a coherence. Tactically, there have been vacillations and coherence has been lacking. Of course, there are differences between strategy and tactics that arise from circumstances and external factors. However, the truth is that the ultimate logic of the tactical plan of action has often not been clear.

Specifically, if one talks about the national cause, one talks about unification. This is a long-term platform that will be realized on the basis of a program to which all political forces, large and small and within or outside Albania, will commit themselves. This final goal will be achieved on the basis of a phased and well-studied policy. Unfortunately, we lack a national political platform of this kind. The PS long ago asked for this. The steps that have been taken have been publicized as tactical steps for solving the question of Kosova. It is still not clear what will be demanded. I say this bearing in mind reality, and having visited the field. According to the PS, a formula for a solution will be determined by the will of the people of Kosova and by international conventions, and the solution of the problem will necessarily proceed along the road of dialogue.

I wish to underline that the national question cannot be subdivided among political parties or personalities. Especially today, when it seems that a solution is knocking at the door, consultation among all the political forces, large and small, is more than urgent. I even consider a political consensus over this issue to be overdue. A roundtable of Albanian political forces in Kosova and Albania must be proposed as soon as possible, including the two Albanian presidents Rugova and Berisha.

In this context, I wish to see that Berisha has recently taken a sensible line. In today's Europe, large and especially conflict-ridden problems are only solved by dialogue, with efforts to respect at the same time national interests and international conventions. We cannot let our national problems be solved outside this spirit and this reality. I can say firmly that our stands on the Kosova issue have been and will be in this spirit.

[Bejtja] What are your objections to Rugova's policies?

[Hajdaraga] On one hand, I am glad that Rugova is coming down to earth in a new reality. However, on the other hand we think that Rugova, in any talks or negotiations, must necessarily bear in mind the views of other Albanian political forces on both sides of the border, and not reduce his activities in this sphere to meetings with the PD and President Berisha. The national problem is not a question of one or two persons. Even though Rugova has not heeded us, although we are the largest opposition party, we are sincerely open to dialogue with him. We ask for Rugova at the table. This would be to the good of the national cause, today and tomorrow.

Rugova's View of 'Aggression' Questioned

AU1306094494 Lezhe KOMBI in Albanian 3 June 94 p 2

[Article by Bido Zeqiri: "What Does Mr. Rugova Mean by the Word 'Aggression'?"]

[Text] Every patriot and honest Albanian, wherever he lives and works, follows with painful concern the events in Kosovo, and it seems to us unfounded and illogical when Mr. Rugova places all his hopes of liberation on external forces. Here is what he said in a recent interview to the newspaper REPUBLIKA: "President Clinton and his administration will not tolerate conflicts or any Serbian aggression against Kosova." We would like to ask Mr. Rugova: What does he mean by aggression against Kosova, when the virtual aggression against Kosova that was perpetrated long ago in this area still mercilessly continues? Is it not aggression when your schools are closed, your university is closed, you are dismissed from your job, your academy is shut down, and your newspapers, radio and television stations, etc., are closed? Is it not aggression when the Serbian police, armed to the teeth, conduct house-to-house searches, terrorizing the Kosovars, beating them up and torturing them without the slightest mercy? Finally, is it not aggression when Serbian tanks and guns are patrolling the roads of Kosova towns?

It is difficult to admit, Mr. Rugova, that the U.S. Administration knows nothing about these things. It is also very difficult to say that this Administration does not know what aggression means. Should we perhaps expect the criminal Arkan to put into practice his plan of ejecting 700,000 Kosovars from their homeland?

It seems to us that in his recent interview, Mr. Rugova tried to conceal something. When Mrs. Edlira Bucpapaj asked the honorable Mr. Rugova about Douglas Hogg's visit to Prishtina, he failed to mention that Mr. Hogg called Kosova "Serbian territory."

Thus, the U.S. Administration is waiting for the Serbs to carry out aggression against Kosova when the Serbs are already there, and Britain's Mr. Hogg argues that "Kosova must be viewed as Serbian territory." The following question then arises: What should the Kosovars do? Should they plead with the Serbs for mercy?

Resolution of 41st BSP Congress Published

AU1306135994 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Jun 94 p 5

["Resolution of the 41st Bulgarian Socialist Party Congress": "Bulgaria Faces New Choice"]

[Text] Bulgaria is at a crossroads and faces a difficult choice. Our society faces dramatic questions that require a clear and unequivocal answer.

Will we create a new political climate and and atmosphere of national consensus, or will we continue the descend the downward slope of lethal disunity, intolerance, and confrontation?

Will we strengthen the state, or will we allow chaos, anarchy, and war to prevail among the institutions?

Will we stop the catastrophic destruction of our economy and plundering of our national wealth and allow Bulgaria to become a state of poverty and humiliated human dignity?

Will we remain indifferent toward the growing unemployment, corruption, speculation, and the unprecedented increase in crime, or will we establish the rule of law, democratic order, and security—guarantees of the protection of our life, property, and peace for our children, and their future?

Will we reconcile ourselves to the collapse of intellectual life, the smothering of the Bulgarian language, the destruction of Bulgarian education and science, the commercialization of our art and culture, and watch them replaced by harmful imported surrogates, or will we revive the Bulgarian spirit and preserve our cultural assets?

The choice between these alternatives is a choice between disaster and recovery for Bulgaria, between national destruction or revival.

1. The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] confirms its striving for a peaceful transition and its policy of dialogue and cooperation aimed at national consensus and reconciliation. It calls upon all citizens, political forces, and public organizations in Bulgaria to display prudence and good will in overcoming political hostility and the desire for revenge, and to create a civilized atmosphere in Bulgarian political life. The BSP is against the war between the institutions. It finds relations between the political forces to be anything but normal and nationally responsible, and rejects manifestations of ethnic confrontation.

2. The BSP favors holding early parliamentary elections in the fall of 1994. Despite the efforts of the people's representatives, the current parliament is about to exhaust its legislative possibilities and political and moral prestige. A new poll is the only democratic and nationally responsible way to stabilize power in the country.

The BSP's success in the elections would allow a new policy of salvation to be pursued in Bulgaria that will help to overcome the acute crisis, stop the destructive processes, curb inflation, and change the model of transition. In its election platform the BSP will present its positions on those changes that are vital for our society. The way those positions are realized will depend on the voters. The BSP views the coalition agreement as the best formula for our country. If it is impossible to achieve this, the BSP is prepared to assume responsibility for governing the country.

The main tasks of the socialist deputies during the period until the elections are:

—to adopt amendments and addenda to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria;

—to adopt amendments and addenda to the Law on Electing People's Representatives, Mayors, and Municipal Councillors, and the Law on Municipal Self-Management and Administration;

—to adopt the Judiciary Bill and the Bill on Defense and the Armed Forces, and adopting amendments to the Law on Restructuring and Privatizing State and Municipal Enterprises and the Mass Privatization Program.

The congress proposes to the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy [PSSD] to implement until the elections systematic and strict parliamentary control over the government's work regarding timely and just income compensation, especially the incomes of the socially deprived, struggling effectively against speculation, enrichment that is not the result of work, and crime, and concluding a deal on our foreign debt.

3. During the period of transition the BSP supports an economic policy that will guarantee:

—a revival of production and its restructuring and renewal, and protection of Bulgarian national capital;

—the stimulation of a variety of forms of ownership and acceleration of privatization by applying market and social mechanisms;

—the efficient management of state property;

—the acceleration of agricultural reform with a view to creating a modern and efficient agriculture; the creation of state protection and stimulation of agricultural producers; the creation of conditions for developing all economic forms and advantages for cooperatives and associations as a means of improving the economic and social status of farmers and halting the fragmentation of the land;

—a qualitatively new budget policy that will stabilize the country financially and in terms of foreign currency, overcome the disproportions in the budget, improve the collection of taxes, finally resolve the bad credits problem, and bring about a gradual transition toward developing own sources if financing in the municipalities;

—the orientation of the Bulgarian economy toward exporting, creating conditions for changing the import-export structure, restoring our country's traditional markets, and linking Bulgaria with the European and world economy.

4. The BSP views the following as its basic tasks:

—guaranteeing the social security of the population;

—providing social compensations and social aid, conducting a struggle against unemployment, and providing every Bulgarian citizen with the possibility of self-fulfillment;

—effecting strict control over the prices of goods monitored by the government and conducting an anti-inflation policy;

—providing the necessary means for education, health protection, and the activity of the municipalities;

—forming independent pension, health, education, and other humanitarian funds.

5. The BSP declares the irreversible character of the democratization processes and supports the improvement of the political system;

—it draws public attention to the danger of the authoritarian degeneration of the transition and of the deliberate striving to destabilize the democratic institutions;

—it supports restoring and expanding local self-management, and expanding the possibilities of conducting a regional and local policy through developing financial, property, and organizational autonomy of the municipalities and settlements;

—it insists on real political independence for the judiciary, which implements the basic role determined by the constitution, namely, to be a barrier against crime and anarchy;

—it declares its adherence to the pluralistic and democratic character of the national media, overcoming their manipulative and confrontational character, and turning them into a public tribune.

6. The BSP supports the protection of Bulgarian culture and arts and the achievements of our education and science, language, and spiritual identity, and opposes the persecution of Bulgarian intellectuals for political reasons.

7. The BSP supports religious tolerance, but it is seriously concerned about the schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. It categorically opposes the infiltration of foreign religious sects and the continuing Turkicization of the Bulgarian population.

8. The BSP will seek cooperation in the future with the trade unions in protecting the people's labor interests, and it favors the further strengthening of the tripartite partnership. The BSP is against the use of the trade unions for achieving political goals and opposes their direct interference in governing the state.

9. The BSP supports the depoliticization of the armed forces and guarantees their high social prestige, financial situation, and combat ability. It protests against attempts to repoliticize the armed forces and views the kindling of conflicts associated with the military reform as a threat to our national security.

The BSP is in favor of maintaining the stability of the security organs, providing their material needs, preserving their high professionalism, and improving their authority as protectors of law and order. The BSP is in favor of an uncompromising struggle against manifestations of corruption in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and attempts to utilize the agencies of law and order for political goals.

10. The BSP is in favor of conducting an active foreign policy that corresponds to Bulgaria's national interests and international obligations;

—it adheres to peace and goodneighborly relations in the Balkans and opposes dragging Bulgaria into the Yugoconflict in any form;

—it adheres to our further integration in the European structures;

—it supports strengthening confidence and cooperation with our partners on an equal bilateral and multilateral basis;

—[illegible] adheres to guaranteeing the country's national security;

The congress adopts the report on the BSP's political line and approves the reports on the activity of the BSP Supreme Council, the All-Party Control Commission, and the socialist deputies after the 40th BSP congress.

—6 June 1994

Videnov Defines BSP Political Line

AU1306150594

[Editorial Report] Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian on 4 June carries on pages 9 and 10 the text of the approximately 12,000-word report that Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), delivered on the first day of the 41st BSP Congress in Sofia on 3 June. The report, which appears under the heading "Bulgaria Faces a New Choice," is "on the political line of the BSP." In his opening words, Videnov stresses that the aim of the 41st congress is "to initiate a new political line in the party's life—a line of direct commitment of the Socialists to solving the immense problems facing Bulgarian society."

In his introduction, having noted the unexpected difficulties of the transition to democracy, Videnov says that "our society today faces a new choice: either to allow the present uncontrolled state of economic anarchy, rising corruption, and gross violation of the law to continue" or "to restore the manageability of the economy in combination with the principles of free economic initiative." He reiterates the BSP's support of the reforms, but says that the strategy followed so far has been erroneous, as it was "based on civil confrontation," for which the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) carries most of the blame.

In the first main section of his report, under the subheading "The BSP in the Institutions of Power," Videnov briefly reviews the political developments in the period since the 40th BSP Congress in 1991, which began by the SDS and Rights and Freedoms Movement (DPS) imposing "an extremist formula of government," with the "new SDS *nomenklatura*" implementing "a restorational, repressive, and revanchist policy in parliament, the government, the Presidency, local government, the judiciary, and the media." This prompted the BSP, "not without certain hesitations," to support the Berov nonparty government of experts. He admits that the Berov administration has achieved only partial success in implementing the reforms, but stresses that it "proved sufficiently strong in parliament (and chiefly in society) to oppose with a solid majority the SDS claims for confrontational, monopolist power based on force."

Videnov then turns to the economic crisis, giving figures on the drastic fall in production in all spheres since 1989, accompanied by falling living standards and inevitable social tension. He asks how the social cost of the transition can be made bearable for the population and whether "the lost of public support for the reforms can be overcome." In seeking answers, he states six "principled conclusions and lessons": First, "any reform program in the socioeconomic sphere is doomed to failure without broad public support"; second, "the sharp political confrontation and primitive politicizing of economic problems paralyze the work of the institutions and block the necessary structural changes"; third, the crisis cannot be resolved "through measures of a monetary nature, especially in shock form"; fourth, the transition from a centralized to a market economy must be carried out "gradually and following the principle of continuity"; fifth, during the crisis, when most property and means of production are still state owned, "the state cannot abdicate from its obligation to regulate and adjust the economic processes"; and sixth, "the entire potential of the nation must be mobilized to find a new philosophy for the economic reform, one most suited to the specific conditions in Bulgaria." However, Videnov fails to propose any specific solutions to the current economic problems, confining himself to generalities such as: "Without a clear strategy for restructuring a considerable number of large enterprises that will remain in state ownership in the future, it is impossible to successfully privatize the rest."

In the next section of his report, subheaded "The Present Political Crisis and Its Solution Through Elections," the BSP leader reviews the party's consistent attempts to seek political dialogue with other parties to agree on "urgently required measures in the socioeconomic sphere." However, he admits that the attempts of the BSP and Prime Minister Berov to reach such an agreement between the parliamentary groups have been rebuffed. Accordingly, Videnov states, "the BSP Supreme Council has decided to turn to you, the delegates to the 41st BSP Congress, with the proposal that you should direct the activities of the BSP toward holding early parliamentary elections in October or November this year, so as to realize a major change in the method of implementing the transition in Bulgaria." He assures the delegates that the elections will mean "the rejection of the shock model for the transition, a clear left-of-center future for Bulgaria... and a clearly defined political configuration capable of giving Bulgaria the competent, stable, efficient, government of dialogue that it needs." Although he admits that to press for early elections involves certain risks for the BSP, he sees no other solution to the present political impasse in parliament. He adds that "this conclusion is also imposed by the grave political situation in the country, for which homegrown politickers and wheeler-dealers are to blame." He notes that many of those who have caused the crisis "are accumulating dirty financial and political dividends from the difficulties of the crisis." Finally, Videnov sees elections as the way to avoid "additional severe socioeconomic risks—hyperinflation, devaluation of the lev, series of bankruptcies, and the failure of the budget."

Videnov then proceeds to propose "a change in the model for the transition." He points out that "the people have every reason to insist that the social cost of the transition is bearable" and that "a strong modern left party is needed to ensure this." In contrast, "the Bulgarian right wing today is dominated by radical trends that, under the guise of ultraliberal slogans, are imposing restorational, authoritarian, and anarchistic views of the transition."

In the section of his report subheaded "On a New Socioeconomic Policy," Videnov first reiterates that "the BSP supports building a democratic society based on a social market economy." He then lists the main points in the Socialists' socioeconomic program:

First, "Bulgarian production is top priority";

Second, "acceleration of the privatization process," promoting "shareholding forms of market privatization, which presupposes the speedy consolidation and development of the exchange markets in securities," including promoting "the purchase of enterprises by workers' collectives," in addition to "the existing preferences accorded to employees in enterprises undergoing privatization";

Third, "realism in agrarian policy," combating the fragmentation of farmland ownership by encouraging the formation of "voluntarily organized cooperatives, and following the worldwide practice of subsidizing agricultural production to maintain its viability";

Fourth, "financial and foreign exchange stabilization," with emphasis placed "on increasing budget expenditure on direct investments and preferences for private entrepreneurs with a view to promoting eventual rises in budget revenue," "finally settling the problem of enterprises bad debts," and avoiding "the present tendency to increasingly tie up our financial balances by taking new loans from foreign sources"; and

Fifth, "an export orientation of the Bulgarian economy and achieving a positive balance of trade," by such measures as "moderate and selective protectionism of our internal market" to give producers the necessary breathing space to become competitive in the world market; Videnov points out that foreign capital, though welcome, "can play only an ancillary role and will come to Bulgaria only when the market situation in Bulgaria guarantees sufficient profitability."

In the section on social policy, Videnov attacks the "shock therapy and the liberal model of the reform that is completely inadequate for Bulgaria and has reduced most of society to poverty." He says that "the state is called upon to make adjustments to the market mechanisms... to guarantee a certain distribution and redistribution of the national income." He advocates measures against "the price speculation that is greatly contributing to the decline in the population's purchasing power." The BSP's "active investment policy will help to create new jobs in all spheres," Videnov says. He also promises proper compensation for pensioners and supports the establishment of independent pension funds and help for families and children.

The next section of the report is entitled "The Political System of Society—Toward Restoration or Modernization?" Videnov notes that "for Bulgaria, the 'velvet resolution' of 1989 proved to be a step backward because it returned the country to the doomed confrontational models of the past." "Today," he says, "most Bulgarian parties consist of coteries without a social basis that are not representative and have no sense of responsibility." Videnov claims that the political system should include the following seven elements: "social democracy as the basis of the new politics"; "decentralization and self-government"; "socialization in economic life," including "a decisive decentralization of ownership sand its just distribution and social privatization" that "puts a great part of the social production funds in the hands of their creators"; following a "responsible left policy" to prevent the risk of the restoration of authoritarianism; "a radical reform of the legal system"; "democratization of the media"; and equal social access to culture.

In the section entitled "BSP—a New Party," Videnov considers the changes that have occurred and are still taking place in the BSP. He summarizes the main ideas that now guide the party activities as follows:

1. "The BSP does not regard power as an aim in itself but as a means for developing a free, just, and cohesive society." Videnov claims that the Socialists realize that "power does not oppose the civic society but supports its manifestations and protects the social, intellectual, and economic autonomy of the individual...."

2. The BSP is a firm supporter of the parliamentary system, and its "indisputable feature is deep respect for the Constitution and the laws, its political partners and opponents, and readiness to conduct an open and equal dialogue with all political formations...."

3. The BSP remains a party of the masses.

4. Replacement of leaders. Videnov draws attention to "the complete replacement of leading figures in the BSP in recent years, and the radical renewal of the leading organs, ranging from the municipal organizations to the Supreme Council."

5. Democratization of the BSP. Videnov claims that "the BSP today can convincingly be assessed as a party with developed and expanding democratic principles within itself and as a party of active pluralism of ideas."

In the penultimate section of his report, Videnov dwells at length on the continuous intense ideological debate that has taken place within the party since the 40th congress, claiming that it serves as proof of the party's vitality and democratic nature and noting that despite sharp debates on the various draft versions of the new BSP program, the party has managed to preserve its unity.

In conclusion, Videnov notes that "in the face of the antisocialist propaganda campaign, relying on insinuations, lies, and manipulations, the BSP counters by offering its own honest analysis and sincere desire for change." He calls upon the party "before the crucial elections, to strive to develop its potential for social dialogue." "We have the moral strength," he says, "and we have political grounds to seek a new public vote of confidence, so as to assume our national responsibilities."

Lilov's 'Defeat' Viewed

AU1406095594 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 8 Jun 94 p 11

[Unattributed commentary: "Videnov's Feint Will Be Assessed in Fall"]

[Text] Formally, the 41st Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress ended according to expectations.

Zhan Videnov was reelected. The adoption of the program was postponed and subjected to a party referendum—as the chairman demanded. The congress announced a course toward new elections.

However, unlike previous forums, events that ostensibly did not occur at the congress prompt the observers to conclude that nevertheless, something happened in the BSP. The personnel changes were the most insignificant development.

According to the forecasts the greatest battle at the congress should have taken place in anything related to the election of the BSP Supreme Council. No major changes were anticipated. However, Andrey Lukanov, Dimitur Yonchev, Rosen Karadimov, and Elena Poptodorova surprisingly were not elected to this organ.

However, the most improbable development was the failure of Aleksandur Marinov, seen as the probable next party leader, to gain election to the Supreme Council. He was supported by the BSP Sofia city organization and Aleksandur Lilov himself. However, Marinov could not even qualify as a contender for the post of BSP leader.

Thus the coup at the top of the party that was planned, did not take place. According to the laws of the party hierarchy, from now on the process will follow the domino rule—other people will also have to leave the higher floors of the building on Positano Street [the BSP headquarters].

It was in the issue of the party program that Videnov's victory became obvious.

The party chief strategist [Aleksandur Lilov] was burdened by his program. This was not a strategic burden. He clearly had no direct commitment to the party leadership. However, isolated in his strategic center, he composed a program that he saw as certain to be adopted at the congress. Surprising or not, Zhan Videnov convincingly defended his position during the debate and in the final analysis he achieved what he wanted—the BSP program will be adopted not by the congress but by a party referendum.

To be able to assess this victory of Videnov on merit one should know that Lilov's center worked for two years on its variant of the program and thought that there would be no competition. However, two additional competitors appeared—the draft programs of the Alliance for Social Democracy and the hardliners of the "Marxist Alternative."

However, at the referendum the party members will not be asked to select one of the three drafts. They will actually vote on Lilov's program, which will be amended and supplemented. It is assumed that the amendments will include the elimination of the democratic socialism line, proposed by the strategist. Thus Videnov, who opposes this formula, will achieve another victory.

There is an additional goal behind all this. When Zhan Videnov imposed the decision on the referendum his secret intention was related to preparing the BSP position at the next elections. The people around him clearly hinted that the concept of democratic socialism stinks and scares the potential allies of the BSP in a preelection and postelection coalition.

The talks with Petur Dertliev's Social Democrats are at an advanced phase. However, one of the conditions of forming the partnership is very categorical—the Socialists should relinquish Lilov's yearnings, and declare themselves Social Democrats.

Videnov's feint in delaying his reply to this demand could turn out to be rather prudent. However, this will become clear only at the next elections.

The BSP Congress approved the idea of holding early parliamentary elections in the fall. This was not by accident and is not a meaningless demonstration on the party of Videnov. He wants the elections and has his reasons. The BSP leader firmly declared that this parliament had exhausted its possibilities. However, his secret concern is related to new changes at the National Assembly, which could be uncomfortable for the Socialists. If Lyuben Berov remains in power, the chance of the anticommunist majority in the parliament to organize itself and form a new cabinet improves.

In addition Videnov is convinced that, if the elections take place in the fall, the BSP will win them.

Nevertheless, the BSP parliamentary faction does not unequivocally accept the idea of new elections. Nora Ananieva [leader of the BSP parliamentary faction] pretended that she was joking when she said at the congress that fall ends on 22 December. Despite the fact that the Socialists unanimously declare their wish to hold new elections, not all of them want to risk their seats in the parliament.

The problem of the Socialists' leader is whether the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] really wants new elections, as it has claimed for a long time, or whether this is a strategic maneuver of the SDS center. The concern grew even more when the SDS National Coordinating Council praised the BSP for finally adopting the idea the SDS constantly promotes. The SDS became even more suspicious after the scandal between Filip Dimitrov and Stefan Savov, which could possibly lead toward preserving the parliament.

Difficult times lie ahead for the BSP. Lukanov, who appeared to be a permanent fixture, is outside the supreme leadership. Lilov obviously suffered a defeat. However, will all this be enough to convince the voters that the BSP is not the Bulgarian Communist Party any longer?

Lilov Assesses Congress Results

AU1406112694 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian
6 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandur Lilov, leader of the BSP Strategic Research Center, by Todor Tokin; place and date not given: "Tribal Political Animosity Could Produce Grave Consequences for Country"]

[Text] [Tokin] Mr. Lilov, how do you assess the 41st Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress?

[Lilov] This is a successful congress. The party's political line is being clarified. I mean the main aspects of this line—elections, working out a practical policy, adopting a long-range program, and continuing the renewal of the party. I think that those steps are in the correct direction and that this predetermined the congress' success.

[Tokin] The congress decided that the program prepared by your Strategic Research Center will serve as the basis of the party program. However, its adoption was postponed by three months. How do you assess this move?

[Lilov] The most important things for me are that first, the draft of the strategic center was adopted as the basis of the party program, and second, that it was decided to incorporate in our draft the most valuable elements of the precongressional discussion and the other drafts published and discussed by the party. The final form of the adoption is not fatal. However, a negative effect will emerge if again requests and intentions are voiced, which could prevent the adoption of the program either directly or by infringing upon its basic ideas. I would not like to think that the next three months will be utilized for wasting time or directing the program's elaborations in an incorrect direction.

[Tokin] How do you assess the election platform proposed by Zhan Videnov, BSP chairman?

[Lilov] I assess very highly the idea of the party chairman, but the program itself is rather raw. In addition, I think that we need a program of a different type. At the congress I said that the election platform should not specify what the BSP proposes for the 21st century, but should say plainly to the Bulgarian voters what the party is proposing for the 1994-98 period, which is relevant to those elections. The BSP must propose a new, very clear, specific, pragmatic, and programmatic policy in all areas.

[Tokin] Do you think that your line was defeated at the congress, as the rumors in the corridors point out?

[Lilov] (Laughing) Yes, the corridors produced this thesis about a defeat or a victory.... I do not think that this is so. However, even if this is so, no one knows what he won, whom did he defeat, and whether he lost something by being defeated.

[Tokin] Do you see yourself as DUMA chief editor? There was such a proposal.

[Lilov] Oh please! This is an inappropriate proposal.

[Tokin] Do you not think that the BSP missed the best moment for the elections?

[Lilov] This is a serious question. The strong policy and the strong party that implements this policy could be identified through many signs. One of them is the selection of the right moment for its actions. Our party must select that moment for the elections, which will be the most suitable one for the country and for the policy that our party proposes. Therefore I think that we discovered the concept "elections" only after an excessively long and unjustified searching. We are late, because most of the political factors in Bulgaria already invoked this concept. However, I do not think that the BSP missed this train. If the party proposes a good tactical policy it has a chance. Elections in the fall could be successful for the BSP if the party produces a good policy.

[Tokin] However, Professor Kyuranov said that if the BSP selects the road of toppling Prof. Berov's cabinet, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] could easily form a new government and restore the old parliamentary majority, through which it could rule until the end of 1995.

[Lilov] The people in Bulgaria must get used to the rules of democracy. This factor that according to the laws and the rules of democracy has the right and ability to form a government, can indeed do so. Prof. Kyuranov cannot guarantee the BSP or the leftist forces that if we constantly postpone the elections and support a government which is losing credit, then what he fears will not materialize. The issue is to conduct democratic and free elections and form a high-quality parliament and strong government in accordance with the wishes of the voters. We do not need behind-the-scenes combinations and should not fear elections.

[Tokin] Why do you not mention specific political factors in your idea regarding a leftist-centrist agreement, which is incorporated in the center's program?

[Lilov] It is the specific political market that will propose specific political factors. This will happen when the political scene becomes clear and one can see what election platforms and forces emerge. If a postelection leftist-centrist coalition is concerned, then one must see the situation in the parliament after the elections. I have absolutely no dramatic concern that the BSP could remain alone without partners. If it succeeds to receive a solid majority in the parliament the chances and possibilities of forming a leftist-centrist coalition in the parliament will grow. This is a very clear and promising idea. If this chance is missed, I think that we will commit a grave error, which will not be applauded in any way by history or the present and future generations.

[Tokin] You said that you relinquish all party posts. Does this mean that you also relinquish the leadership of the Strategic Research Center?

[Lilov] This is absolutely sincere. If I wanted the leadership post I could have it without any difficulties. As far as the strategic center is concerned—this is not a party post. There are no political appointments in science.

[Tokin] Your colleagues reproach you for not mentioning Zhan Videnov when you speak about the party's new face. According to you, who are the capable persons in the BSP?

[Lilov] Those are concocted accusations. Infighting is one of our party's bad traditions.

I see Zhan Videnov's face among the new faces of our party, but I want to stress that the party's elite does not consist only of the posts in its leadership. We have certain differences with the party leader regarding certain issues, but I do not wish to dramatize them. I think that the party leader must be independent. If Zhan Videnov obtains this independence I will be the happiest member of the party.

Yanaki Stoilov is one of the most gifted persons in the party. Aleksandur Marinov, Nikolay Kamov, and many other young people are the hope of our party. I am glad that at such a difficult moment the party can show so many new and promising faces.

[Tokin] What are the main differences between the BSP and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party [BSDP]?

[Lilov] We have no profound programmatic differences. While some of the BSDP leaders do not like this, it nevertheless is a positive factor in relations between the two parties and a wonderful prerequisite of developing cooperation. The differences are the result of the still existing historical heritage and the failure to develop a sufficiently active and constructive dialogue.

[Tokin] What party will the BSP present at the elections? Whose party will it be?

[Lilov] The BSP will present in the elections a party that very seriously wants to eliminate the tribal political animosity which exists in Bulgaria, and which could have grave consequences for our country. The BSP must place national consensus and interests above everything else. Afterward, the BSP must propose another alternative for the reforms in the country. It should do so not in order to stop the reforms, but in order to give them a new impulse and provide them with a new leftist-centrist philosophy and program. Finally, the BSP must express and protect the interests of that majority of the population which is subjected to mass impoverishment, while keeping in mind its role in our society.

[Tokin] Do you think that the leftist wave that began in Lithuania and continued through Poland and Hungary, will reach Bulgaria tomorrow?

[Lilov] There is no other way. We are in the way of this wave.

DUMA Editor Views Results

AU1306144794 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 8 Jun 94 p 5

[Commentary by Stefan Prodev: "Two Days After Congress"]

[Text] Rather than three days, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Congress lasted four days and one night. This was not because so many of the delegates wanted to speak, but because of purely organizational reasons. It turned out that we still do not know the real price of time. Time costs money, which does not grow on trees.

The congress was awaited with interest by our entire public and was accompanied by many forecasts. Unfortunately, the forecasts were made by amateurs, and not a single one turned out to be true. As so many times in the past, it again became clear that our political prophets are not interested in the truth about the BSP, but in their own notions about it. This causes them to deceive themselves, which is not only confusing, but almost evokes ridicule. If one reads their forecasts one sees that their preliminary expectations have nothing in common with the facts. Again most of the journalists, political scientists, and observers showed that bias and personal feelings are only an elementary propaganda game with the real situation. None of them succeeded in forecasting what would happen at the congress, and thus distinguish himself.

The 41st BSP Congress provided a number of "surprises," which if sensed before the congress, could have been a case of serious political intelligence. I will not dwell on all the surprises, but will point out only two that deserve special attention.

The first was the fact that the expected personal and ideological duels did not take place, although they were implied in some of the statements. In this context the expected split or great differences in assessments proved to be a bluff. The congress' energy was not wasted on imposing someone's will or settling accounts. The delegates not only showed prudence, but they also did not allow anyone to impose his will for his own ends. This was not the result of weariness, feebleness, or fear, but of a most serious attitude toward the problems. It became quite clear that the factors that divide the party are much weaker at present than the factors that unite it. Even the strongest words from the rostrum and the most nervous scuffle near the microphones did not confuse the congress' general atmosphere. On the contrary, the atmosphere was businesslike and influenced by the results, not by selfish and vain struggles. Even those persons from whom great thunder was expected did not violate the rules of good taste. This is more than indicative for a political congress taking place in the present social situation, torn apart by explosions. It became more than obvious that the Socialists can think bitter thoughts, but do not seek success through scandals. There were indeed attempts to create scandals, but the initiators did not find any support. The congress quickly quashed such attempts, sometimes with derision, and showed that it thinks on a grand scale and rejects petty ambitions. This is what the political prophets were not able to forecast. They expected a storm perhaps even catastrophic clashes, but instead of this they saw a complex but fruitful dialogue. The BSP again proved that unlike its political opponents, it is a party with sound nerves and a clear voice.

The second serious surprise of the 41st BSP Congress involved the election of its top leadership. For a long time the press and the radio toyed with various names, pointed out ideological currents, sought heroes and victims, and tried to forecast a conflict of personal and group interests. Today the election is already a fact and all this does not sound serious. Almost all the great figures in the BSP, with a few exceptions, found their place on the BSP Supreme Council. Only a few of them, who either evoke concern with their behavior, or express radical and unacceptable positions, were not elected. I personally regret the fact that some of them were not elected, but this does not change anything. The election sense of the delegates proved to be quite precise. The delegates refused to give their confidence mostly to people who did not convince the congress that they were selfless in their ambitions, and that they profess sober views.

Of course, this does not mean that controversial persons, people associated with the old notions of party behavior, and people who still have a leadership mania did not enter the BSP Supreme Council. Despite this, however, the result is positive. The delegates voted according to their conscience and generally elected a leadership that corresponds to the current BSP interests. It is a leadership of balance, professional thought, and a useful combination of the center and the ideological currents. This is a hope that could produce positive results. Those who were not elected are certainly disappointed, but if they are politicians, they must draw the necessary conclusions. At the present political moment the party does not want and cannot be subjected to a test by controversial persons and extremist views. It faces serious social battles and needs a prudently composed leadership that will guarantee a complete balance. I would like to believe that, despite the forecasts, precisely this is what the new Supreme Council will do.

As usual, various gossip accompanied the congress, or was spread afterward. Now that the forecasts have been proved wrong it is the time of the lies. One of them is more than bankrupt. I mean the BTA report, quoted by certain media, according to which I was jeered by the delegates because of a report in DUMA that ostensibly attempted to suggest Zhan Videnov's election prior to the actual vote. This is a pitiful forgery. The truth is that the congress jeered not DUMA's chief editor, but a small group of delegates from Sofia who made use of the report in order to compromise the newspaper and the party leader before the election. By the way, this unworthy act had a decisive role in the fact that Aleksandur Marinov was not elected a member of the Supreme Council. There were other similar lies, but let us not pay any attention to them. Whoever wants to know about them should read DEMOKRATSIYA. This newspaper presented what happened at the congress in such a twisted manner that one can only laugh.

The 41st BSP Congress will go down in party history as a useful congress. It adopted a new charter and election platform, and cleared the way for for the new party program finally to be adopted. What was very important—the congress confirmed the decision to hold early parliamentary elections. Now life should prove the correctness of the party's collective mind. This can happen only if the congress' ideas successful merge with the requirements of our time, and if each of us, Socialists and supporters alike, accept them as our own ideas. Let no one become the victim of excessive suspicion or inappropriate confidence. Both suspicion and confidence are more than harmful, especially at a time such as the present, when the BSP's opponents are becoming ever more confused and malicious. We are yet to face the struggle for the new parliament, which means a struggle for power that will require all our strength. In this sphere things are extremely clear and cannot be subjected to any games. It depends on us, rather than anyone else, whether the people will believe us and will give us their confidence. Therefore, the congress' decisions must become the destiny of all those who want to help Bulgaria. It was no accident that most the statement read at the congress referred to the future. The real chance of our nation lies somewhere in the future. Let us devote everything we have as Socialists and patriots to this chance. Only thus will we be able to prove that we are ready for the great public role that awaits us.

Call for Elections 'Empty Phrases'

AU1306174394 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 8 Jun 94 p 3

[Commentary by Ivaylo Kutov: "Congress of Camouflage"]

[Text] The latest congress of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] confirmed that the Socialists are still afraid of the political responsibilities of the time. The declaration of their intention to go for elections in the fall is nothing more than a scrap of paper, at the very least, because it does not envisage any procedure or compelling force to make them overthrow the Berov government in the autumn so as to provoke the elections.

The BSP top leadership also pretends it is disturbed by the status quo and that it has set course for elections. These are mere empty phrases, nothing more. At present, it is very convenient for the Communists to rule without bearing any direct responsibility. Someone may say that, following the events in Poland and Hungary, they may have hopes of winning independently. Even if something of the kind occurs, which I do not believe for one moment, they will not know what to do with the power when they get it. The new geopolitical situation forces them to operate in the conditions of a pluralist democracy. Even in Brezhnev's time, the Polish and Hungarian Communists were more accustomed to working in an environment containing elements of dialogue, with the organic necessity of stating the reasons for their decisions and actions to their own people and the civilized democracies. For this reason, the successors of the Polish and Hungarian Communists have some experience of working in conditions of dialogue and competition.

Our BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] was a foreign branch of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. It never made an independent decision, either mechanically carrying out Moscow's directives or imitating, in an inimitable way, the decisions of the CPSU.

This is why the present BSP top leadership is well aware that as the party in power, the only thing that will happen is that it will finally expose itself for what it is. In any case, they will lose the next elections. Even if they should by chance win something, they will not know what to do with it.

President Interviewed After D-Day Observance

AU1306144194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by Milan Rusko; place and date not given: "An Opportunity To Present Slovakia"]

[Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac, accompanied by his wife, returned home yesterday. He had been in Great Britain and France to take part in the 50th anniversary commemorations of the Allied landings in Normandy. He gave us an interview before his return, from which we have selected the following:

[Rusko] Mr. President, what is your view of the significance of the visits you have just made?

[Kovac] This was an excellent opportunity for us Slovaks, an opportunity for us to feel proud that our citizens also took part in the historic battles and that Slovakia—of course, along with the citizens of the Czech Republic—also contributed in this way to defeating fascism. It was also an opportunity to draw attention to Slovakia not only in the eyes of the European public because, apart from the European countries, representatives from the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were there. The opportunity to meet so many presidents, prime ministers, and members of royal families at the same time crops up, perhaps, once in 50 years; therefore, I believe that this event will help to create a favorable image of Slovakia. It was also a great opportunity for me to meet with our citizens, veterans, in England and Normandy and to thank them for the sacrifices they made. There was plenty of time to talk with those present, and it was pleasant for me to find out from them that they are following the situation in our Republic and that they view our future with hope.

[Rusko] Did you have talks with French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur? Did you touch upon the issues involved in the Stability Pact initiated by him?

[Kovac] I made use of the fact that I was Mr. Balladur's first guest, and I followed up on the talks that Prime Minister Moravcik had with him during his visit to France. We also discussed the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the Stability Pact. I praised the proposal as a significant French contribution to extending the zone of stability in Europe. Mr. Balladur was obviously aware that the Slovak Republic and the Central European region, in general, plays and will play a major role in the European situation. He said that the French Government's policy is oriented toward helping the countries of this region become incorporated into European structures.

[Rusko] A very favorable atmosphere prevailed among the representatives of the participating states. Did you make use of this to intensify your contacts?

[Kovac] I made use of each contact to acquaint people with Slovakia and its policy. During my conversation with President Mitterrand, I expressed my delight that he has accepted my invitation to visit in September. He confirmed that he will come to visit because he realizes that it is necessary to support the Slovak Republic's democratic forces. Britain's Queen Elizabeth II, the Canadian prime minister, and others also spoke positively about Slovakia.

[Rusko] In the televised relay from the royal yacht Britannia, we saw you talking with President Bill Clinton. During the voyage, did you also have an opportunity to discuss your forthcoming visit to the United States?

[Kovac] Yes, I informed Mr. Clinton that President Goncz and I will be receiving an award in the United States from the Institute for East-West Studies in New York and that we will be in the United States at the end of June. He promised that he would find time for us. We also discussed our domestic political situation. He is also among those who have noticed certain changes, and he spoke about them with understanding. He expressed his conviction that we will continue to bolster domestic political stability and carry on in our course of transformation.

[Rusko] You saw how the commemorations held to mark the 50th anniversary of the Allied landings were organized. What is your view, on the basis of this experience, of the coming 50th anniversary commemorations of the Slovak National Uprising?

[Kovac] I also observed everything from the point of view that I am the main host and that it is very much up to me to ensure that it all turns out well. I think that something of what we have seen here could also be implemented in the scenario for our commemorations. I realized that we have a unique opportunity to present Slovakia in a favorable light.

Meciar Explains Late Charges Against Kovac

AU1306175694 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Replies by Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, to questions from PRAVDA correspondent Marian Lesko during the "Thirteen Plus One Debate" organized by the weekly SLOBODNY PIATOK in Bratislava on 8 June: "I Envy You for Knowing What I Know"]

[Text] The guest of yesterday's "Thirteen Plus One" event, which was organized by the weekly SLOBODNY PIATOK [FREE FRIDAY] by the Danube, was Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and deputy to the National Council of the Slovak Republic. During the debate, the PRAVDA correspondent asked him the following questions:

[Lesko] Mr. Deputy, there have not been many opportunities to meet you since March; therefore, I would like to return to some older affairs. In the television program "Kroky" [Steps] about two months ago, you said that the fundamental change of your stand on the Tatragate affair [involving the alleged "sale" of the right to commercial use of the Tatra mountains to a U.S. company] was linked to a certain document you had obtained only a few weeks before and that you did not have at your disposal earlier. I would like to ask you what kind of document this is and why it has not been published to date. And now my second question: At about this time last year, [Deputy Prime Minister] Mr. Roman Kovac said under the chestnut trees [in the garden of the Slovak Government building in Bratislava] that he had received some $5 million. How is it possible that you did not file a lawsuit against him at that time, and how is it possible that he kept executing the post of deputy prime minister for a few more months?

[Meciar] It is fairly easy to respond to the first question. We discussed in the government a report on a trip to the United States by [then Deputy Prime Minister] Mr. Kucerak, [then Finance Minister and present president] Mr. Kovac, Mr. Rakicky, and perhaps there was also a fourth member of the delegation. We approved that report and considered the matter closed. We did not know at that time that there existed yet another signed document. Subsequently, a commission of the National Council carried out an inquiry, but, as you know, the commission of inquiry was practically recalled before it reached any conclusions. The commission was chaired by a Green Party deputy, whose name was Huba. This commission never completed its work. After we went over to the opposition, one citizen came to see me and brought a copy of documents that he called the fourth part and that carried the signatures of Mr. Kucerak, Mr. Kovac, and Mr. Rakicky and showed that an agreement had been concluded in the United States. I then had a talk with Mr. Rakicky, in which he confirmed this act, when it happened, and under what circumstances. I was not the only person before whom Mr. Rakicky confirmed this. Even before that, he had confirmed it to another member of my government. I therefore believe that these matters have been proved and that parliament should take them and investigate them.

As far as Mr. Roman Kovac is concerned, the situation was somewhat more complicated. He really admitted this fact [the acceptance of a $5-million bribe]. Quite a few of us were present when he said it, and we remember it well. Should it be necessary to remind him, we will do so one more time. As for the conclusions, what options and possible solutions were open to me? The option of asking the president of the Republic to recall him was not feasible. At that time, the president had already considered Roman Kovac as my successor for the post of prime minister. The option of asking parliament to pass a vote of no confidence in him was equally unfeasible because some [HZDS] deputies from Zilina district had already announced that, should anything be done to remove Kovac, they would leave the [HZDS] club of deputies. The third option, that of filing criminal charges, was also unfeasible because Roman Kovac, in his capacity as deputy to the Federal Assembly, enjoyed immunity and there was no one to strip him of this immunity. There was an analogous case involving Duray; the Mandate and Immunity Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic declared that it did not have the authority to strip him of immunity. We therefore thought we would drop Roman Kovac from the government in the process of concluding a coalition agreement with the Slovak National Party. This resulted in a very strong internal misunderstanding, with Keltosova, Gasparovic, Roman Kovacj, and me present. Following talks with the president, it was impossible at that time to put forward a proposal that Roman Kovac be recalled. I more or less announced to Kovac that he could not be in the government and called upon him to resign from the government, which he did not do. At that time, he had simply already worked differently, and the alliances were different. You know well that, from approximately March 1993, there were efforts on the part of the Castle to recall my government, and, from approximately August, the president was proposing Roman Kovac for my post to HZDS and National Council functionaries. This was announced to me personally. That was simply the limit, and nothing could be done at that moment. That is why we did what we did. By making it possible for him in that television program to sue me, I actually gave him the chance to clear his name. This was also discussed in the National Council, which is easier for him than to prove now that I was not speaking the truth. [sentence as published] If what I said was not the truth.

[Lesko] Judging from what you said, everything you know about Tatragate has been actually known to you since 1991. You have had plenty of opportunities since then to present your new standpoint and did not have to wait until March 1994. As for the second case, if you really lost trust in Roman Kovac in the summer of 1993, why did the HZDS authorize him to conduct coalition talks with the Slovak National Party, which, as is well known, took place in September and October 1993? He must have enjoyed your trust; otherwise, he would have scarcely been authorized to conduct these talks on behalf of the HZDS....

[Meciar] Regarding the first question, I envy you for knowing what I know. These documents were not known to me in 1991. There were two agreements. The first, which was known to me, was acknowledged by the government. The second was not known to me. As for the talks with the Slovak National Party, it is true that they were conducted also by Roman Kovac. But they were conducted also by Ivan Gasparovic and me. The conclusions from the talks were made by me. Roman Kovac was responsible only for the final legal formulation, or, to be more accurate, it was done in his office because there was a meeting in mine. He was not the only person present at these talks, in which there were many other participants. You know that the talks with the Slovak National Party were very complicated and took place concurrently along several lines. Apart from talks with [then Slovak National Party Chairman Ludovit] Cernak, there were also talks with a number of other Slovak National Party functionaries.

Moravcik Discusses Elections, Liberalism

AU1306160294 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 6 Jun 94 p 9

[Interview with Prime Minister Josef Moravcik by Alena Melicharkova; place and date not given: "I Am Not at All Afraid of Elections"]

[Excerpt] The final deadline for parties and movements to decide whether they will run in the elections independently, in a coalition, or on the slate of a stronger party is drawing near. Representatives of the Democratic Union announced some time ago that they would run independently. This will be no easy test for them. We talked to Jozef Moravcik, chairman of the Democratic Union and prime minister, about this difficulty and other issues.

[Melicharkova] After our interview several months ago, you said in a certain context that you were not afraid of anything. Are you not afraid of the coming elections and their results? When you look at the results of the current public opinion polls....

[Moravcik] I am not at all afraid of the elections. To run in the elections, you need determination, above all. We have enough determination and the needed amount of self-confidence to run in the elections. We are trying to draft a very serious program that will be convincing—that is, we are creating the conditions for obtaining positive results in the elections. What is important is that we perform our duties well in order to convince the people that this style of government and politics, above all, are viable and capable of solving long-term problems of development in Slovakia. The current public opinion polls confirm that the coalition that has formed the government could continue. We will try to improve its position.

[Melicharkova] Do you anticipate that this or a similar government coalition could exist after the elections?

[Moravcik] This is one of the alternatives, and, in my opinion, it is quite likely.

[Melicharkova] You intend to present a summary of your government's activity to parliament before the elections. What do you consider to be the greatest success of your government Cabinet?

[Moravcik] We would like to develop in the economic field some activities that would stimulate development, which means outweighing a certain restriction that we have to impose in the state budget. This restriction is inevitable but should be counterbalanced by development stimuli. This is what we want to secure in the period before the elections.

[Melicharkova] The coalition government is a very interesting compromise, and its seems to be a good one for Slovakia. On the other hand, this coalition is very fragile. The most interesting solutions are reportedly reached during strong differences of opinion. Have you ever experienced a tough conflict or difference of opinion in your government?

[Moravcik] We cannot speak of conflicts. A difference of opinion is very natural and happens very often. It is quite a usual working method and a usual way of solving problems. From this point of view, everything is all right. Regarding the basic problem, I believe this coalition is less fragile than the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] was. The HZDS was unable to retain its compactness. It was unable to keep its election results. I am convinced that this coalition is stronger and capable of exercising its power in the period for which it has received a mandate or in the period for which it could possibly receive a mandate after the elections.

[Melicharkova] It is often said that you have a calming effect on people. Was this not your main trait that you used to appeal to the people? Public opinion polls show that you are catching up with your predecessor. Or is there another reason for that?

[Moravcik] Personally, I have never analyzed this problem, so I will leave it up to the people. Maybe everything you said plays a part. I believe that the Slovak electorate is very rational and can very well express or reflect values that are important for Slovakia in this or that period. Maybe in this very period it is important to be able to calm the public and introduce a certain amount of discretion into decisionmaking.

[Melicharkova] One of our readers says that you are an artist when it comes to diplomatic answers. According to her, you can speak for a long time and say nothing. Why do politicians give diplomatic answers from time to time?

[Moravcik] I only speak exceptionally for a long time. I always try to say what is essential.

[Melicharkova] The Democratic Union wants to be a liberal party, but, in our part of the world, it has not been clearly explained yet what liberalism actually is. At a conference in the United States not so long ago, J. Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, defined liberalism as being very dangerous. What is liberalism, which the Democratic Union, of which you are the chairman, is going to push for?

[Moravcik] Liberalism is a basic orientation. We are interested in establishing a skeleton program for the development of Slovakia in which the basic ideas of liberalism would be used. Many publications and books have been written about the essence of liberalism. Liberalism emphasizes human values, human beings, and their responsibility. Liberal policy is also oriented that way. If we speak about economy, this policy is based on individual initiative, which means private ownership and emphasis on the responsibility of the individual not only in the sphere of economy but also in other spheres. For example, in the social sphere, liberalism prefers activities of the nongovernmental sector, various foundations, and similar organizations to the paternalism of the state, even if some paternalism cannot be avoided. Our intention is to create conditions for the people to be able to solve basic problems themselves, while the state should intervene where people are unable to solve these problems by their own activities or through institutions under civil law. This policy, in which the individual and his development have a central place, is based on support for education because education and cultural development, in fact, intensify the significance of the individual in society. Those are, in a certain sense, basic directions.

[Melicharkova] When you speak about the responsibility of the individual, what is the responsibility of the politician according to this philosophy?

[Moravcik] He secures the execution of the political power, state power, in a direction that makes it possible to develop society's mechanisms on these principles. This means that a liberal politician, above all, has to make it possible for the people to be able to secure the development of their own character and thus the development of society as a whole.

[Melicharkova] Governments are either successful or unsuccessful according to the extent to which they are able to secure economic development, which is closely linked to cooperation with economic experts. Whom do you consider to be the top expert in Slovakia? If we look at the Czech Republic, the country is swarming with economists. What is your opinion of Prime Minister Klaus's policy in that respect?

[Moravcik] Regarding your question on whom I consider to be the best economist...? I am a proponent of teamwork. I do not see any prominent person in Slovakia whom I could describe in that way. However, we have a lot of wise and competent experts, many of whom have a good chance of becoming good politicians. Regarding Mr. Klaus, I highly respect him as a politician. Above all, I appreciate his ability to make an unequivocal analysis that enables him to pinpoint and describe the essence of the matter very quickly and make a decision. Then there is the consistency in his policy. Despite the fact that I do not always agree with him politically, I have to respect the methods he is using.

[Melicharkova] My previous question was also linked to the question of who would be a better prime minister, an economist or a lawyer.... Do you see any advantages in the prime minister being a professional?

[Moravcik] This can have certain advantages. However, a politician should be universal—that is, the said criteria are only auxiliary. Of course, it depends on the function. You mentioned the function of prime minister: Here, universality is very important. The experience he acquires during his studies, as well as practical experience later on, is very important. However, professional orientation is only an auxiliary aspect. [passage omitted]

Hungary To Alter Attitude on Ethnic Minority

AU1006154194 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Jun 94 p 2

[Article by "jl": "Relations With Slovakia Are a Priority"]

[Text] Bratislava—The new Hungarian Government will not be the government of 15 million Hungarians but the government of the 10.5 million citizens of Hungary, Imre Szekeres, executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], declared at a meeting organized by the Sandor Marai Foundation in Bratislava yesterday.

Szekeres and Balint Magyar, head of the election campaign team of the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats, were speaking about the probable future Hungarian coalition government of Socialists and Liberals. They stressed that they ascribe priority significance to the settlement of relations with Slovakia. The coalition government will look after the fate of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, but in a style different from that of the present government—without interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, pragmatically, so that these relations with the minorities become a factor of enhancement of trust.

Imre Szekeres was received yesterday by Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik. The Hungarian politician informed him that the new Hungarian prime minister, who will probably submit the new government's policy statement to parliament toward the end of this month, will wish to meet him within the shortest possible time. He also said that talks on the drafting of a basic treaty on relations between Slovakia and Hungary, which would contain guarantees of present borders and of the rights of ethnic minorities in both states, should start as soon as possible.

Szekeres also held talks with Peter Weiss, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and chairman of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], with whom he discussed, among other issues, the possibilities of future cooperation between the SDL and the MSZP. The Hungarian politician also met with Jaroslav Volf, chairman of the Social Democratic Party in Slovakia.

Duray Views Cabinet Ties, Hungarian Coalition

AU1306205194 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Jun 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement, by Jana Pankovcinova; place and date not given: "We Would Be Glad If We Could Support the Government"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Pankovcinova] In explaining why he abstained during the vote on the signpost law, Coexistence Deputy M. Feher argued that, after the incorporation of proposals for changes, the government bill was undemocratic. Do you agree with him? Does it mean that the other Coexistence deputies, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] deputies, and deputies of the government coalition parties voted for an undemocratic law?

[Duray] Unfortunately, Deputy Feher is right in that, had this draft been adopted, the law would have been discriminatory and restrictive. I can only express pleasure at the fact that it was not adopted. I agree with Interior Minister Pittner in that this problem must be addressed also in order to demonstrate to the European public that this petty issue will not be the stumbling block of democracy in Slovakia.

[Pankovcinova] All of the MKDH deputies voted for this law. The MKDH is your coalition partner, and, in the coalition agreement, you had agreed to vote unanimously in the National Council of the Slovak Republic on issues pertaining to minorities. In the case of the signpost law, this did not happen. Will this disrupt coalition relations between your two parties?

[Duray] We are going to hold consultations on this issue, and there could be a sharp exchange of opinions. However, this does not affect the substance of our cooperation.

[Pankovcinova] Why have you not yet signed a preelection coalition treaty with the MKDH, the signing of which you had heralded to reporters two weeks ago?

[Duray] The treaty is 90-percent ready. Only the final provisions remain to be drafted, the wording of which depends on whether there will be an agreement on a three-member coalition comprising also the Hungarian Civic Party [MOS]. Once we agree that a tight three-member coalition (which means conditions such as a joint club of deputies, joint course of action in communal elections, and joint representation of our voters' interests abroad) is acceptable to the MKDH, the treaty can be signed in a short time.

[Pankovcinova] According to the MKDH chairman, however, this is not acceptable. Will you sign a treaty on a two-member coalition, then?

[Duray] The treaty is ready, except for the final provisions.

[Pankovcinova] What is the Coexistence Movement's attitude toward the government coalition? Will you support the government until the last day of the last meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic in this electoral term?

[Duray] We would be glad if we could.

[Pankovcinova] Under which conditions will you support it?

[Duray] At today's meeting of the Coalition Council, we will have talks not only on how to resolve the issue of the signpost law but also on the restructuring of the Ministry of Education. If we come to an agreement, we will support the government.

[Pankovcinova] And what if you do not come to an agreement on the signpost law and a possible deputies' draft of this law does not pass in the National Council of the Slovak Republic?

[Duray] We had agreed with the government even before it was formed under which conditions we would support it. I hope we will not have a reason not to support it.

[Pankovcinova] Let us assume that, at today's meeting of the Coalition Council, you will agree that the deputies' draft of the signpost law will be submitted in the form in which it was approved on 3 June, but without Deputy Kaliska's amendments [under which communities named after important figures of Slovak history should be exempted from the bilingual regime]. Will your deputies vote for such a law?

[Duray] We will propose that the version that was submitted to the National Council of the Slovak Republic by the government be used as the point of departure. Proposals for changes that expand the application of the signpost law are acceptable to us. We will support the proposal, under which it should be possible to designate Ukrainian and Ruthenian communities in these languages on a greater scale as well as the proposal that an exemption [from the provision, under which a minority must constitute at least 20 percent of the population for bilingual signposts to be installed in a community] be granted to communities inhabited by citizens of German nationality. We will support the signpost law in that form.

SDL: HZDS Preparing Anti-Kovac Referendum

AU1306144994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 10 Jun 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "A Four-Leaf Clover Is the Symbol of the Left Choice"]

[Text] Zvolen—The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has received indications that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] is preparing a referendum through which it would like to shorten the current president's term of office. Such an attempt could lead to doubts being cast on Slovakia in the world and to new tension in Slovak society, said P. Weiss, deputy chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] and chairman of the SDL, at a meeting held in Zvolen yesterday with almost 120 town and city mayors from Central Slovakia who were elected on behalf of left-wing oriented parties. Representatives of the election coalition—Deputy Chairman S. Krcho of the Farmers Movement; S. Holes, a member of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia Presidium; NR SR Deputy A. Chlapikova; and others—were also present.

SDL Deputy Chairman D. Dorotin said that the left-wing partners agreed at the Coalition Council on Wednesday, 8 June, to go into the elections under the collective name of "Left Choice" [Lavicova volba], with a program called "Social Democratic and Green Choice for Slovakia," and with a green four-leaf clover as its symbol. The political bodies of these entities have still to approve the proposal.

Foreign Concerns About HZDS Win Highlighted

AU1306150794 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 10 Jun 94 p 2

["(zl)"-signed and TA SR report: "The Christian Democratic Movement Is Intimidating the Voters"]

[Text] Bratislava—At a movement press briefing yesterday, Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], said that, in conversations with him, his foreign partners have expressed the view that, if Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] wins the elections in Slovakia, the process of the Slovak Republic's integration into European structures will be slowed down. In reply to a question from SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA on whether he thinks it is democratic for foreign states to influence Slovak voters, he said that these countries have the right of veto in admitting new members into the European Union and that we cannot prevent them from doing this. In reply to other questions from SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, which has obtained information that government members have increased their salaries without the agreement of parliament, he said that this is not true, and, in reply to a question on whether he thinks it is right that the government has exempted the daily NARODNA OBRODA from tax, he said that he knows nothing about it. He did not rule out the possibility of forming a postelection coalition with the Party of the Democratic Left. He said apropos of the HZDS: "A coalition with Chairman Meciar is not being taken into consideration for the KDH."

Green Party Preparing Congress, Seeking Partner

AU1306141494 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 9 Jun 94 p 3

[TA SR report: "A Realistic Green Philosophy"]

[Text] The Slovak Green Party has been registered under the altered name of Slovak Green Alternative (SZA). The SZA's objective is to constitute the party on a realistic approach to green philosophy, a philosophy that will push for the optimum relationship between Slovakia's economic development and a healthy environment. This is the guarantee for a healthy and also socially secure individual and whole of society. The SZA Preparatory Committee is organizing the party's constituent congress on 18 June in Nitra. A decision will also be made on a coalition partner at the congress. The Preparatory Committee has held informative coalition talks with representatives from the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS). Coalition talks will also be held in the near future with representatives of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia.

Deputies Exempt FNM From Bankruptcy Law

AU1006184494 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "bog, jam": "Deputies Approved Amendment to Referendum Law"]

[Excerpt] Bratislava—[passage omitted] After the lunch break [at the 8 June meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic], parliamentary deputies approved with comments the Statutes of the National Property Fund [FNM] of the Slovak Republic, which define the powers of the FNM Presidium and the FNM Supervisory Board. The approval of new FNM statutes was necessary because the amendment to the law on large-scale privatization from the beginning of this year substantially changes the FNM's legal status. At the same time, the deputies approved an amendment to the law on bankruptcy and settlement, under which the FNM's property is excluded from the law's jurisdiction.

In a secret ballot, the deputies then elected the ninth and last member of the FNM Presidium. It is Emil Hubinak, who had been nominated by the Democratic Union. Blazej Krasnovsky, candidate of the Christian Democratic Movement, was elected chairman of the FNM Supervisory Board, and Gregor Danisovic (candidate of the Party of the Democratic Left) and Jan Lukacik (candidate of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) were elected out of 11 candidates as members of the FNM Supervisory Board.

Schmoegnerova Outlines Macroeconomic Aims

LD1306152994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmoegnerova briefed journalists at a regular news conference about this morning's signing by the representatives of the government and the Slovak National Bank of the letter of intent for the IMF's standby loan. The letter of intent was sent to IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus. The attention of journalists at the brief news conference focused on the commitments arising from this document for Slovakia. Our radio was represented by Ivan Samel.

[begin Schmoegnerova recording] The letter of intent incorporates economic policy intentions for 1994 and 1995, which include a budget deficit of 4 percent for 1994 and a GDP rise of 3 percent for 1995. Our further aim is to hold inflation at 10 percent in 1994 and at 8 percent in 1995. Another of our macroeconomic aims is to maintain the internal convertibility in 1994 and 1995, with the proviso that, by 1 January 1996, we will have prepared a so-called full internal convertibility of the current account of the balance of payments.

Apart from these macroeconomic intentions, or rather the government economic policy aims, the letter of intent also contains measures related to financial policies, the external financial sector, privatization, the financial restructuring of enterprises, and the building up of the financial sector. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Chairman Horn Interviewed on MSZP Goals

LD1406102394

[Editorial Report] Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian at 1920 GMT on 13 June carries an unscheduled 30-minute compilation called "Help Yourself, the West Will Help You Too." The program, which deals with the political and economic conference held in Innsbruck on 11 June, includes a 20-minute exclusive interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP. Jozsef Laszlo hosts the program; the place and date of the interview are not given.

Laszlo outlines the agenda of the Innsbruck conference and introduces its participants. Video clips are shown of Gyula Horn's arrival at the venue; there are extracts from his interview given to Austrian Television. Also shown are an extract from an interview with German politicians Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Rudolf Scharping, who both express their trust in Hungarian democracy and Gyula Horn's premiership.

The interview with Gyula Horn follows next. Horn reiterates his criticism—outlined at the Innsbruck conference—of the European Union, EU, for not having concrete programs on cooperation with the Visegrad countries. He repeats his arguments in favor of an urgent change. He confirms Hungary's readiness to repay its debts and urges the EU to draw up a timetable for Hungary's process of joining the EU.

Horn also confirms the three main elements of the MSZP's foreign policy. Asked about relations with Hungary's neighbors, he says:

"There is a basic treaty with Ukraine, as well as an agreement of about 20 pages on cooperation in minority matters. I have to say that the question of whether the Ukrainian side indeed observes the agreement also has to be examined, since there have been reports that this is not happening exactly the way it should."

Horn adds: "There have been problems in its implementation, and what is happening is not exactly what had been promised by the other side, in Kiev."

Horn is then asked about relations with Slovakia. He replies:

"When I met [Slovak Prime Minister Jozef] Morvacik in Bratislava about one and a half months ago, I said that we should try to free the entire Danube matter—the Gabcikovo matter—from its political overtones and hold substantial talks on it. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the situation they created, which would mean the eventual implementation of variant C. We consider unacceptable any kind of divergence from the water distribution system recommended by the EU, which would be disadvantageous for Hungary. We regard this as a key question, and Moravcik promised that they would revise the decisions, the position, taken by them [Slovakia]."

After further elaborating on the subject, he says:

"As far as the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border is concerned, I do not know whether there is any need for it or not. I am personally convinced that there is no need for it. I have to say—although the reports may be exaggerated, or perhaps they are not well founded—that I have heard a lot of negative things about its activities. However, there are people even within the party who say that this office should be maintained. We will examine this question. We will not make a hasty decision on it."

At the end of the interview Horn outlines the most urgent tasks of the new government: a detailed review of the economy, decisions on the world exhibition and the Gabcikovo project, and solutions to the most serious problems in health service. He says:

"I am convinced, finally, that the Hungarian Government has to prepare an overall program—which should be handed over, first and foremost, to the EU and, in addition, to the United States and Japan as well—that would serve as a basis for Hungarian modernization. I mean complete modernization of the infrastructure, including roads, transport, telecommunication and all large networks in connection with this, since modernization cannot be started without this. And I am thinking of a revision of all the rules, regulations, laws, and decrees that prevent a larger influx of foreign capital into the country."

KDNP Chairman Surjan Views Future of Party

AU1006200794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 10 Jun 94 pp 1,7

[Interview with Laszlo Surjan, chairman of the Christian Democratic People's Party, KDNP, by Jozsef Szabo Bartha; place and date not given: "Surjan: The KDNP Has To Be Reorganized in a Professional Way"]

[Excerpt] [Bartha] [passage omitted] In your view, what are the main tasks of the national meeting convened for 25 June?

[Surjan] Christian ideology and democratic belief do not in themselves make anyone suitable to form or implement a Christian Democratic policy, or to fill the position of party leader. We must do away with the illusions. The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] has to turn into a people's party that has a message for all strata of society. It has to have a powerful economic development and socially committed program for this.

[Bartha] If I am not wrong, you will reorganize the KDNP from top to bottom.

[Surjan] This is inevitable. As a result of the reorganization, we will need an executive chairman—or perhaps a general secretary—who is consistent and implements everything strictly. He has to be given rights that make him into a strong person in the party. I do not consider myself suitable for this position.

[Bartha] It is rumored that you would prefer to see parliamentary group leader Tibor Fuzessy beside yourself as this "force."

[Surjan] I will not talk about personnel issues.

[Bartha] Judging from views arising from party, the KDNP is seeing many conversions.

[Surjan] I do not wish to comment on this, either.

[Bartha] How are you taking the fact that everyone is now blaming the party chairman for everything, for whatever reason?

[Surjan] In politics, thinking about changes of personnel is natural after failures. I believe that this is how it should be. For this reason, the KDNP's leadership and I have also announced that we would hand in our resignations at the extrordinary national convention. The delegates will then decide which leaders' work they will continue to require in the future.

[Bartha] What do you expect? Will you stay?

[Surjan] Similar to the relationship between the president of the republic and the prime minister, the position of a chairman can also exist alongside a strong executive chairman. At least, this is the way I see it. Very many people support me, but quite a few believe that I am responsible for everything. If the party decides that it needs my knowledge, in any position, then I will accept this. If it decides—as was suggested to me by Sandor Keresztes—that I should vest my energies in being a parliamentary deputy, then I will help the new party leadership this way. Providing that this new party leadership does not shift to the right. The fate of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] not only showed that letting down the coalition is cowardice, it also showed that, by shifting to the right of the KDNP's current policy, one falls into an abyss. The MIEP's right-wing policy has minimal support of society, and it is dangerous for the country's future.

[Bartha] As far as we know, Miklos Gaspar, who is said to be one of the leading figures of the radical wing, will also run for the position of chairman.

[Surjan] I have already said that I will not talk about people.

[Bartha] Fuzessy indicated that it would be fortunate if the KDNP was able continue to provide the ambassador to the Vatican. The former prime minister once successfully "exported" the then party chairman, Sandor Keresztes, who had criticized the coalition and had become inconvenient, to this position. Is it possible that you are the next one?

[Surjan] It would be good for Hungary and the new government if the new Vatican ambassador was a Christian democrat. Presumably the coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats will not deny this request. However, I clearly say no to me filling this position. As a matter of fact, I know that Fuzessy was not thinking of me when he talked about this.

[Bartha] There is also talk about setting up a ministry dealing with church affairs, under your leadership.

[Surjan] Ministerial and state secretarial positions can only be filled from within the coalition. At least this is natural. Therefore, this is out of the question in this form. However, if it operates as a non-governmental organization that fulfills concrete tasks then I can easily imagine mainly legally trained Christian Democrats in it—but not me.

[Bartha] Another coalition is also often mentioned, namely that of the future opposition. In the KDNP, many people fear that "the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] still wishes to absorb the KDNP."

[Surjan] Some MDF politicians still consider this as the main goal of their lives. My answer to them and to others: Yes for cooperation, no for fusion. The KDNP will be a constructive opposition party that has its own image and that has goals.

Poll Views Citizens' Hopes for Future

AU1306172294 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 13 Jun 94 p 4

[Report by Geza Lajos Nagy: "Public Opinion Survey of the Hungarian Gallup Institute: What Will the Next Four Years Bring?—The Voters of the Socialist Party Are Most Optimistic"]

[Text] On 28 and 29 May, the Hungarian Gallup Institute carried out a survey of a representative sample of 1,500 people of the adult population on people's expectations regarding the coming four years. At the time of the survey, the victory by the Hungarian Socialist Party in the first round of elections was known, and it seemed very likely that, as a governmental party, the Socialists would have a determining role in the country's life. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the replies show what performance people are expecting of the new government.

The outgoing government "was found wanting" because everyday living conditions and the circumstances determining the narrower and wider scope of life were unfavorable. The country will judge the performance of the government that is being formed and the parties that are setting it up in four years' time. As for the present, all in all, it can be said that the new government is facing serious burdens regarding the population's expectations. Whether it is the macroeconomic conditions, personal living conditions, or issues affecting the political sphere, the majority or people expect as a minimum that the situation will not deteriorate. However, as is shown by a detailed analysis of the data, it is a—realistic or unrealistic—desire of many people for conditions better than the current conditions to emerge.

On the subject of the country's economic situation in the next four years, the population's living standards, the unemployment rate, the level of inflation, the number of poor and rich people, and the financial situation of their own family, some one-tenth of people (7-10 percent) cannot choose between the positive and negative alternatives offered. Almost twice as many or even more people (17-27 percent) cannot or will not express their views on the expected changes of the country's foreign political relations, the political structure, and the freedom of the press in this brief period.

If we only look at people who have an opinion and are willing to express it, we can establish that half (49 percent) of them believe that the country's economic situation "will improve" in the coming four years. More than one-tenth (14 percent) have an opposite view—"it will deteriorate"—and more than one-third (37 percent) believe that the country's economic situation "will remain similar to the current situation." It has to be mentioned here that the surveyed people did not select the two extreme points of the five- point scale of values—"it will improve significantly," and "it will deteriorate significantly." This also applies to the further questions that, at the same time, indicate that the expectations, whether positive or negative, are moderate. Therefore, the public attitude is characterized neither by overt optimism nor by dark pessimism.

The overall picture is less favorable when people talk about the expected living standards of the population. The proportion of those who expect the living standards "to remain similar to the current one" (41 percent) is almost the same as of those who expect improvement (39 percent). One-fifth (20 percent) expect a deterioration of living conditions. Therefore, 10 percent fewer people expect the improvement of living standards than the development of the economy, and 6 percent more people mention their deterioration than economic decline.

As for the financial situation of the families, the proportion of those expecting improvement is even smaller (34 percent) than the proportion of those who expect a positive change in the population's living standards. Half (50 percent) of those who replied do not believe in either a positive or a negative change, and 16 percent believe that the coming four years will bring a negative change in the family's financial situation.

Therefore, the further away we get from the macrosphere and the closer to people's everyday living conditions, the more reserved the expectations become. This is also supported by people's views on the expected level of inflation. According to a relative majority (42 percent), inflation will be higher than the current level in the coming four years, and similar proportions (28 percent) hope that the level of inflation will "decrease" or that it will "remain similar to the current level."

Expectations as regards the economy and unemployment are closely related to each other in people's way of thinking. A relative majority (45 percent) of people believe that the number of unemployed people will decrease in the next four years; according to 23 percent, the situation will be the opposite of this; and according to 32 percent, the number of unemployed will not change. Three times as many (64 percent) of those who believe in economic improvement also believe in the reduction of unemployment, than those (20 percent) who believe in further deterioration of the economy. Conversely, more than half (55 percent) of the latter, and 10 percent of the former believe that the number of the unemployed will exceed the current level in the next four years.

Although these are cutting issues that directly or indirectly affect the everyday conditions, people's views are less determined by their social situation than by their party affiliations. The calculations clearly show this. As an example, let us take the expectations regarding the financial situation of families and inflation. In both cases, positive expectations are more influenced by the fact whether someone had voted for the MSZP or the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] than by the fact that the person is at the top or bottom—as unemployed—of the social hierarchy. This "logic" is valid in all cases. The voters of the Socialists and—although more moderately—of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] expect a better performance in the next four years than the supporters of the Smallholders, Christian Democrats, or the Hungarian Democrats.

The Gallup survey also touched upon the future size of the two opposite ends of society, namely the poor and the rich. The same proportions of people (46 and 47 percent) believe that, in the next four years, there will be more poor and more rich people in the country than currently. However, while one-quarter (26 percent) trust that the number of the poor will decrease and 28 percent believe it likely that the current proportions will remain, 12 percent expect the number of rich people to decrease and 41 percent believe that their number will not change.

Based on the replies given to the two questions, the Gallup prepared an indicator that shows how people see the "movement" of these two social groups in the future. Accordingly, the replies can be placed in three groups. The majority (51 percent) expect the same kind of movement in the two groups, namely either both groups will increase, both will decrease, or neither will change. According to the second group (30 percent), the number of rich people will increase more than that of the poor, and according to the third group (19 percent), the number of the poor will increase more than that of the rich. Regarding the proportions of the latter two groups among the voters of parliamentary parties, it can be established that three times as many MSZP voters and twice as many SZDSZ voters expect the population to become richer than to become poorer (MSZP: rich 44, poor 13 percent; SZDSZ: 28 and 13 percent respectively). As for the voters of the other parties, the proportions of those who expect one or the other group to increase are nearly the same. The voters of the Federation of Young Democrats [Fidesz] are an exception to this: More (22 percent) of them expect the number of poor people to increase than that of the rich (16 percent).

The public opinion survey only touched on the sphere of politics. With the help of a question—that has been asked many times in the past years—it examined where people place Hungary in the dimension of dictatorship and democracy, where they think it stood at the end of the 1980's, and where it will be in four years' time. A nine-point scale was used where a 1 meant that the country's political setup is "dictatorial" and a 9 meant "democratic."

Comparing the results of the survey six months ago—October 1993—with the end of May results, no change can be seen as regards the future. In October 1993, the average for "now" was 5.65, and in May 1994 it was 5.61. Both values indicate that the country's "current" political system is considered to be more democratic than dictatorial. As for the near future, people expected further expansion of democracy at both surveys (October 6.95, May 6.73).

The voters of two parties—the MSZP and the MDF—are worth mentioning whether we are looking at views on the present or the future. As opposed to the stability of views typical of the other parties, the voters of these two parties have a more positive view of the "present" situation than they did six months ago. However, as regards the future, the views of these two groups change in the opposite direction. The expectations of the MDF supporters have become less favorable—7.45 in October and 6.36 in May—and that of the MSZP supporters have become more favorable—it increased from 6.66 to 7.36. Let us also note that the Socialist supporters are the only group whose expectations for the future changed in a positive direction.

People have a less favorable view of the past—the political system of the 1980's—now (4.23) than six months ago (4.78). This applies to all voters, including the Socialists, regardless of the party affiliation. However, it also has to be seen that the views of the Socialist supporters on the 1980's was better both in October (5.45) and in May (4.80), than among the voters of other parties.

The general tendency that the Socialist voters expect more and better in the next four years is also manifest in their views on the freedom of the press. According to 41 percent of the replies, the freedom of the press will increase in the next four years, half (52 percent) do not expect any change, and 7 percent expect it to be reduced. Six out of 10 MSZP voters (59 percent) and four out of 10 SZDSZ or Fidesz voters (44 and 43 percent) expect a positive change in this area. In the other camp, two to three people out of 10 hold this view: 17 percent of MDF voters, 20 percent of Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] voters, and 29 percent of Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] voters.

During the election campaign, the question of how Hungary's foreign relations with the Western and neighboring countries will change was raised many times. The results of the survey show that an absolute or relative majority of people also expect improvement in this area. According to 45 percent of them, the country's Western relations will improve in the next four years, 12 percent believe that they will deteriorate, and four out of 10 people (43 percent) believe that they will not change. As for relations with the neighboring countries, even more people expect positive changes. The view of the absolute majority (54 percent) is that Hungary's relations with the neighboring countries will improve, and 7 percent have an opposite view. According to the rest of the people (39 percent), no change will take place.

Whichever aspect we look at, significantly more Socialist supporters expect positive changes and a better governmental performance than the voters of any other party. This is particularly true for our relations with the neighboring countries. Almost three-quarters (72 percent) of the MSZP voters expect our relations with our neighbors to improve in the next four years compared to now. Some 38 percent of the MDF voters expect the same.

National Security Head Resigns; Successor Named

LD1306173194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] This evening Minister Jerzy Milewski asked President Lech Walesa to release him from the duties of National Defense Committee secretary and the responsibility of heading the National Security Bureau attached to the president's chancellery, which is legally linked to them.

Lech Walesa has accepted the resignation and appointed Henryk Goryszewski to these posts, and simultaneously appointed him also secretary of state in the Chancellery of the President of the Polish Republic.

Background, Comments of New Chief

LD1406093694 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0600 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Yesterday, President Lech Walesa appointed Henryk Goryszewski to the posts of secretary of state and head of the National Security Bureau [BBN]. Earlier, he accepted the resignation of Jerzy Milewski, who has, however, retained his post as deputy defense minister.

Henryk Goryszewski started his political career as a Christian National Union [ZChN] deputy in the first democratically elected Sejm. In Hanna Suchocka's government, he was deputy prime minister as well as ZChN deputy chairman. After the fall of Suchocka's Cabinet, he left the ZChN leadership and retired from political life. Henryk Goryszewski told a reporter from the Polish radio "Signals of the Day" that he does not intend to introduce radical changes at the BBN:

[Begin Goryszewski recording] I have great respect for the achievements of the BBN so far, when the bureau was managed by Minister Milewski. For this reason, it would definitely be premature to talk about any changes in the way the bureau works. Of course, like Minister Milewski, I shall be modifying the ways in which the bureau works, its procedures, when the need for such modification arises. In a way, this will occur in response to changing needs.

I have always attempted to be a flexible politician. People view me as a pragmatist. [end recording]

TV, Defense Ministry Sign Agreement

LD1406101294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0827 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Warsaw, 14 Jun (PAP)—In Warsaw today, National Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk and Wieslaw Walendziak, chairman of Polish Television SA [joint-stock company], signed an agreement on cooperation in the production and broadcasting of television programs on defense and military issues. Military programs are to become more attractive.

Kolodziejczyk told journalists that the agreement will enable the presentation of issues related to the Army "in a flexible way and in response to need, and not according to a rigid schedule." He added: "I think that a battle for television slots is a misunderstanding."

Walendziak explained that military programs will be produced with "technological contribution from the Army". He said: "I am pleased about the agreement because there has been a lot of discussion recently about whether television is willing to cooperate with state institutions. Of course, it is willing, provided these institutions clearly express their expectations. The Ministry of National Defense is the first ministry to say very clearly what hopes it attaches to cooperation with television, and which has not tried to do this in a dictatorial manner," he said.

Liberal, Unionist Integration Problems Aired

PM1306180194 Krakow GAZETA KRAKOWSKA in Polish 7 Jun 94 p 3

[Interview with Donald Tusk, Union of Freedom deputy chairman, by correspondent Katarzyna Janowska; place and date not given]

[Text] [Janowska] Do you believe there is a real chance for a true unification within the Union of Freedom's Krakow organization? After all, it is public knowledge that there is no love lost between the Liberals [Liberal Democratic Congress, KLD] and Unionists [Democratic Union, UD] in Krakow....

[Tusk] If it were just a question of feelings and emotions, my presence here would not change anything at all. You cannot influence the way people feel about one another.

[Janowska] But we are not talking about feelings: We are talking about political facts. As recently as a few weeks ago, UD and KLD activists in Krakow fought each other over the influence each group wanted to wield in local self-government structures over questions of economic policy. Now, with the drafting of the joint list of candidates for positions in local self-government, the UD candidates were forced to give way to the Liberals, which was not conducive to promoting good relations between the two groups.

[Tusk] This phenomenon is not restricted exclusively to Krakow. Problems with integration within the Union of Freedom occur throughout Poland because, as we know, the two groups involved have often followed very different paths. We assumed from the very beginning that, owing to the frequency and intensity of contacts and a different level of conflicts, we would achieve the optimum consensus at the top—that is, in Warsaw—sooner than anywhere else. This assumption has proved correct. On the other hand, sparks tend to fly more often in local circles because of their past experience with local self-government affairs or because of personal considerations. However, I would prefer not to overestimate their significance.

[Janowska] Nevertheless, some local KLD activists claim that, fearing that they might disappear from the political stage, Messrs. Tusk and Bielecki have secured for themselves positions in the larger party.

[Tusk] Of course, you have the right to form any opinion or arrive at any interpretation, especially when it comes to individual motives. However, we are bound by the party discipline, which obliges us to reason and act in unison. During the congress at which we decided on joining forces with UD, there were only a handful of votes—out of the total of 300 delegates—from abstainers or adversaries of the unification proposal. Liberals from all over the country decided to join forces with the Democratic Union and form a single party by a proportion of about 99 to 1. The subsequent presence and active participation of the Liberals during the unification congress confirmed this decision unequivocally.

In addition, Krzysztof Bielecki, who holds the post of a high-ranking bank official in London, did not particularly depend on the outcome of the unification congress. In fact, neither did I—and it could even be said that I lost out by it because I had to give up the attractive position of party chairman in the process.

[Janowska] But, instead, you gained the post of deputy chairman of a larger party, which actually commands seats in parliament.

[Tusk] Even so, I do not automatically gain access to parliament by becoming a member of the Union of Freedom party. I believe that, contrary to the charges that have been brought against me, the conjunction with UD opens up the field for the activity of several thousand activists of the former KLD, who would otherwise have remained on the margins of political life. After all, the Liberals did not have any realistic chances of an independent victory in the local election anywhere apart from the Tri-City [Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot].

[Janowska] Are you not afraid that the unification may increase the already considerable distance between the former KLD's central authorities and its local representatives?

[Tusk] At the moment, my priority is to ensure the effectiveness of Union of Freedom policies rather than the comfortable situation of its members. Anyone who fails to tune in to the theme of our new music—that is, the construction of a new, strong party that will win the coming elections—will lose out in the party contest. Nevertheless, I am still moderately optimistic as regards the future, which also goes for the Krakow troubles. Everybody should be given time to readjust.

[Janowska] Does this end to the rivalry between the activists of the two former parties mean that the KLD will ultimately merge into UD?

[Tusk] I would be happiest if it meant that the former Congress and the former Union merge equally into the Union of Freedom. However, we cannot pretend that things are different from what they really are, and so we must accept that the former UD leaders will continue to play a leading role in places where the former UD was particularly strong. All the same, I do not regard this as a great problem, especially in Krakow, where the former UD circles were more akin to the KLD circles than they were in, say, Warsaw. I am inclined to treat the conjunction of UD and the KLD not as a union between two political parties but as a rapprochement between two separate tendencies that proved capable of pursuing the same philosophy on a number of issues. I trust that there will be no instances, either in Poland at large or, specifically, in Krakow, whereby either of these formerly separate tendencies refuses to participate actively in the life of the new party. On the other hand, it could happen that individual political figures will experience difficulty in carving a place for themselves within that new reality. But that is something that cannot be helped.

[Janowska] How long will we have to wait for the actual, practical unification?

[Tusk] During the unification congress we held in April, we allowed a year for that. The next national congress of the Union of Freedom will be preceded by a truly democratic internal party election. By April of next year, we will be able to say that the intraparty hierarchy has been determined according to the wishes of all Union of Freedom members.

[Janowska] When will the Union of Freedom nominate its presidential candidate? We have already heard certain names being mentioned—such as Jacek Kuron, Leszek Balcerowicz, and Professor Andrzej Zoll.

[Tusk] There is no need to nominate our candidate to the office of president today or even tomorrow. However, the Union of Freedom must begin to get used to the thought that it might be best to name a candidate representing several tendencies. I hope that the all-Poland congress of the Union of Freedom, scheduled for the spring of next year, will mark the moment of the official nomination of our candidate. For the time being, all speculation as to his name must remain just speculation.

Review, Analysis of Coal Companies

94EP0064B Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 20, 15 May 94 p 50

[Article by Aleksander Szpilewicz: "The Coal Companies"]

[Text] A year is about to elapse since the formation of the coal companies. Much indicates that the effects of this measure have been positive so far. The companies group mine clusters by the criterion of contiguity of mining land according to land registers. (In accordance with that criterion, the so-far single-mine autonomous Bogdanka joint-stock company has been established.)

A stronger export standing: It was possible, more so than in the preceding years, to mesh the structural and seasonal slump in domestic sales of coal with a commensurate increase in export shipments, as illustrated by the tabulation below of sales (in millions of metric tons) in the years 1989, 1992, and 1993.

Table 1
Coal Sales in Millions of Metric Tons

	1989	1992	1993
To power plants	57.2	39.0	37.2
To coking plants	21.7	14.4	13.0
To other domestic customers	98.7	54.1	57.2
Exports	28.9	18.7	23.8[1]

[1] plus 1.4 million metric tons from the stocks of Weglokoks

Receiving credit for their coal exports enabled the mines to meet their most urgent obligations and especially to disburse wages. The nightmare of spreading coal dumps vanished. At year's end, the coal-storage areas were empty.

The following coal companies rank foremost among coal exporters (tonnage exported and proportion of exports to total sales in parentheses): Jastrzebie (7.1 million metric tons, 47 percent), Rybnik (4.9 million metric tons, 33 percent), Katowice (4.4 million metric tons, 19 percent), Gliwice (3.9 million metric tons, 22 percent), Ruda (1.5 million metric tons, 11 percent), Bytom (1.4 million metric tons, 10 percent), and Nadwislanska (0.8 million metric tons, 3 percent).

Concentration of mining operations. These operations became less extensive, reflecting a more selective concentration of extraction at mine levels and galleries and assuring a more efficient utilization of machinery and personnel. The overall length of extraction walls dropped to 79 km (compared with 112.4 km in 1989), and the number of active extraction walls dropped to 440 (compared with 640 in 1989). While the volume of extraction was the same as in 1992, employment in mining companies declined by 19,000, and productivity, as measured by the number of metric tons of coal extracted annually per employee, increased by 6 percent and reached 415 metric tons.

The maximum productivity—greater by a factor of 1.5 than the average—was attained by the Lublin Coal Company.

Decline in the real extraction cost of coal. This is due to lower operating expenses (other than wages), which in dollar terms decreased by $2.6 per metric ton, to $14.10 from $16.70—i.e., by 18 percent—compared with the preceding year. Of these expenses (in dollars per metric ton):

- The cost of materials and energy decreased by 10 percent, to $6.20 from $6.80.
- The cost of outside services decreased by three-fifths, to $2.70 from $4.60.
- Depreciation, owing to, among other things, greater sales, decreased by 10 percent, to $1.70 from $1.90.

The expenditures on wages and salaries, on the other hand, increased by $0.30 per metric ton, to $16.2 from $15.9, of which direct wages increased to $11.50 from $11.40 and the cost of fringe benefits to $4.70 from $4.50.

During the year, the value of the dollar rose, and the zloty [Z] was devalued by a factor of 1.3 times. The mean annual currency exchange rate amounted to Z18,300 per dollar, compared with Z13,600 in the preceding year.

Altogether, the real production cost of coal dropped to $31.20 [per metric ton] from $32.60—i.e., by 4 percent.

What problems were encountered by the coal companies during the period in question?

First, there was the price "Rubicon." It was quite explicit, as shown by a comparison of domestic and export prices of coal. In domestic sales, coal prices increased in real terms (by 8 percent after a year) to $29.90 from $27.60 per metric ton, of which, for lump coal, by 13 percent, to $52.50 from $46.40; for coal breeze used by power plants, by 13 percent, to $22.40 from $19.80; and for coking coal, by 18 percent, to $41.20 from $34.80.

As for the export prices, there was a big slump in export sales owing to the decline in the prices of crude petroleum. As a result, in real terms, export prices plummeted by 18 percent, to $30.30 from $36.0 per metric ton, of which the decreases were: for lump coal, by 9 percent, to $58.20 from $62.90; for coal breeze used by power plants, by 27 percent, to $21.6 from $29.60; and for coking coal, by 11 percent, to $33.00 from $37.20.

Viewed in this light, reflections on the so-called import parity have to be qualified. To domestic customers, only lump coal is cheaper (almost $6 per metric ton) than to foreign ones, whereas they have to pay more (almost $1 more per metric ton) for coal breeze and coking coal ($8 more per metric ton) than foreign customers. Thus, on the whole, the average price optained for exported coal has become only slightly higher ($0.40 per metric ton) than the domestic price, while the differences in quality remain considerable. In the preceding year, the situation was much better because then the average price obtained for exported coal was $8.40 per metric ton higher.

These proportions were averaged over the year and do not quite reflect the actual variations. Price movements in the first three quarters of last year were moderate, so most of the increases in domestic prices of coal occurred during the last quarter. That was needed to balance income with expenditures, but it adversely affected the costs of fuel (lump coal, coke), electricity, and heat—hence the increases.

Market capacity. The domestic market for [black] coal is shrinking and will continue to shrink owing to competition by the cheaper brown coal (used by power plants) and the more convenient natural gas used in the households not connected to the heating mains. Each year the gas industry is gaining 200,000 new customers, of which 100,000 are for gas heating of homes.

An export offensive on the West European market might afford us an opportunity. Another, more long-term opportunity is presented by Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic countries. As for overseas markets, freight cost is too high to make exports to them profitable. Last year, imports by the West European countries were about 130 million metric tons, of which 90 million tons were of power coal and 40 million tons of coking coal. That was 17 million tons less than in 1992. Owing to the recession, purchases by power plants declined by about 10 million tons, and by coking plants by about 7 million tons. In that situation, exporters, including Poland, benefited from the withdrawal of Russian coal (12 million tons in 1992) from the market owing to the government-ordered soaring increases in the cost of Russian rail freight. Among coal exporters to the West European market, Poland ranked fourth, with about 18 million metric tons, after South Africa (about 34 million tons), Australia (about 30 million tons), and the United States (about 2 million tons [as published]).

It would be vain to expect a resurgence of coal demand in West Europe, despite the continuing decline in extraction in Great Britain, Germany, and France. It remains for us to continue an obdurate struggle to retain our beachheads in competition with such low-cost "tigers" as, chiefly, South Africa and Australia, not to mention a turnaround toward the "East," considering that, under the barter system, coal and coke, for example, are swappable for Krivoi Rog ore and iron nodules.

Financial performance of the coal companies. The closing balance sheet for last year was somewhat negative (sales declined by $1.60 per metric ton compared with a decline of $5 per ton in 1992), although by December it turned positive (sales increased by $4.80 per ton). Table 2 illustrates the performance of individual coal companies for 1993 as a whole and for December 1993 alone.

Table 2
Financial Performance of Coal Companies in 1993 (in dollars)

	1993	December 1993
Bytom Coal Company	- 2.7	+ 2.7
Ruda Coal Company	- 3.1	+ 4.0
Gliwice Coal Company	+ 1.5	- 1.3
Katowice Mines	+ 0.1	+ 4.7
Nadwislanska Coal Company	- 1.2	+ 3.0
Rybnik Coal Company	- 2.2	+ 2.7
Jastrzebie Coal Company	- 1.6	+ 6.8
Bogdanka, Inc.	0	+ 7.6

The principal wish for the future is that the coal companies improve their performance on their own rather than at the expense of the consumer and the currency devaluation. Miners' jobs depend on this.

ΩGrowth of Organized Crime Fueled by Drug Trade

94P20850A

[Editorial Report] Several recent Polish newspaper items have described and commented on the rise of organized crime in Poland and its involvement in the international narcotics trade.

Criminal Gangs

An editorial in the 28 April Warsaw daily POLSKA ZBROJNA complained of the increasing involvement of organized "gangs" in large-scale auto-theft, money-laundering, and drug-trafficking operations. The paper stated that these criminals, who are reportedly equipped with high-tech communications systems and fast cars that have no trouble in outrunning police cruisers, are able to use the profits from their criminal activities to thwart the criminal justice system: "Even if the police succeed in arresting a member of one of these gangs, highly qualified and generously paid lawyers get him out in 48 hours. Bail is paid immediately. The events described in the press every day confirm the rumors about corruption in the police department, the public prosecutor's office, and the courts." Frequent violent clashes between rival gangs have led the police to predict that "in the next few years, on the streets of our cities, one will be able to see scenes as depicted in the U.S. gangster films of the 1930's."

Polish "Mafia"

A 19 May ZYCIE WARSZAWY article entitled "How a Mafia Is Born" noted that, while Polish authorities reject the use of the term "Mafia" for Polish gangs, there are "well-organized gangs" that control prostitution, extort protection money from legitimate businesses, smuggle drugs on a large scale, and have infiltrated the criminal justice system. According to the Warsaw daily, the three main gangs are named "Pruszkow," "Ozarow," and "Wolomind" after districts of the Polish capital. Increasingly violent "turf" wars are said to have included the use of military.weapons, including hand grenades.

Police Powers Limited

Journalist Ireneusz Krzeminski has traced the rise of organized crime to the limitations placed on police authority and procedures since 1989 by successive democratic governments. Writing in the 8 May RZECZPOSPOLITA, Krzeminski asserted that the new restrictions have demoralized the police and made them reluctant to take action, while, at the same time, emboldening a criminal element used to the harsh repressive measures of the communist regime.

Russian Example

An editorial in the 9 May ZYCIE WARSZAWY warned that the recent experience of Russia demonstrated the dangers inherent in unimpeded growth of organized crime: "We should see what the Mafia has done in Russia, where, in only the past few years, it has become one of the forces controlling the country. Now they are looking toward us as partners. In this context, we should look at the development of organized crime in our country."

Drug Smuggling

Polish criminals have made their country the fourth-largest European producer of illegal amphetamines, behind the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Belgium, according to an article in the 9 May ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Polish amphetamines are reportedly destined primarily for the German and Scandinavian markets. The paper noted that Polish drug dealers had been arrested recently in Berlin for attempting to sell 10 kilograms of Polish-produced amphetamines, worth approximately 144,0O0 German marks.

The 27 April ZYCIE WARSZAWY reported that the largest single seizure of illegal drugs in the history of Britain was made on board a Polish freighter in the harbor of Liverpool. The ship, which was en route from Venezuela to Poland, contained 520 kilograms of "very-high-quality" cocaine, hidden in glue cans. The cocaine was said to have been intended for distribution to West European markets via Poland.

Defense Minister Previews Visit to Washington

AU1406091494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0400 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca is to leave today for an official visit in the United States at the invitation of Defense Secretary William Perry. This is the first visit by a Romanian defense minister to the United States since 1989 and the second in the history of Romanian-U.S. relations after World War II. Tinca made the following exclusive statement to Radio Romania Actualitati correspondent Nicu Popescu:

[Begin Tinca recording] The visit I am to begin today in the United States is a very important one for Romanian-U.S. military relations and the cooperation between the two countries. It would mean a great deal if at least the majority of the goals I set for myself—even if not all of them—could be achieved so that I could return home with the certitude of a genuine progress in the Romanian-U.S. relations.

I hope I will be able to present as convincingly as possible the concrete steps taken by Romania on its way to democratization of Romanian society, the stabilization of the economic situation, and the increasingly dynamic implementation of the economic reform in our country.

I also hope that I will be able to convincingly demonstrate the clear readiness of the Ministry of National Defense in view of carrying out certain specific actions together with the United States and with other countries within the Partnership for Peace initiative, as well as our readiness for Romanian-U.S. cooperation with respect to our efforts to modernize and re-equip the Romanian Armed Forces.

I hope very much that my visit, and the results it will yield, will contribute not solely to the consolidation of our country's internal stability, but also to the strengthening of the feeling of security in our entire region and, why not, in the whole of Europe.

I begin this visit with a very strong sense of responsibility, but also optimism, having in view the United States' increasingly pronounced readiness to further relations with Romania and the consensus existing among our political forces with respect to the importance of Romania's ties with the United States. [end Tinca recording]

Opposition Walks Out of Senate Debate

AU1306202794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Today the Senate passed the final form of Article 2 of the Draft Bill on the Regulation of the Juridical Status of Certain Dwellings Which Became the Property of State by Nationalization. After debates that lasted many hours and after six amendments proposed by the opposition representatives and by the special Senate panel had been rejected, eventually they passed, by ballot, the amendment proposed by Senator Ion Culcea of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania]. In concordance with the text proposed by the senator, Article 2 was adopted in the following wording:

The persons mentioned by Article 1, that is, the former owners or their heirs, are to benefit from restitution in nature in the form of regaining their right to property over the apartments they currently live in as tenants, while for all other apartments they are to be paid damages under the terms of Article 12 of this bill.

Article 2 was passed by only 60 votes in favor, 15 against, and 4 abstentions; that is, the total number of votes was just 79. This happened because before the article was submitted to ballot, the representatives of the opposition, with the exception of the Democratic Party senators, walked out of the hall.

Immediately following this, Senator Alexandru Popoviciof PL-93 [Liberal Party '93] explained their gesture by pointing out that the opposition cannot associate itself to theft and that it decided to definitely withdraw from the discussions on the aforementioned draft bill.

According to our correspondent, Dan Preda, immediately after the opposition senators walked out Omnia Hall [Senate headquarters] they met with representatives of the press. Here is the declaration that was adopted in the end of that meeting and which was sent to us via fax by our correspondent:

Considering the fact that today the parliamentary majority in Senate adopted in principle merely the paying of limited damages for the nationalized dwellings or other dwellings that after 6 March 1945 went into state property under any other form—expropriated, confiscated, or taken by abuse;

—considering that this solution actually represents a second and final nationalization;

—considering that this solution violates Romania's Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights;

—considering that the ruling coalition has rejected all the amendments suggested by the opposition, including the ones adopted by the [Senate] Commission for Public Administration and the Organization of the Territory, as well as other variants to those amendments;

—considering that the ruling majority has not accepted the proposals of the opposition regarding the social protection of the tenants;

—not wishing to be coauthor of such legislative abuse, the signatory parties of the present declaration withdraw for good from the discussions and vote-taking on the draft Bill on the Regulation of the Juridical Status of Certain Dwellings Which Became the Property of State by Nationalization.

The declaration is hand-signed by representatives of the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], the PL-93, and the PNL-CD [National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention].

Croatian President Makes 'Official' Visit

AU1406093694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, and his aides have arrived on the first official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo, as was announced for some time. President Tudjman was met and welcomed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak and Ejup Ganic, president of vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, Sarajevo Mayor Tarif Kupusovic, and other prominent politicians and public dignitaries.

The official Izetbegovic-Tudjman talks and the talks at the level of the delegations of the governments of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia opened in the building of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately after the festive welcome with the highest state honors. After these talks, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, will visit the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia.

Dr. Tudjman's visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo will end early this afternoon with a luncheon that will be hosted in honor of the prominent guest from the Republic of Croatia by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Silajdzic: Control of Borders 'Key to Peace'

AU1306192594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and General Michael Rose, commander of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, held talks in Sarajevo today on the possibilities of reaching a political solution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the situation on the lines of separation. After the meeting, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic told journalists that we cannot expect a complete peace in our country as long as the borders with Serbia and Montenegro are open. Until control is established over these borders, we will not have peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, our prime minister pointed out among other things. Mirela Hukovic has the details:

[Begin Hukovic recording] After their meeting today, Gen. Rose and Haris Silajdzic gave statements for domestic and foreign journalists. Gen. Rose said the following:

[Rose, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I talked with the prime minister about the latest development of events along the lines of separation. I must say that I am encouraged by the development of events. We only had one or two cases of truce violations and that number is not increasing. Recently I visited (?a certain) number of positions in the sensitive regions. I think that it is very calm and I hope that (?it will stay) [word indistinct].

[Silajdzic] [words indistinct] also talked about the solution—a political solution, of course—and I told General Rose again [word indistinct] we cannot expect a complete peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina as long as the borders with Serbia and Montenegro are open. Until control is established over these borders, we will not have peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the regime in Belgrade says—and it does say so—that it has nothing to do with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then why does it not allow these borders to be controlled? (?There is this) Resolution 838, the Security Council resolution, we have to implement that resolution, and then we can begin to seriously talk about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We posed the question again of what to do if representatives of the aggressor (?refuse) any peace solution and whether we shall—as we did after the (?London) conference—say that [words indistinct] or we shall [words indistinct].

(?In my opinion), the international community has several things to chose, from ranging from increasing the sanctions to lifting the embargo [words indistinct] control of borders. I think that the control of the borders with Serbia and Montenegro is the key to peace not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in the entire region. Thank you very much. [end recording]

Serbs See Croat-Muslim Aim To Capture Posavina

LD1306175994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1658 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Brcko, 13 Jun (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croat forces and the Croatian Army shelled Krepsic 10 km west of Brcko at around 1300 today, firing twelve 82 mm mortar shells from the direction of Vucilovac, the press center in Brcko said today. Croatian forces opened strong infantry fire on Covic Polje 8 km southwest of Orasje from the direction of Matici at around 0900 this morning.

The republic of Srpska army units did not respond because the attacks had no serious consequences. Muslim forces also launched attacks on the southwestern part of the Brcko front, targeting Serbian positions but also without consequences for the Serbian side which did not respond.

According to Serbian military sources, the attacks indicate that the Croatian and Muslim forces have no intention of halting their operations against the Serbian defense lines in Posavina, and that in this way they will try to create conditions to realize the goal for which they have been massing troops in the area over the last few months—to capture Posavina and link Croatian and Muslim territories through this area.

Bosnian Croats, Muslims Violate Latest Truce

LD1306130294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1236 GMT 13 Jun 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Zvornik, June 13 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Croats and Muslims continue violating the latest truce by repeatedly attacking the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic, Bosnian Serb military sources said on Monday [13 June]. The truce was signed by the Bosnian belligerents in Geneva last week and came into effect at noon on Friday. The same sources told TANJUG's reporter that the Croats had stepped up attacks in northern Bosnia and that Muslim provocations had been reported in many areas.

Bosnian Croat forces and regular army troops of neighbouring Croatia continuously opened fire from small arms along the entire line of separation in the area of Orasje, a Croat enclave in northern Bosnia. Croatian artillery also shelled Serb settlements and the town of Brcko. The Serb side lodged a strong protest with the U.N. command and special U.N. envoy Yasushi Akashi, warning them that the attack on the Bosnian Serb Republic from Bosnian and Croatian territory might have serious consequences.

The Muslims were opening fire from small arms and tanks on Serb positions in the areas of Gradacac and Teslic in northern Bosnia. Provocative actions, mostly from snipers, directed against Serb civilian targets on the right bank of the Drina and check points on the line of disengagement were renewed from the U.N.-protected Muslim enclave of Gorazde in eastern Bosnia.

Muslim provocative actions in the areas of Olovo and Kladanj in eastern Bosnia also continued, Bosnian Serb military sources said and added that a part of the Serb municipality of Zvornik had come under Muslim mortar fire.

In Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb military sources reported sporadic Muslim sniper and infantry fire aimed against the Serb sections of Nedzarici and Grbavica, while the suburb of Ilijas was shelled by rifle-grenades.

Preparations for Croat-Muslim Federation

LD1306163994 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Croatian deputies to the assembly of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a delegation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna visited Zagreb over the past weekend and had talks with Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman. The topic of their talks was the establishment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. What are their impressions upon return to Mostar? Zdenko Vranjes has a report:

[Vranjes] The Croat-Bosniak federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to get its government at a session of the constitutive assembly on 22 June in Sarajevo. The constitution is to be changed at that session in order to regulate the constitutional status of mixed cantons in the Neretva river valley and central Bosnia which have been agreed upon in Vienna. These are just some of the next steps to be taken in the pursuance of establishing the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation. In order to provide complete protection of the Croat interests in all this, there should be maximum unity of the Croat deputies ought to exist. It is precisely for this unity that the Herceg-Bosna government assessed their talks with President Tudjman as exceptionally important. What did the Zagreb talks focus on and what are the results of the talks? This is what Ivan Bender, the president of the Chamber of Deputies of the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna, is going to tell us:

[Begin Bender recording] In the beginning it ought to be stressed that this meeting was organized while the delegation of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna was paying a visit to Zagreb on the occasion of Croatia's Statehood Day. Mr. Jadranko Prlic and Pero Markovic, chairman of the executive committee of the Croatian Democratic Union, led the delegation.

A meeting like this one was necessary at this time as it had been felt that there were forces trying to disunite the Croatian deputies in the constitutive assembly in order to achieve their goals—to wreck the continuity of the Croatian policy on the territory of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is interesting to stress that a majority of deputies were in attendance as we had taken all the necessary measures, and within the framework of all this we agreed what has to be done in the forthcoming period: First, we should stress again that the federation and its organization is closely connected with the establishment of the confederation with Croatia. This is a package. Because without the establishment of the confederation there can be no federation. This should be clear to all of us and it should be repeated that this is a package, that is, in practice, a kind of unity about which there should be no discussion on this occasion.

Further, we should stress again, and we will do so in the capacity of deputies at a session of the constituent assembly of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that the bodies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and Bosnia-Herzegovina itself are going to exist until the package which I have mentioned has been established. There can be no talk about the suspension of the government of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, on the contrary it should further be strengthened until the federation and the confederation have been established, i.e. until some other bodies take over responsibilities currently discharged by the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna.

As for the next session of the constituent assembly which is to be held on 22 June, we have reached an agreement that we, within the Croatian Democratic Union, should carry out all the necessary preparations for the election of the government of the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have agreed, as regards the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, actually the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, that the executive committee of the Croatian Democratic Union should prepare concrete solutions as regards the posts of ministers and deputy ministers. [end recording]

Army Generals Meet Rose, View Truce Monitoring

AU1306195694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] As the Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina reports, Generals Rasim Delic and Enver Hadzihasanovic, commander and head of the Supreme Command of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, had talks in the UN base in Visoko today with General Michael Rose, commander of the UN Forces for Bosnia-Herzegovina, about the implementation of the Geneva agreement and the method of monitoring the cease-fire.

During the meeting, the representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented a proposal on the deployment of observers, liaison officers, as well as the way of maintaining mutual communications. It was agreed that in the days to come, heads of headquarters should establish places for deploying observers, as well as other elements significant for monitoring the cease-fire [word indistinct] in the field.

Army General Delic insisted that elements for monitoring the cease-fire with the Serbian aggressors side should be established in the same way and that UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] should urgently take more efficient measures to stop attacks at the protected zone of Bihac, as well as to return the population to the right bank of the Drina River, that is, to the protected zone of Gorazde.

The (?system of) maintaining the truce on the entire battlefield of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be monitored in the same way and on the basis of the same criteria, Army General Delic said at the end of the talks today, it has been reported by the Press Center of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

UN Forces Avert 'Clash' Between Refugees, Serbs

AU1306205294 Paris AFP in English 2038 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Sarajevo, June 13 (AFP)—UN troops in the eastern town of Gorazde intervened Monday to avert a clash between 100 Moslem refugees trying to return to their homes and armed Serbs determined to stop them, a UN official said. Around 100 Moslem civilians had crossed to the east bank of the Drina River and were preparing to march on their homes within a UN- designated three-kilometre (two-mile) exclusion zone when 15 armed Serb civilians appeared within the zone, Commander Eric Chaperon said.

A UN peacekeeping patrol intervened rapidly and sent both groups back to their respective zones, Chaperon said. The incident "was settled peacefully, but the problem remains and so could happen again," he said.

Gorazde, designated a "safe area," is home to thousands of refugees who were forced out of their homes and villages in the region in the early stages of the war in 1992. The exclusion zone is off limits to Serb military forces. A truce negotiated last week in Geneva came into effect at midday Friday and is generally holding, according to UN spokesmen.

The planned four-week ceasefire was violated a number of times over the weekend. The latest incident was an attack Sunday by Bosnian Serbs on a British UN patrol comprising two armoured personnel carriers on a frontline near the northern town of Maglaj. There were no casualties in the incident in which 30 machinegun bullets hit one of the the vehicles. The British troops fired back with 80 rounds before withdrawing a short distance.

General Michael Rose, chief of UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, said meanwhile that he was generally encouraged by the decrease in fighting, since "nothing stops immediately." He said he had visited some of the most sensitive frontline areas Sunday and found that things were "fairly quiet."

UNPROFOR Confirms Shelling of Brcko

LD1306203994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2021 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Zagreb, June 13 (TANJUG)—The U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) confirmed on Monday that Moslems and Croats had on Sunday shelled the Serb town of Brcko in the north of war-shattered Bosnia, wounding a number of people. A statement released at the UNPROFOR command in Zagreb, Croatia, said that Brcko had been hit by six shells fired from Bosnian Croat and Moslem positions. Authorities in Brcko said on Sunday that the town had been hit at 12:02 local time (10:02 G.M.T.) by eight shells fired from 128-mm multiple rocket launchers, and that six people had been wounded—five civilians, a child among them, and a soldier.

The attack was on Monday condemned also by U.N. envoy to former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi as a violation of the ceasefire agreement signed at Geneva on June 8, all the worse for endangering the lives of Brcko's civilians. Akashi said that the shells appeared to have been fired from Orasje in northern Bosnia, where Bosnian Croat and Moslem troops were now deployed. Representatives of the Moslem-Croat federation and Bosnian Serbs undertook under the terms of the truce, which took force at noon on Friday, to refrain from offensive operations for the period of one month.

Seven people have died and 46 have been wounded in the eight artillery attacks on Brcko in the last month, launched in an effort to cut off a corridor which links the eastern and western parts of the Bosnian Serb republic and which is at its narrowest at Brcko.

Russian Pilots Defect From Serbs to Bosnian Army

AU1406073594 Paris AFP in English 0439 GMT 14 Jun 94

[By Michel Moutot]

[Text] Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, June 14 (AFP)—Two Russian helicopter pilots serving with the Bosnian Serbs have defected to the mainly Moslem Bosnian army, bringing their helicopter with them. In the first defection of its kind since fighting began in Bosnia over two years ago, the two pilots landed here near the headquarters of the Bosnian army's Third Corps last Wednesday at 3:00 pm (1500 GMT), according to a senior officer who wished to remain anonymous.

Their Russian MI-17 "HIP" helicopter, painted in the Bosnian Serb colours of red-blue-white, was quickly repainted in Bosnian army colours and is still making test flights at a Zenica barracks. An AFP journalist saw it in flight, two days after its arrival. The story was confirmed to AFP by western military sources in the sector. The motive of the defectors remains unknown.

An officer at the barracks, speaking to two western journalists Monday morning, confirmed the presence of the two Russians but said it was "impossible to see them or speak to them without the agreement of the Third Corps command." The corp's press service refused to confirm or deny the story and said the command was not informed about the affair.

Another Bosnian Army officer said the two Russians did not plan to stay and fight with the mainly Moslem army, which in any case "needs arms rather than men to defend itself." He said the two had brought "presents to prove their good intentions," but did not specify what the gifts were.

The MI-17 is a heavy transport or assault helicopter, a valuable catch for the badly equipped Bosnian airforce. A western military source said the pilots—whose motives for defecting were not revealed—arrived from the east, apparently from Serb lines in the Mount Vlasic area. They first flew over the outskirts of Zenica for a long time, probably to allow time to negotiate their defection over the radio, he said.

There have been many cases of Russian soldiers fighting alongside Bosnian Serb forces, either as mercenaries or sympathisers. On May 5 IZVESTIYA interviewed a Russian mercenary who said he had served for three years in Bosnia for 200 deutschmarks (120 dollars) per month.

Two Civilians Wounded in Muslim Attack on Teslic

LD1406104394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1003 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Excerpt] Doboj, 14 Jun (TANJUG)—Muslim forces have been active on all battlefields in the Doboj area, the information service of the republic of Srpska army's 1st Krajina Corps said today. Muslims fired several artillery shells on Teslic from the direction of Tesanj. Two civilians were injured in the attack and material damage was caused. [passage omitted]

Tuzla Defended by Civilian Volunteers

94BA0303B Trieste REPUBLIKA in Slovene 21 May 94 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Partisan Townspeople Are Fighting Against the Regular Serbian Army"]

[Text] Tuzla—They are professors, students, workers, and farmers. They are all dressed in the same uniforms, their shirts are usually "civilian," and they wear handknit sweaters—probably made by their mothers or wives. Those Muslim fighters want to return to their families as soon as possible. Although they rarely talk about revenge, they reject any negotiations that would take away their land and houses. The commander of the Blue Helmets in Sarajevo, Andre Soubirou, recently described the Muslim fighters as "an army of townspeople, partisans," who are fighting against "Serbian professional soldiers." "It is the armed populace, as Tito envisioned and wanted it," stated a certain military member of the UN Protection Forces.

Thirty-two-year-old Kemal Hodzic was a driver before the outbreak of the war, and now he commands a company on Mount Kocar, which lies southeast of Tuzla, where the Muslim units carried out a lightning offensive. He is from Bratunac, a village approximately 30 kilometers away, which was "cleansed" by the Serbs in May 1992. His mother and father were murdered by the Serbs, and his wife and 10-year-old daughter fled to Tuzla. Soldier Rafa Dzufic is fighting on the first front line near Tuzla, in the vicinity of the strategic corridor near Brcko. The ruins of his house are only about 200 meters away; he returned from Austria "to defend his family and relatives." Twenty-nine-year-old Nadja Otici from Brcko can only observe the fields and roofs of his birthplace from a distance. He does not hide his feelings. The front line is at the end of a valley, and for more than a year he has not had any news about his family. Hakia Hodzik, likewise 29 years old, was an officer in the former Yugoslav Army. Now he commands the First Muslim Brigade on Mount Podrina, and he also conducted an offensive near Kladanj. Like all the others, he is also a volunteer, who fled from the valley along the

Drina together with his fellow townsmen before the Serbian ethnic cleansing. One of his soldiers acknowledges: "We will fight to the last man. We want our land back. We will stop only when the bank of the Drina is ours again." The Drina marks the border between Bosnia and Serbia, and all the Muslims have been driven out of the villages that lie along the river. The area is now in Serbian hands, and the self-styled republic of Srpska is not prepared to give it back.

"We will not accept any diplomatic solution that will dictate to us that we have to give up our land," Kemal says. He resolutely adds: "We will remain armed and we will fight." His fellow fighters also agree with him; they reject the politicians' attempts to persuade them to accept a "realistic" solution. The commanders of the units in this area complain that they do not have modern weaponry, with which they could have saved many of their fighters' lives. They can only attack the armored Serbian units with obsolete antitank shells. Farmers usually bring them food and ammunition with teams of horses.

"Every four days we get a loaf of white bread, and otherwise we only eat black bread," said a gaunt soldier who is no more than 20 years old. He interrupted his studies during the Bosnian war, but he hopes that he will someday become a machinery engineer.

Views of Bosnian Serbs Opposing Karadzic

94BA0294B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 94 pp 12-14

[Interview with Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, by Svetlana Vasovic-Mekina; place and date not given: "City-Dwellers and Mountain-Dwellers"]

[Text] *What the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now launching are campaigns in an attempt to defend an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina by cutting off the corridor, which would force Karadzic to sit down at the negotiating table.*

Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Miro Lazovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, as representatives of the Serbs in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, recently returned, via Ljubljana, from an official visit to Moscow where they met with Vitaliy Churkin and top-ranking representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.

[Vasovic-Mekina] Whom do you actually represent?

[Pejanovic] After the first multiparty elections in Bosnia, the victorious parties arrogated the right (and the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] institutionalized this in particular) to represent all of their own nation. This is a dangerous formula of "representation," both for the nation and for democracy, because a nation can never be represented by just one political party if we want to have a multiparty system. As far as the Serbian Civic Council is concerned, it was formed by an assembly of citizens of Serb nationality who live in free territory, territory under the control of the government and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We stand for those citizens. Accordingly, through the Serbian Civic Council we do not represent, but rather stand for, those citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina (around 200,000 of them) who both before and during the war were and remained in favor of coexistence with Muslims and Croats, in favor of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and equality of the nations. I am chairman of the Serbian Civic Council and a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, while Lazovic is the president of parliament and a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina War Presidency.

[Vasovic-Mekina] Is it not paradoxical that on the one hand you, as representatives of civic parties, oppose blocs of expressly nationalistic parties while on the other hand you stand for Serbs?

[Pejanovic] In our case, by organizing citizens of Serb nationality an association of citizens was created, which is not a party organization.

[Lazovic] It is not our ambition to replace the SDS as a national party. Over the course of the peace process that has been going on for two years now, it has been necessary to oppose Karadzic's and Milosevic's policy so that the world will finally realize that they cannot speak on behalf of all Serbs. We continue to stand for the civic option and believe that Bosnia-Herzegovina as a civic state is the best solution for all its citizens, including the Serbs.

[Vasovic-Mekina] As representatives of a portion of Bosnian Serbs, what do you think of the policy of other Bosnian Serbs being represented by Radovan Karadzic?

[Lazovic] The idea that he represents all Bosnian Serbs has been taking shape for a long time, as if there is not a single Serb opposed to his political option. If that were the case, Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been partitioned long ago.

[Pejanovic] One of the reasons for our public actions is to remove the collective burden that Karadzic's and Milosevic's policy has placed on the shoulders of the Serb nation. We believe that the Belgrade regime and the exponent of that regime in Pale bear the blame for what has happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and that the Serb nation on the whole did not want war, at least not the percentage of it claimed by Karadzic, so that this was the best way for Serbs themselves, within their own nation, to oppose the expansionist, greater-state policy of Slobodan Milosevic. On the other hand, we want to show the world community that an enormous percentage of the Serbs living on free territory do not support Karadzic's policy, and that an enormous number of Bosnian Serbs have fled territory controlled by Karadzic and his exponents, not wanting to take part in a war against their state and neighbors. Indeed, the figures put Karadzic against a wall—right now 40 to 45 percent of the Serbs who lived in the territory that he controls are unavailable to him. And even of that 45 percent, an enormous number does not support his policy, but since a regime of coercion and totalitarianism is in control there, it appears that all those Serbs are in favor of his policy. It is not known that an enormous number of them have fled, roaming Europe with Bosnian Croats and Muslims, and that is why it is high time to expose this false image of him and us that has been created in the world. They want to resolve everything through force, through war; true, they are a factor that must be considered in the course of the negotiations, although they can represent only one faction within the Serb nation, the chetnik faction. An enormous number of Serbs are for the civic option, the peace option, not for war. We want these Serbs to be heard.

[Vasovic-Mekina] All the same, it appears that the world media are bashful about devoting attention to you, since you ruin the image that has been created about all Serbs in public opinion. Indeed, it seems that thus far it has not been in the interest of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities to show the world, at the height of the war and shelling of Sarajevo, that there are in fact other kinds of Serbs?

[Pejanovic] Unfortunately, the world media are already accustomed to gauging everything according to national leaders, regardless of what they do.

I think the very worst about politicians who pursue policy through war. We are among the people and public employees who would prefer a thousand times over to talk, not for a single second to wage war.... It is true that the entire European world has accepted the formula that there are three nations, three parties, and three leaders in Bosnia, and that only what they say is important to Europe, so that multiparty life has also been ignored within the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government.

[Vasovic-Mekina] What are the prospects for negotiations with representatives of the same nation, with Karadzic?

[Pejanovic] What is one to think of people who base their policy on God-given, inherited strength? Karadzic gained strength in the form of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], aimed at waging war in the name of Greater Serbian interests. And what is one to think of a policy that uses force to drive people from their age-old homes en masse? What is one to think about a policy that murders people? About a policy that thrives on hatred toward people who belong to another nation or another religion, even though they have lived in this region for centuries in mutual tolerance? Karadzic was not born in Bosnia, he simply completed his schooling and studies in Bosnia. And now he is fighting, with force, for the idea of the impossibility of ethnic mixing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is destroying coexistence by force. That is the Greater Serbian policy that he brought with him from his native Montenegro. It is a policy that separates Serbs from the neighbors with whom they have lived together for centuries, that separates them into national pens, into ethnically pure areas. What does it mean today, at the end of the 20th century, to carry out a policy of ethnic cleansing, genocide, a criminal policy?

[Lazovic] I have participated in all the negotiations in Geneva and Washington. Despite all the efforts to keep everything on a diplomatic and sober level, there were often occasions where we had to react emotionally to their incoherent proposals. For example, their proposal that everything must be divided, meaning that there must be separate roads for Muslims, Croats, and Serbs. The original solution was an intersection—the Serbs take the overpass and the Muslims take the underpass: They presented such absurdities to us in all earnest, with maps and drawings.... To our question about how the citizens of Sarajevo would get to Zenica, Karadzic said, literally: "Dig a tunnel under Kobilja Glava!" which is one of the mountains above Sarajevo. That is very indicative of those who are deciding the fate of the Serb nation in an extremely frivolous and irresponsible way. Milosevic's and Karadzic's policy have forced the Serb nation into a moral, material, and spiritual calamity that the Serb nation never deserved, because never before has it borne the stamp of the aggressor, it has always been the victim.

[Vasovic-Mekina] Does it not seem, ultimately, that this policy of Karadzic and Milosevic has in fact been successful; the world accepts them as parties in the negotiating process?

[Pejanovic] We differ from others in that we believe that people must now secure international guarantees that they can return to their own homes, and that the question of a territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina according to ethnic criteria is criminal. For us, it is not possible to resolve the Bosnia-Herzegovina war drama through military force, but only through political negotiations aimed at stopping the war and all military operations, as well as enemy propaganda, and at making the Serb side accept a formula according to which Bosnia-Herzegovina is a unified state in which the equality of all three nations would be institutionalized through federal institutions. If that is not accepted, the war will simply continue.

[Vasovic-Mekina] How can the war be stopped if now, for example, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government's troops are engaging Karadzic's army and attacking Brcko?

[Lazovic] The position of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is legal, in pursuit of our political goals. On the one hand, we want to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina and block the full reconstitution of any future Serb ethnic state and its connection to Krajina in Croatia, while on the other hand there is the project to realize a Greater Serbia, which would undercut Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state. We advocate a modern, civic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in its territorial borders and believe that that would be most suitable to Bosnian Serbs as well. What the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is now launching are campaigns in an attempt to defend an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina by cutting off the corridor, which would force Karadzic to sit down at the negotiating table....

[Pejanovic] Let us look at the facts—who took the offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina? If it had been the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then we might have controlled 70 or 80 percent of the territory; Karadzic's army would not hold 70 percent of the territory if it had not taken the offensive. Today they are circulating the theory that they are forced to continue fighting because they are facing an offensive by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which they call the Muslim army, which is a profanity. Concretely speaking, the Brcko front serves the purposes of the propaganda war, in a desire to project a continuation of the war. The Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has spent the whole time in a position of defense and resistance, and in that way it has managed to defend some places and regain some of them. The policy of the legal institutions of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to break off military operations and engage in negotiations and the search for political solutions. Our government did everything it could to find a political solution with so-called Herceg-Bosna, i.e., the Croat national corpus, in the form of the Washington agreement. That was not a wonderful solution, holding forth milk and honey, but at least military operations were halted through this constitution of peace. The same thing is sought from the so-called Karadzic side. Instead of that, he offers us an offensive against Gorazde. We have stopped Gorazde, and now Brcko is being opened up as a propaganda ploy.

[Vasovic-Mekina] You said that it is a profanity to call the troops of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government a Muslim army. Besides Kladanj, can you cite any other example where Serbs are fighting on your army's side?

[Lazovic] The Tuzla region is an example of a joint government in power, where people of different nationalities are trying to jointly defend themselves against the greater-state appetites of Karadzic's army. For two years, Serbs in Sarajevo have experienced together with Muslims and Croats all the horrors of the biggest concentration camp maintained by Karadzic's Serbs from the surrounding mountains.

[Pejanovic] The Serb victims of shells in Sarajevo alone are enough to condemn Karadzic as a war criminal. In terms of inhabitants, Sarajevo was the biggest Serb city after Belgrade. And it still is today: Inside it there are still between 60,000 and 70,000 people of Serb nationality. Why is that hushed up in Belgrade, and who will bear responsibility for that?! According to some analyses, more Muslims than Serbs have left Sarajevo. The Serbs are the ones who have remained in Sarajevo in all the structures of life to work and continue fighting, to defy Greater Serbian aggression. By working in joint institutions of government, we have allowed the Serbs to preserve their political and human honor, both in Sarajevo and in Tuzla and the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Lazovic] During the first months of the war, two shells that fell in front of the building where I live and where children were playing killed seven children. Of the seven, five were Serb children. Were these children traitors? The theory that the Serbs who have remained in Bosnian cities are traitors is the fruit of chetnik ideology. In this context, we are traitors: I am personally a traitor to a chetnik ideology, and I will never support a Greater Serbian policy.

[Vasovic-Mekina] Are you not afraid that the Bosnian Government will use you publicly as honorable Serbs and that you could be misused in its political activity?

[Pejanovic] No, because we have always acted in the interest of peace and coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Permit me to turn the question around: What would have happened to the other Serbs if Mr. Lazovic, I, and many other Serbs had not participated in institutions of power and shared responsibility with others for the fate of the state? What would have happened to Serbs in cities and villages all over Bosnia, where even today they live peacefully with their neighbors, if we had not defended our Bosnia? What would have happened, in the end, if we had not opposed the extremists within Bosnian politics, if we had not contributed to seeing to it that Cacina, Jukina, and other paramilitary units were transformed and that control over security was assumed by a professional Bosnia-Herzegovina army and a well-organized police?

[Vasovic-Mekina] You participated in the Washington negotiations, but the Serbs are not included in the current constitution for a new Bosnian federation?

[Lazovic] That is understandable. It is not possible to be constitutive twice—once within Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole (Karadzic's Serbs—author's note) and then again, separately, within the current federation. The Washington agreement is open to everyone. If Karadzic accepts the negotiations, then the Serbs too will gain the same status within an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina as all the other nations. If not, then Serbs in Bosnia, thanks to Karadzic's policy, will in fact become a minority.

[Vasovic-Mekina] What then?

[Lazovic] In that case, we are left with the possibility of fighting for adequate national, but most of all civil and human rights for Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina without the status of a constitutive nation.

[Vasovic-Mekina] What sort of guarantees did Churkin give you in Moscow?

[Pejanovic] We were pleasantly surprised when he confirmed that the entire world is united in the effort to preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Churkin literally told us, let the war stop for one year, even with temporary maps, and that will be enough for the drunkards of war and the extremists to leave their positions.... We presented to Churkin our views, the views of all Serbs who do not agree with Karadzic's policy.

Tudjman Confers With U.S. Ambassador Galbraith

LD1006175794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Jun 94

[Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman today received U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith in the presidential palace. Tudjman informed him about the activities of the Croatian authorities in implementing the Washington agreement, and about his imminent visit to Sarajevo. He particularly stressed that, despite certain rumors in the public, the establishing of the Croat-Muslim federation is closely linked with the setting up of a conferederation with Croatia. Ambassador Galbraith said that the U.S. leadership holds the same stances on that issues.

They also discussed the improved bilateral relations between the two states and specific steps that need to be taken in that sphere. They spoke especially about investments by U.S. firms in the Croatian economy.

Tudjman Receives Herceg-Bosna Delegation

LD1206123594 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 12 Jun 94

[Text] In Zagreb yesterday President Tudjman received the leaderships of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croat deputies from the Constitutional Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated the presidential office on Saturday evening.

The Croatian president and his guests discussed the further implementation of the Washington agreements and confirmed that it was very important to make efforts for implementing the agreement regarding the organization of the B-H Federation and the creation of a confederation with the Republic of Croatia. Undertaking these efforts, the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain united in order to achieve its political aims and the strategic interests of the Croatian state. On this occasion President Tudjman announced his forthcoming visit to Sarajevo in an effort to contribute to the implementation of the Washington agreement.

Last night's meeting was also attended by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Ivan Milas, president of the HDZ deputies' club in the assembly, Ivan Aralica, deputy spokesman of the Chamber of Counties, Ivic Pasalic, HDZ member and the president's internal affairs adviser, and Miomir Zuzul, Croatian Ambassador to the United Nations.

RSK President on Upcoming Talks With Croatia

LD1306150194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1332 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Knin, 13 Jun (TANJUG)—The fact that the Croatian delegation [to negotiations with the Krajina Serbs] accepted Plitvice as a venue for talks on economic cooperation with the Krajina delegation is a kind of recognition of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], said RSK President Milan Martic at a news conference in Knin today.

He said that the protocol for the talks was agreed with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. Krajina official bodies will provide security at the talks. The official Krajina insignia will be displayed in Plitvice except in the conference hall.

A single Croatian journalist will be allowed to attend the talks. This is based on the principle of reciprocity since one Krajina reporter was present at the recent talks in the Russian Embassy in Zagreb.

Asked about the implementation of the Zagreb agreement by the Republic of Croatia, Martic said that he discussed this with Butrus-Ghali's special envoy, Yasushi Akashi, and with UNPROFOR's head of civil affairs in Sector South, Enrico Aguillar. Martic said he was given guarantees that Croatia will implement the provisions of the [Zagreb] agreement before the Plitvice round of talks.

President Martic also commented on the latest statements by Croatian officials about the reintegration of Krajina into Croatia and their threats about a new war. We are closely following the situation and we are ready to respond to a possible Croatian reaction, Martic said, adding that he received guarantees in Geneva that such behavior by Croatia will be rigorously sanctioned by international factors.

The talks in Plitvice will primarily deal with economic issues based on the principle of reciprocity. Certain humanitarian issues should also be discussed, such as pensions blocked by the Republic of Croatia immediately after the outbreak of the war. In the long term there can be no permanent cooperation with Croatia without annulment of UN Security Council resolution 820 which left the Serb nation in the RSK in a specific kind of isolation, Martic said, adding that there can be no political and economic cooperation without the equality of the partners.

Territorial Dispute With Slovenia Viewed

AU1306105394 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 94 p 5

[Article by David M. Fistrovic: "The Croats Are Building on Their Land!"]

[Text] Today, the Croatian metropolis and the first among the Croats will receive the President of the Republic of Slovenia Milan Kucan. The Slovene is coming for the sake of bilateral relations and most probably also to discuss Croat-Slovene border-dispute, nuclear power plant, Ljubljanska Banka, and a series of other unsolved problems burdening relations between the two young countries. He stated for Slovene Television he was meeting the Croatian president to personally protest about the border crossing in Istria, the one in Secovlje. The Croats are allegedly building the border crossing on disputed territory that belongs to Slovenia, and the Slovenes have already filed a protest about it and threatened to strain relations and spread the malice in the media (the Slovene foreign minister had managed to halt the construction of that border crossing once but not for good). The Slovene president will most probably bring up the question of some allegedly Slovene villages on the left bank of the Dragonja (Skodelin, Buzin) which did not participate in the last elections in Slovenia and which raised an incredible amount of dust in Slovensko Primorje. The inhabitants of those villages were not on the election lists and a part of the Slovene press considered this to be a betrayal of national interests. Croatian Istria, keenly interested in the controversial border crossing and the said villages, calmly stood by watching the euphoria on the other side of the Dragonja, expecting Kucan's visit to Croatia, hoping that the Croatian president would tell him how the Istrians feel.

On what grounds and with how much right will Kucan cite some facts from Istria directly to his host? It is more likely that the Slovene will spend more time talking about his (i.e. Slovene) delusions than about actual rights at the delta of the Dragonja and villages like Skodelin and Buzin. Those villages and the Dragonja River are undoubtedly on Croatian territory. The Istrians have known that from time immemorial and it was also recently proved by Ljubo Boban, who has been researching the history and the circumstances of the Croat-Slovene border in Istria after World War II.

What, then, do those new documents say about the land on which Croatia is building one of its most beautiful entrances to Istria and about villages that did not go to latest elections in Slovenia?

Some 20 documents that Boban presented to the Croatian State Commission for Borders give Mr. Tudjman the right to reject all the territorial demands of his guest and ask several very unpleasant questions (about returning land registers which are presently in Piran, moving the Dragonja River, or about the arrogation of the river's delta). The Croat can tell his Slovene counterpart with a clear conscience that, by requesting that Croatia stop working on the border crossing in the Plovanija-Skrile (Secovlje in Slovenian) sector, Slovenia is making direct territorial pretensions toward Croatian territory. And he would be telling the truth.

Skudelin and Buzin—Belong to Croatia

President Tudjman should first study the map from 1945 that his guest will refer to and on the basis of which he claims the disputed area of the Dragonja, saying that Croatia is building a border crossing on the plot of land that belongs to the cadastral municipality of Piran III. The map is a supplement of publication "Cadastre National d'Istrie" [National Land Registry of Istria] that was made in Susak in 1945 to be used at the Paris peace conference. The publication contains all relevant information about the population, the land registry and administrative division in Istria of 1945. The controversial map (drawn by the Adriatic Institute of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences) clearly shows that, in 1945, the land registry borders of the municipalities of Piran (today in Slovenia) and Kastel (today in Croatia) overlapped with the administrative and political border. Already on pages 525-526 of the document the map is attached to, one can see that the map does not correspond to the actual situation. Those pages show that the administrative and political division at the estuary of the Dragonja was different after all: the villages of Buzin, Kaneda, Skudelin, and Veli Malin were registered as belonging to the municipality of Kastel, the district of Buje.

President Tudjman should present some other documents from that period to Kucan, for example the "Administrative and Territorial Division of the District of Buje in 1945," which says that the villages of Skudelin, Veli Malin, Kaneda, and Buzin—on Victory Day on 9 May 1945—belonged to the territory of the Kastel People's Committee. From "Administrative and Territorial Division of the District of Buje of 15 March, 1946," it is obvious that the villages of Skudelin and Buzin belonged to the Local People's Committee Kaldanija, the district of Buje. Furthermore, Kucan should also see "Submission of the District of Buje" of 1946, which says that "the district of Buje stretches between the rivers Mirna and Dragonja and that its eastern border are the villages of Kucibreg and Zavrsje." The document proves that Skudelin, Veli Malin, Kaneda, and Buzin belong to the territory of the People's Committee of Kastel.

Never in Slovenia

In the year 1947, when the peace agreement with Italy was signed and the territory of Free Territory of Trieste (STT) was established, as well as the so called Istrian District composed of two sub-districts Buje and Kopar, the controversial building site also belonged to Croatia. The decision about the establishment of the Istrian District clearly mentions Skudelin and Buzin. The "Administrative and Territorial Division of the District of Buje" for 1947 puts the villages of Molini Scrile (Molini, Skrile), Scodelin (Skudelin), and Canedo (Kaneda) under the People's Committee of Kaldanija; the same document for 1948 again mentions Skudelin (Scodelin) and Buzin (Busin) as parts of the People's Committee of Kastel. The "Background for the Regional Index of the Istrian County of 21 April, 1949" shows that Buzin and Skudelin fall within the territory of the People's Committee of Kastel. Those villages also belong to Croatia in accordance with the decision by the Istrian Regional People's Committee of 12 April, 1952. The decision assigns them to the district of Buje and to the cadastral municipality of Kastel I.

Even when the order by Yugoslav Army Military Administration of 1952 abolished the Istrian County and when, on 7 October, 1954, the area of what used to be known as the STT Zone A was assigned to the civilian administration of the FNRJ [Federal National Republic of Yugoslavia], those villages were in Croatian municipality of Buje. Areas south of the present course of the Dragonja (the so called cadastral municipality of Piran III) were transferred to Croatia. This territory became and integral part of it and it was so noted in all municipal, republic, and former federal regulations. As we can see from all those documents, the territory has never been a part of Slovenia, it has never belonged to the administrative and political unit of Piran, nor to the district of Kopar, and therefore not to Slovenia either.

Groundless Claims

If, in conclusion, we wonder what the dispute is about—as does Ljubo Boban—on what grounds does Slovenia claim the area of the so called cadastral municipality of Piran III, it must be said that those claims are groundless. Croat-Slovene demarcation in that area, from the outset, was not made according to land registry criteria, but on an ethnic basis, always in relation to the Dragonja River. In the world it is normal that such border be also "covered" in the land registry. There is nothing unclear about that.

Furthermore, President Tudjman could ask his eminent visitor when Slovenia intends to return court (land registry) books for the area of the cadastral municipality Piran III? Land registry documentation for that municipality was semi-officially given to the Land Regristy of the Municipality of Buje in 1963, but not the court land registry. It was kept by the court in Piran and those who are not well-versed in the matter use it as an argument claiming that area as Slovene. And when his guest starts telling him to his face everything regarding the Plovanija border crossing and accuses him of sabotaging the agreement on borders in Istria, President Tudjman will, hopefully, have the courage to say: "But Mr. Kucan, those problems have not been solved because of Slovene institutions' blackmail with documentation."

That documentation, according to Boban, must be unconditionally and immediately returned to Croatia.

Moreover, President Tudjman should ask his guest the following question: where is the Dragonja River? For decades this Croatian river has been moved from its bed by Slovenia, which pushes it deeper and deeper into Croatia and then refers to it as the border. The Croats could substantiate that by Italian military maps which clearly show that the bed of the Dragonja was once to the north of the St. Odorika channel in which the Dragonja flows into the sea. Mr. Tudjman could also show Mr. Kucan the map published by the Statistic Office of the Regional People's Committee for Slovensko Primorje and Trieste in 1947. That map also shows the Dragonja in its northern bed.

Planned Moving of the Dragonja

From the landing of the allied forces in Normandy until the present, the course of the Dragonja has always belonged to the municipality of Buje, i.e. to the area that was included in Croatia after 1945. Therefore, the area should not and must not be a matter of agreement, especially as it was an integral part of Croatia at the time it declared its independence in 1991. The history of the area to the north of the St. Odorika channel and the earlier bed of the Dragonja shows that its ownership has become a matter of dispute only recently. In February 1944, according to the agreement between Croat and Slovene partisans, the Dragonja River was marked as a borderline of administrative and territorial demarcation. Some 10 years later, Slovenia started to move the river and create conditions for conquering Croatian territory. Today, it is blindingly obvious that the moving of the course of the Dragonja was planned and that it was moved from its original bed to the bed of the St. Onorika channel in order to get as much of Croatian territory as possible. Such a perfidious moving of borders is not tolerated by any court in the world.

By moving the river, the Republic of Slovenia gained control over the area between the two river beds. Researcher Ljubo Boban, however, could not find a single act according to which that very sector would be specially regulated. Therefore, the area should be discussed in a separate agreement between Croatia and Slovenia and it should be viewed separately from the question of the present course of the Dragonja (the so called Piran III).

The northern course of the Dragonja itself is not and cannot be disputed.

Convinced that historian Tudjman knows all this, the Istrians calmly await the results of Slovene-Croat talks in Zagreb, firmly believing that the ominous prediction "Kucan in Zagreb—Zagreb in trouble" will not come true.

After this round of negotiations, the Bay of Piran will remain the biggest bone of contention in relations between Croatia and Slovenia. The border in that bay has not hitherto been regulated by any bilateral act and this is where one will be forced to apply international law on so called flank demarcation. All in all, it will not be Kucan and Tudjman who will pull the chestnuts out of the fire, but some other group of politicians.

Ruling Party Official Says No Early Elections

AU1306101194 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 94 pp 7-8

[Interview with Jure Radic, Croatian Democratic Community secretary general, by Ante Gugo; place and date not given: "There Will Not Be Early Elections"]

[Text] Jure Radic, secretary general of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], has lately been impossible to reach for an interview. His excuse was that the time is not right for giving interviews until the negotiations with the opposition are over. After much insisting and persuasion, and after saying that the representatives of the opposition make public appearances while the other side is silent, Radic agreed to give us an interview. As practically the second man of the state, Jure Radic is always an interesting interviewee, but the topic of this conversation was defined in advance by unsolved personnel problems in the Assembly. Obviously, this time we are not talking about mere political haggling, but about a process that could, in the next couple of years, define important political processes in the state, so we tried to focus our questions on that subject and reveal present positions of the ruling party. It is indeed strange that the HDZ, though it claims it has the majority, still agrees to make compromises that sometimes grow into blackmail.

[Gugo] As we speak (Tuesday evening), the media are revealing the information about new positions in negotiations between the HDZ and the opposition, which has reiterated the demand to annul the session of the Chamber of Representatives. What do you think about that?

[Radic] It is an unreasonable demand. That which is legal and constitutional, and does not go against the Standing Orders of the Parliament, cannot be annulled at the request of the opposition or any other political factor. The Croatian Assembly is a legislative institution defined by the Constitution and activities in the Assembly cannot be dealt with as controversial outside the Assembly. Therefore, the work of the Assembly can only be discussed by its legal bodies. All proposals of the opposition are based on the allegation that, for the time being, there are no other deputies in the Assembly except those representing the HDZ, which is not true. However, even if it were true, the work of the Assembly would be legal and legitimate provided that the HDZ has the majority vote. There is no reason to question the legality of its work.

[Gugo] If that is so, i.e., if there is a quorum in the Assembly, why do you persist in reaching an agreement with the opposition?

[Radic] We showed that the Assembly, in which the HDZ has the majority in both chambers, must work so as not to threaten the functioning of any other institution in Croatia. Many activities are dependent upon the work of the Assembly and we were aware of that. On the other hand, we wanted to hear out all proposals and suggestions of other political parties in order to use everything that might contribute to the general prosperity and interests of the Republic of Croatia. We do not want to use the power of majority at all times and work like that with regard to all activities of the Assembly. We have been trying to reinstate the opposition in the Assembly, to the benefit of the Croatian state. Nothing bad will come out of that. However, we will not do so at all costs. If they will not accept our good intentions, we are helpless. I am deeply convinced that the representatives of the opposition have left the Assembly quite unnecessarily. We are prepared to make certain compromises, but only provided they do not bring the essence of the functioning of Croatia into danger. That means we will not accept that what is legal and legitimate be declared illegal for the sake of political agreements. We understand and accept the new situation in the Assembly, and we are prepared to cooperate in accordance with the new circumstances, but only if that is politically correct.

More In Than Out

[Gugo] Why is the HDZ against Mr. Mesic and Mr. Manolic as vice presidents of parliamentary chambers?

[Radic] The Club of the HDZ Deputies gave the freedom of choice to every deputy to decide as he or she thinks fit. We did not want to put pressure on anybody. I would not say that the HDZ does not accept certain individuals, since the HDZ did not make decisions with regard to individual members of the opposition. Mr. Mesic and Mr. Manolic were not accepted because the majority of parliamentary deputies, voting of their own free will, did not want to elect them. Those people have probably had their reasons for doing so. I think that the strongest reason for voting against them was that they left the HDZ, and turncoats always arouse indignation. The second reason are the letters written by Manolic and Mesic, which are negative about Croatia and which were sent abroad.

[Gugo] A couple of days ago, Bozo Kovacevic, secretary general of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, was the guest star of an OTV [Youth Television] broadcast. On that occasion, in a discussion with Drago Krpina [HDZ deputy; currently advisor to the president on military matters], he gave an example of Stipe Mesic's unconstitutional behavior when he was the president of the Assembly. Today, the opposition in which the Liberals are the strongest party, insist on having Stipe Mesic. Could you comment on that?

[Radic] I have not seen that program, so I do not know any details. I am convinced that there were no unconstitutional procedures in the Assembly, for the proper authorities would react to that. Personally, I am glad the opposition considers those two gentlemen their best representatives, for the Croatian public will be able to see their true colors.

[Gugo] Mladen Vedris has also recently left the party. Since his function is important for the economy of Croatia, this could be considered a serious blow to the party in which you are secretary general. Will that influence the stability of the HDZ?

[Radic] I was not surprised to see him leave. We were not weakened by the departure of some ten party members. Today, the Secretariat sent me new data which say that, in the past couple of months, 49 members left the party, but 796 new members joined the party in the same period. I have exact information about every county and I was particularly pleased to read this analysis. No member of ours is irreplaceable. We all have our reasons and those reasons should be dignified, so that we can realize our political plight, our confrontation of ideas, in a democratic and civilized manner.

[Gugo] What will happen if the opposition maintains its demand to trade Manolic and Mesic for the annulment of the session of the Chamber of Representatives? Will the HDZ manage to keep the Assembly functioning or will there be early elections?

[Radic] During those negotiations, an opposition leader asked us whether we negotiated because we wanted to develop democracy or whether we acted from the position of being a parliamentary majority. I said we negotiated from the position of a party that wanted to develop democracy in Croatia and we would do everything within limits to achieve that. At the same time, we are aware that we have the majority in the Assembly. We will try to reach an agreement with the opposition. Our concessions will not go below certain minimums which enable the functioning of the Assembly at present and in the future.

[Gugo] So you are not considering early elections in the HDZ?

[Radic] There is no reason for that, although I am convinced that would be beneficial for the HDZ.

[Gugo] Everything that happened in the Assembly boils down to fighting for power. Some analysts are trying to make it look like the defeat of the left in the HDZ, i.e., of the state leadership, and the same sources report that extreme rightists, who hinder the functioning of the institutions of the political system, are coming to power. Is there any truth in that?

[Radic] It is true that this is fighting for power. However, it is not true that this is the victory of the right wing of the party, i.e., that the HDZ lost its democratic quality. The latest events contributed to exactly the opposite. I am aware that we are losing the extreme left wing of the party, but that is good. At the Second General Assembly of the HDZ, we determined we wanted to be a firm party of the center with a very broad program. All those who cannot fit into that program will drop out. Our presidency and secretariat general implement this program. This does not mean that there are no extremes in our midst, but the problem lies in the fact that those people do not exert much influence on the work of the party. They act individually, and everyone has the right to do that. The most important thing is that no one can accuse of being extreme left or extreme right in our program or activities. Those events have taught us procedure and democratic process. On several occasions we confirmed our democratic orientation, and the presidential candidate for the Assembly was chosen by a secret ballot. We are aiming toward building a firmly central democratic orientation.

No Conflicts With the Church

[Gugo] Rumor has it that relations between Church and state have been strained. Is there any truth in that?

[Radic] No. If each of those two institutions acts within its competence, there will be no conflict. It is important that the Church and the state do not interfere in each others' activity. I have personally witnessed good relations between the Church and the state and I know there are no conflicts, although there still is an occasional lack of understanding. However, that is mostly part of tradition, which can be transcended if there is a will. The Church and the state are working together for the benefit of the Croats.

[Gugo] As we speak, Russian envoy Churkin is negotiating with Martic and Mikelic in Belgrade. Does that mean we are facing a new round of talks with the authorities in the temporarily occupied territory?

[Radic] That gentleman will be here any minute now, and it is a pity that we cannot talk in a couple of hours. Our view is crystal clear: We do not want and will not delay solving the problem of our occupied areas. I say with full responsibility that this is the last mandate of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]! Our refugees can no longer bear the solution of their problems being postponed and we must remember that. The state leadership, considering the international circumstances, has no right to postpone the solution to those problems. An intensive diplomatic action is under way and we must explain to important international factors that this is the time to take concrete steps to solve the Croatian problem. Furthermore, we are prepared—if the international community does not make any progress—to start solving the problem with all the means at the disposal of a rule-of-law state. Those who died for our freedom oblige us to bring freedom into every Croatian home. That is our principal task in the following period.

Washington Agreement Seen as 'Staggering'

94BA0289B Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 94 pp 8-9

[Article by Marinko Culic: "Tudjman Returns—to Continuity"]

[Text] *From Tudjman's restrained answer to Izetbegovic, it can be concluded that the Croatian president has decided on the tactic of procrastinating, evidently convinced that it is only a question of time until Bosnia-Herzegovina disappears from the map. After the failure of the international community on the test of Gorazde, it seems that Tudjman's hopes are being realized. However, it might be useful to warn the local mediators in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina of an opposite result of the Bosnia-Herzegovina drama—Bosnia stays, they fail.*

While a ceremony for the Croatian-Bosnian agreement was being prepared in Washington, Ivan Bender recommended from Siroki Brijeg, not at all jokingly, that the

Croats there will see how "this" looks in practice, and only then decide whether to accept the agreement. Several days after the rainy wedding ceremony in Washington, the Presidency of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina had already resolved, it seems, all dilemmas and announced actions that will be "louder than you think and different than you expect."

Indeed, events followed that are unambiguous, and some really announced "loudly" that the Washington agreement is staggering before it was put on its feet. The first contacts of the two sides showed that they are not in a position to find a common language even for that rare matter that is not fixed by the agreement but is left to their internal decision (the order of the election of leaders of the federation). Not long after Franjo Tudjman gave the usual interview on the eve of the visit of the chief of state to the other country and, quite unusually, announced that the visit to Sarajevo would perhaps—not take place. Finally, 15 days ago, someone very expertly set off an explosion in Livan, leveling the minaret of the 150-year-old mosque of Curcinica. In only a month, therefore, everything occurred that was necessary for the conclusion to be drawn that one side traveled to Washington not with the intention of achieving an agreement under the sponsorship of the most powerful administration in the world, but, under the umbrella of that authority—which was perhaps lulled that everything was ready—of doing just the opposite.

Why Curcinica?

The incident with Curcinica is too striking and resonant to be treated simply as "just another" mosque that no longer stands erect. First, it was destroyed in a city that at one time was cited as an example of where that doesn't happen; this means that someone passionately wanted to emphasize that not even small islands exist in the sea of Croatian-Muslim hatred any longer. Therefore, if the other side is held to account for much lesser war crimes than its own, although it is claimed at the same time that the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is more a leaderless army of bandits than a real, disciplined army, then the question of the responsibility of the allegedly well organized HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Croatian police arises with two-fold weight. In truth, they cannot be accused—without firm proof—as directly guilty parties for the destruction of the mosque, but they can be accused of not bringing in criminals and terrorists, because there is already proof of this. For example, it is known who leveled Stupni Do and why (the aim was to "warn" the Muslims, but also to incite them against Croats in Vares in order to resettle them), but that man is still—now under a new name—in his old position in the HVO.

Those who are leaving him in freedom are probably projecting through him intimate notions about prohibited, but desirable filthy messes—my God, it's war!—as Slobodan Praljak did several days ago, when he decisively denied that he had ordered the destruction of the Old Bridge.... But he then added, in the same breath and equally resolutely, that, in a situation where military reasons demanded it, he would do the same thing. As you can see, the "dogs of war" are not to be foreseen and tied up, but the chains are long and tight on which they are placed and, one hopes, anyone can easily reach home along them. Here it is interesting to mention that, according to Akmadzic's recent statement, two sides have agreed that each will clean from its ranks those who are hindering the establishment of a joint state, and it is certainly not accidental that right here and only here was "full sovereignty" insisted on. We will not guess who was more interested in this clause, but the conclusion is inevitable in view of the later series of recent actions by both sides.

Road Tax

Although the facts were different, the Bosnians first roughly activated the staff sieve, having already replaced Safer Halilovic some time earlier, and then mercilessly having eliminated several "warlords" who could no longer be controlled (Caco, perhaps even Prazina). The only thing with which the Croatian side reciprocated was its moving of Boban and the arrival of the moderate Bosanac Zubak. But as nothing beside this happened, it was clear that the aim was not to clean up their own ranks but to blackmail the other side into sweeping them according to what was already swept, or, if it didn't want to—to refrain from everything. The present taking of bids on the election of the first leader of the federation is aiming at that. Croatians do not want a Muslim in that position, claiming that after five or six years it's the Croats' turn, but just when one thinks that it is a case of a stand on principle, he changes into—possibly a Muslim, but not the "belligerent" Izetbegovic.

Since we are talking about the leader of a state that, whatever has been said, enjoys the support of a large part of the citizens, the challenged one has evidently been sent not only to Izetbegovic personally, but also to the whole Bosnian people, who are just entering a period of maturity and self-awareness. This is all the more insulting in that, contrary to the internal agreement mentioned, what is exclusively in the jurisdiction of these people is being encroached upon, and at the same time notorious criminals are being tolerated in their own ranks. Moreover, local propaganda has set loose a mill of insinuations about how the Bosnians have abandoned the Washington agreement—it was claimed earlier that they had abandoned Bosnia-Herzegovina—allegedly swayed by Izetbegovic's legal adviser Boyle, who believes that the agreement practically sanctions the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But Bosnia-Herzegovina deputy prime minister Edib Bukvic stated lately that the Bosnian side had an insight into Boyle's opinion even before the signing of the Washington agreement; this means that it nevertheless believed in it, while only some trends in Bosnian policy, claims Bukvic, were submitted to Boyle's analysis.

In addition, Bukvic stated that Herceg-Bosna is again assuming the old form of a pseudo-state, which functions well only in a robbery. A road tax has again been introduced, this time with a firm scale of charges, so the shipment of goods over the border is encumbered with levies of 100 to 150 percent (!), and even humanitarian convoys for central Bosnia pay a "road toll." Although one shouldn't doubt the material greed of the leaders of Herceg-Bosna, the aim of the highway robbery described by Bukvic is indeed broader and is directed at provoking Muslims to erect firm borders toward Croats. With this the concept of cantonal division would definitely be destroyed, and a partition into two parts would be consolidated, which Ivo Komsic says is being hastily carried out. A further, more ambitious aim is to leave the Bosnians with the conviction that "their" Bosnia-Herzegovina is impossible and that it has remained only on their shoulders (about which Milovan Sibl recently wrote, in DANAS, an unusually detailed text, having failed to answer only the trifle of whether he wrote it as a journalist in politics or as a politician in the newspaper).

This could also be the explanation of why Djapic and his Croatian Rights Party members were recently attacked with tables and chairs in Siroki Brijeg. Although they say that he has often been on Pantovcak recently, where an alliance of the "right" against the "vampire-like left" has been worked out, Djapic nevertheless poured the cup too full. And this, it seems, not so much through attacks against the great (Zagreb) and the small (Mostar) leadership, and not even with charges that Tuta Naletilic is "responsible for destroying the Livanj mosque," as through dreaming by the Croatian Rights Party about the fighting unity of the Croatian and the Muslim people, which has also been supported in recent days by the announcement about a new founding of the HOS [Croatian Defense Force].

Sarajevo Is Far Away

If the Bosnians rear on their hind legs at all of this, so much the better! At an SDA [Party of Democratic Action] convention, Alija Izetbegovic recently reduced all the aims of his party to one basic and undoubtedly justified one—"We want all the territory back"—but with this also fell into the trap of national and confessional exclusivity, stating that there would be no more genocide against the Muslim people, because weapons would not be taken from anyone "except criminals." It is interesting that now, when critical repercussions from this should be expected in Zagreb, all of a sudden there are none, although whole tomes were written until recently about alleged Islamic fundamentalism. As if a little real fundamentalism in Sarajevo would be appropriate to the masters of local propaganda, so it would be easier for them to steal away from the Washington agreement, into which they have been pushed against their will anyway. Recent correspondence between Izetbegovic and Tudjman, in which the former is understandably concerned, and the latter not understandably satisfied with what has been achieved, indicates that the Croatian president has favored a tactic of making a resolution difficult (he announced a visit "soon" to Sarajevo, but he immediately mentioned "technical and communications" problems, as if we are somewhere in the middle of 1992), evidently convinced that it is only a question of time until Bosnia-Herzegovina disappears from the map. Taught by experience, he will just not keep making inroads this time, but he will let someone else do the coroner's job, possibly the United States.

After the failure by the international community of the Gorazde test, it seems that Tudjman's predictions and hopes are being realized (thus Sibl hurried to be hailed as a journalistic analyst). But both foresee that Bosnia-Herzegovina has been trying to divide itself in quarters, now, for more than two years already, but it isn't working. That this is really a question of an "artificial state," "a colonial creation," and however they have already called it, this would surely happen even without any great effort by Belgrade and Zagreb, and even the United States and Russia together would not be able to prevent disintegration. Thus we are warning the local mediators in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina to keep in mind the opposite result of the Bosnia-Herzegovina drama—Bosnia stays, they fail.

Zagreb Linked to Attack of HSP Leaders

94BA0299A Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 6 May 94 p 18

[Interview with Anto Djapic, Croatian Rights Party vice chairman, by Vlado Vurusic at Djapic's office in the Croatian Assembly building; date not given: "'Mladen Tuta Naletilic Is Responsible for Destruction of the Mosque in Livno!'"]

[Text] Anto Djapic, Assembly deputy and vice chairman of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party], who together with Karlo Varjacic, chairman of the HSP Supervisory Committee, and Velimir Kvesic, an official from party headquarters, was severely beaten on Sunday, 1 May in Siroki Brijeg, which he accuses soldiers of the controversial Herzegovinan commander Naletilic of doing, alleges in an interview with GLOBUS that Mladen Tuta Naletilic is responsible for the destruction of the mosque in Livno.

Mladen Tuta Naletilic is the commander of a unit known as the "Legion of Honor." He and the semiliterate General Ivan Andabak take orders from the top leadership of so-called Herceg-Bosna, but they in turn get their orders from Zagreb: This is the Zagreb-Herzegovina vertical. The Herzegovina police has not dared even to launch an investigation into the attack on the HSP leadership. If it were not for General Roso, Herzegovina's UDBA [former Yugoslav State Security Administration] and KOS [former Yugoslav Counterintelligence Service] agents and criminals would have recommenced the war with the Muslims.

The recent brutal attack on the leadership of the HSP—at a rally in Siroki Brijeg—when Karlo Varjacic (chairman of the party's Supervisory Committee), Velimir

Kvesic (official from headquarters), and HSP vice chairman Anto Djapic were beaten black and blue with baseball bats, mallets, and pistol handles, has elicited a great deal of interest, especially since Djapic has said that the government of Herceg-Bosna, the Croatian state leadership, and the Croatian minister of defense are responsible for the attack.

We spoke with Anto Djapic about this occurrence and about his opinion on the situation in Herceg-Bosna at his office in the Assembly building. Anto Djapic walks cautiously; the consequences of the beating are obvious....

[Vurusic] What happened at your party's rally in Siroki Brijeg?

[Djapic] That was an example of an assassination attempt. One slap is enough to qualify it as that, given our position in the Assembly, let alone when the attack is carried out by 50 armed people, some of whom were in uniform. The attack was painstakingly planned and has a strong political background. I believe that an explanation of this incident is due from not only the government of so-called Herceg-Bosna, but also, and most of all, from the Croatian state leadership. If they do not speak up, that I will feel like "he who remains silent agrees with what happened."

For days, we were warned by Tuta Naletilic's people not to go to Siroki Brijeg, that we could go there but that we would not leave alive, and so on. Nor does that surprise me about him. Ruffians from his unit (which, ironically, is known as the "Legion of Honor") frighten and terrorize the local population.

We decided precisely for that reason to go and hold a rally there, to restore the people's hope, but we knew very well who was waiting for us there and what all could happen to us. We wanted to dispel the fear among the local population, fear that has insinuated itself into them because of the precarious conditions under which they live.

[Vurusic] What is happening in Herzegovina?

[Djapic] A dictatorship in power there. Especially in Siroki Brijeg. UDBA and KOS agents are still wreaking havoc. There are only two people in the government of so-called Herceg-Bosna who were not employees of those two notorious services.

We arrived there as an alternative, which naturally bothered them, so they wanted to frighten us and other potential party leaders who were planning to go to Herzegovina. The situation there—and the attitude of the people toward the local authorities—is such that I have the impression that any alternative political option would win if elections were held in Herzegovina today.

Herzegovina today is fertile ground for crime, smuggling, wartime profiteers.... They have arrived from all directions, and against the will of the vast majority of Herzegovinans. All the political riff-raff from the former regime has remained in power there. However, to make things worse, nothing in Herzegovina happens by accident.... The Herzegovinans are despondent!!!

[Vurusic] Are the people in Herceg-Bosna opposed to implementation of the Washington agreement on a federation between the Croat and Bosniak nations?

[Djapic] The people want the agreement to be implemented. This policy of various Tutas and Andabaks in so-called Herceg-Bosna represents a desire to dash the Washington agreement. Because the smugglers and criminal structures there do not want peace between Muslims and Croats; peace means that there will not longer be as much lawlessness (and you must know that some people have managed to turn over hundreds of thousands of German marks a day) and that all the facts will finally be learned, because of which they want to channel the people's dissatisfaction toward the Muslims, not toward eradicating crime of unseen proportions.

They accuse us in the HSP of having come to scheme against the Washington agreement, which is ridiculous. The HSP has always advocated an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and opposed the fighting between Croats and Muslims, and that is even the core of the HSP program principles. They want to block implementation of the agreement, because it is clear to them that as soon as the federation comes to life, Tuta and his ilk will be put on trial for war crimes. They are steeped in blood and there is no turning back for them!

Herzegovina is the backbone of our nation-building ideal and that is why they had to impose a reign of terror there, to compromise both the Herzegovinans and the nation-building ideal itself. They have indeed been partially successful in that, so that in some parts of Croatia a certain animosity has arisen toward Herzegovinans. We must not be duped by the tricks of a handful of UDBA and KOS agents! These people are "as thick as thieves" with Karadzic and Vucurovic, with whom they trade and smuggle.... The other 95 percent of Herzegovinans are for the agreement, democracy, and peace.

[Vurusic] You said that the policy of the HR [Croat Republic of] Herceg-Bosna is being guided from Zagreb?

[Djapic] Yes. But it is not that simple. Actually, our policy is turned around and refracted in Herzegovina, it is the key to the solution to our problems there. If things were put in order in the so-called HR Herceg-Bosna, if the current group of politicians were to leave, things would change in Zagreb too! We must undertake the transfiguration of Herzegovina for the sake of our own lives.

The top-most state leadership in Croatia, and thus even President Tudjman, is answerable for the fact that it is not disassociating itself from these sorts of occurrences that are rocking Herzegovina. I expect both President Tudjman and Minister Susak to say something about the attack on us in Siroki Brijeg, because the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] is in power there!

[Vurusic] You mentioned Mladen Tuta Naletilic and Ivan Andabak as the men who ordered the attack. Why?

[Djapic] Ivan Andabak is a semiliterate man with the rank of general, Naletilic is an executioner. Mladen Tuta is a so-called emigre with a dubious past and employer. I say "so-called emigre" because after the first elections many people returned who had been sent abroad by UDBA. The majority of emigres who joined the Croat government—both here and in Herzegovina—are former UDBA agents, previously infiltrated into Croatian emigree circles.

Moreover, Tuta was also directly involved in the murder of our knight, HOS [Croatian Defense Force—armed wing of HSP] commander Blaze Kraljevic. He has built a house above Siroki Brijeg worth several million German marks. Where did he get that much money? He gives orders to Andabak, the leadership of so-called Herceg-Bosna gives orders to Naletilic, and they get their orders from Zagreb. This is the Zagreb-Herzegovina vertical!

This Naletilic is an officer (but no gentleman) in the HVO [Croat Defense Council]. The fact that the Ministry of Defense reported the attack on us to the HVO clearly indicates their involvement. Why is the local police not saying anything—it has not even begun an investigation, much less dared to undertake anything concrete.

[Vurusic] Do you think that the HVO leadership is behind the attack? Are you also accusing General Ante Roso?

[Djapic] No, Gen. Roso is not connected to this. He is one of the rare people in the leadership of the so-called HR Herceg-Bosna who genuinely supports implementation of the Washington agreement. If it were not for him, these KOS and UDBA people would have already recommenced the war with the Muslims. Moreover, I think that Tuta is also responsible for the destruction of the Livno mosque 10 days ago. Tuta is the lord of Herzegovina, the lord of life and death in that region of ours.

[Vurusic] You said that Naletilic and Andabak are only the executors of someone's orders? Could you be more specific and say whose orders?

[Djapic] It is no secret that Tuta is a favorite of Mr. Gojko Susak! Still, I do not want to prejudice the matter. That is why I call upon the minister of defense of the RH [Republic of Croatia] to make a statement. Let him confirm or refute my suspicions. We spoke on Monday, right before the press conference. Her asked me what was going on. I told him that he was in a better position to tell me what was actually going on. And why! He had no answer for me!

I will raise this question at the next session of the Assembly. I have already asked the president of the Assembly House of Representatives, Stipe Mesic, to put this subject on the agenda of the next session.

[Vurusic] You always call the HR Herceg-Bosna "so-called Herceg-Bosna." How did the people attending your rallies throughout Herzegovina react to that?

[Djapic] Our rallies in Tomislavgrad and Grude were extraordinary, well-attended, and we got an exceptionally warm reception. The people know our positions, they know that we support the Washington agreement. It is a little ridiculous that we, as an opposition party, have to go around Herzegovina promoting the agreement that Tudjman signed while his people attack and kick us. Moreover, why would the prefix "so-called" offend them? Since the Washington agreement the HR Herceg-Bosna has no longer existed, there are only cantons or zupas and velezupas. They signed the Washington agreement that abolishes this entity, and now they are acting as if it still exists. It is ridiculous that we from the HSP are working on promoting the Washington agreement, instead of Vukojevic or Milas, and the so-called HDZ right wing. But ultimately we must ask ourselves: Is the Washington agreement Croatian state policy? I hope that it is, but after everything that has happened to us I am beginning to doubt that. But we were there and we will go back. Our rally in Siroki Brijeg was not finished, and I am someone who finishes all his business. We have to go down there without fear, even if it means getting hurt. Because I know that they will not stop at beating us. We must not lose Herzegovina! Let Budisa and Racan go to Herzegovina, if necessary—at the same time! We must show that there is an alternative, that democracy and a multiparty system must ultimately come there too.

At the rally, I managed to say: "Gentlemen, we have come here to show you that we are not afraid. We have shown that we are even willing to die for the Independent State of Croatia." We cannot open fire on Croats, even though they wanted to provoke us into doing that.

[Vurusic] You have brought up the suspicion that Minister of Defense Gojko Susak is behind the attack on you and your party colleagues. However, in the Assembly you recently defending him when the opposition sought his dismissal because of the explosion in Duboki Jarak.

[Djapic] I said that he is responsible until he makes a statement. That is disinformation by news commentators, including yours at GLOBUS. This is a question of principle. The opposition must unite around key questions, not around less important ones.

[Vurusic] There are reports that now, after the split in the HDZ and the departure of Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic from the party, the HSP will become a coalition partner of the HDZ, because you are close to its right wing, which is now in the majority....

[Djapic] That is fantasy. Moreover, I no longer even know what the HDZ is. We have a neutral stance toward the conflict within the HDZ.

[Vurusic] Do you think that the Washington agreement is in danger and that the fighting between Croats and Muslims could resume?

[Djapic] I am afraid that that could happen. The people in power in Herceg-Bosna are the same ones who initiated the fighting. Because of their whims, our young people perished at Vakuf and Vitez, instead of fighting the Serbs with our combined forces, instead of defending the corridor, which was closed. What would there be of so-called Krajina and the so-called republic of Srpska today if the corridor had remained in our hands? We would be at the Drina today! The bombing of the mosque in Livno and the attack on us, as representatives of a party that has supported the alliance with the Muslims the whole time, is the best indication of how much individual leaders of so-called Herceg-Bosna do not want the Washington agreement to succeed.... They are defending their positions, not the position of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are thwarting the multiparty system in Herzegovina! But they will not halt the arrival of democracy to Herzegovina with one beating. We must settle scores with this gang. The entire government of so-called Herceg-Bosna is responsible for this situation.

[Vurusic] Does the thing that is conditionally called the Herzegovinan lobby exist?

[Djapic] I do not believe such reports. That is an erroneous expression, which compromises Herzegovina. The leadership of the HDZ is behind the attack on us, the ones who formulate policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because we are their stained conscience.

If they are for the Washington agreement, why not dismiss those people who are undermining it? Or rather, why does Tudjman not go to Herzegovina to promote the agreement? That would reassure the local population, which is not guilty of anything, but is living in fear.

I would clip the wings of that gang of criminals that is in power. The government of so-called Herceg-Bosna was not able to prevent the bombing of the Livno mosque, but it was able to prevent—in hooligan fashion—our rally in Siroki Brijeg. We have had enough of the Herzegovinans paying the price of flawed policies, lost wars, suffering at Bleiburg. We do not need another Bleiburg!

Census Official on Progress of Commissions

AU1406112794 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 10 Jun 94 pp 1, 3

[Report by K. Cangova: "The Census Within the Deadline"]

[Text] The preparations must be completed for the census in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] from 21 June to 5 July according to schedule. All the deadlines for this major statistical survey have been met and there is no reason to suspect that anything will go wrong. This was stated at yesterday's news conference organized by the State Census Commission to report on the progress of work on the census. Namely, it was emphasized that the appointment of the communal census commissions had been completed, that they had been constituted, and that they had started work. On these commissions 356 members have been elected, of which there are 34 (including three Albanians) presidents, 102 specialists, and 222 basically elected on a national basis, so the legal criteria have been respected. Of the 222 members on the communal census commissions 50.4 percent are Macedonians, 15.32 Albanians, 11.26 Turks, 9.46 Romanies, 1.35 Vlachs, 5.41 Serbs, 2.7 Muslims, 1.32 Egyptians, and 2.7 percent other nationalities.

We were informed by President of the State Census Commission Risto Ivanov that the criterion for appointing members to the communal census commissions from the nationalities has been respected. Disagreements about Article 24 of the Census Law related to these appointments did not arise in the State Census Commission, but in the communal assemblies, where the article was differently interpreted. Ivanov emphasized that it is legally clear that the national structure has to be respected only for the members that are appointed from the nationalities, while those members—such as specialists in statistics, urbanism, geodesy, and demography—do not have to belong to particular nationalities. The criterion on which the national structure was determined was based on the last census in 1991, and wherever there was over 1 percent of a certain nationality, at least one member of that nationality was appointed. According to these criteria, 110 people have been appointed to the communal census commissions, of whom 34 are Albanians, 24 Turks, 21 Romanies, 3 Vlachs, 12 Serbs, 6 Muslims, 3 Egyptians, and 6 other nationalities.

As for remarks on the structure of the personnel carrying out the census, this was not defined according to the structure of the population in a commune or a locality, but depended on whether in a census area a certain nationality participates with 50, that is 20 percent of the whole population structure, which is the condition for selecting a person from that nationality. [sentence as published] In order to ensure people's right to use the language of their nationality, that is Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Romany, or Serbian, those who know that language must be selected, regardless of their nationality. Selections are also made regardless of nationality in cases where there are no candidates of a particular nationality who meet the conditions.

President of the State Census Commission Risto Ivanov pointed out that in the first stage there were 10,000 applicants to be census officials and communal instructors, which was not sufficient, and in the second 11,000, which was sufficient for testing the candidates. If we do not obtain people with the necessary language abilities, there will probably be another round of testing. Yesterday, Ivanov denied that these "census takers" will not be paid, because, as he said, there was a book of payment regulations. He also denied that this was the reason that a large number of applicants had refused the testing.

Concerning the citizenship regulation, it was stated that this was a matter for the Interior Ministry. According to the State Census Commission's information, around 94 percent of the citizens in the state have been officially sent citizenship certificates, one of several identification papers acceptable in the census. The full situation will be known in the course of the day, and by 15 June all those meeting the conditions for citizenship will possess adequate documents. Until 5 June the Interior Ministry was officially sending information by mail, and since then citizens have been able to appeal to regional offices for such documents.

During the census there will be around 100 organizations present in the country, which will have the opportunity to monitor the development of the statistical survey, and it is up to the European Commission to decide which countries they will come from. As Svetlana Antonovska, director of the Republican Statistical Department, said, at the moment work is being done on applications from observers and representatives of international organizations and statistical departments from other countries, and so far there are representatives of the National Institute for Statistics of Bulgaria, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE, who have confirmed that they will be present.

VMRO Presents 'Evidence' of Security Activity

AU1306152094 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 10 Jun 94 p 3

[Report by B. Geroski: "Watergate for a Second Time"]

[Text] Yesterday, at a news conference, the President of VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Movement for Macedonian National Unity] Ljupco Georgievski distributed copies of a "document" to journalists, which "confirms that the State Security Service [SDB] is continuing its active telephone bugging of the main opposition party's offices." Allegedly, this has to do with the discussions held between [VMRO-DPMNE Deputy President] Dosta Dimovska and the SDB "collaborator" codenamed "Coordinator" (the allusion is apparently to

Tomislav Stefkovski, until recently the coordinator of the party's parliamentary group before setting up a faction).

Georgievski claims that the "document" reveals that the SDB is dealing with the VMRO-DPMNE under the codename "Lion," while the whole operation is called "Division." Georgievski also claims that the SDB has formed a command center on several levels that "not only passively follows the work of the party, but is also actively involved in it, with the purpose of completing the operation [to split the party]." The VMRO-DPMNE is publicly calling on the public prosecutor of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] to react and it hopes that the affair will end in court. Until then, the party will not respond to the accusations and attacks of the factionists.

According to Georgievski, the whole affair has been created with the aim of distracting the attention of the public from the real problems—the Serbian threats to the security of Macedonia and the incidents on the border. Moreover, Georgievski indicated that they are in possession of a document similar to this, but like the one codenamed "Cave," in which the publicly known "Curve" is mentioned, there is another subject entitled "Cocktails" (related to the so- called "bombing campaign" in Veles), as well as some others. The VMRO-DPMNE claims that it has also been informed about the SDB's criminal activities against some private businessmen. When we asked him if he was ready to produce the "evidence" of the claims that the present deputy secretary of the SDB, Slobodan Bogoevski, handed over to him confidential information on Boris Zmejkovski, Georgiveski replied that he had a couple of witnesses who could testify to this, and that if Mr. Bogoevski sued the leader over his statement, these witnesses would testify in court.

Asked about the authenticity of the "document" presented to the public, Georgievski demanded that an expert study be done on the typewriter on which this document was written (in the Latin alphabet). As far as the [7 June] meeting with President Gligorov is concerned, Georgievski said that the head of the state had neither confirmed nor denied his statements, so the party leadership is satisfied with the discussions. The presentation of this document, as Georgievski put it, is a message to the SDB that the VMRO-DPMNE "knows a lot." Georgievski underlined that his party is receiving such documents from SDB people who were perfect strangers until only yesterday, because they are displeased with what their service is doing. Finally, Georgievski called on the Macedonian public to put a stop to these SDB activities.

VMRO-DPMNE: Authorities Purging Police

AU1306125294 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 13 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "VMRO-DPMNE Public Announcement"]

[Text] In its announcement for the public, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] most bitterly criticized latest staff purges in the Interior Ministry, which turn the ministry into a committee of protection of the current ruling coalition, especially SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the Liberal Party. Mr. Gogov's [former deputy head of the Interior Ministry Operative Department] press conference clearly showed police leaders Frckovski [minister of internal affairs], Bogoevski [undersecretary in the intelligence service], and Gjurev must leave immediately. Fabricating political processes against innocent people was a feature of totalitarian Stalinist-communist regimes, but Macedonia is obviously not immune to this. Democracy and human rights are continually being narrowed by the current true dictatorship, the announcement says. The party demands that the Interior Ministry officially explain the role of the recently killed high inspector Dimce Ristovski in revealing a crime including over a million German marks, with a presumable involvement of the minister of health, Jovan Tofovski. The party also appealed to Pavle Trajanov, in the name of democracy and the future of the Macedonian state, to publicly reveal government's attempts to discredit him in the eyes of the public, and state other fabricated cases, as well as the government involvement in organized crime in the country.

Gligorov Warns of 'Real Danger' of Greek Embargo

AU1306112094 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 9 Jun 94 pp 1-2

[Report by Z. Skerlev: "Macedonia Insists on a Package Solution"]

[Text] Yesterday, the special envoy of the U.S. President and mediator in the Macedonian-Greek dispute, Mr. Matthew Niemitz, held talks with the President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Kiro Gligorov after holding discussions with Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski in Ohrid.

On this occasion they exchanged opinions about the current stage of the Macedonian-Greek negotiations and the possibility of resuming the dialogue on disputed questions. This time, too, the Republic of Macedonia's stance was reiterated on the need for an urgent lifting of the unilateral embargo and for all the questions to be solved as a package. President Gligorov made a special review of the difficulties suffered by Macedonia because of the Greek embargo and the real danger that it represents for a greater destabilization of the republic and the whole region. He also expressed his belief that in the next round of negotiations with the mediators from New York there will be greater likelihood for solving this situation, which has already become a clear element of threat to the stability in the south.

During the discussions there was also an exchange of opinions about the further development of relations between the United States and the Republic of Macedonia. On what was referred to as "an exchange of opinions about the current views of Macedonia and Greece in relation to the solution of mutual problems," Minister Crvenkovski and Mr. Niemitz made short statements to journalists.

"Yesterday we had long and extensive discussions in smaller delegations, and today we had discussions with the president of the republic," Minister Crvenkovski said. "We discussed all the aspects of the situation here and particularly the damage caused to Macedonia by the embargo, as well as the whole situation in the region. We discussed a number of other questions of importance for the whole region and we hope that we shall soon have another opportunity to meet and continue these discussions, and that we shall also have continual meetings with Mr. Cyrus Vance."

In his statement to the journalists, among whom, as usual, there were a large number from the Greek media, Mr. Niemitz said that it was his great honor to be here again and to have two days of discussions about these issues. "As you know, we had serious discussions in New York. Cyrus Vance and I talked with Minister Crvenkovski there, but we thought it was a good idea to come and hold discussions here. There is no special reason for this, or any special message, just fruitful discussions."

After that Mr. Niemitz stated that he was ready to answer some journalists' questions. The first was whether he had nothing more to say after his few days of discussions in Greece and Macedonia.

"I will just say," Niemitz said, "that we have all agreed not to talk or discuss the contents of the meetings. I know that this is frustrating for you journalists, but it is a fact that it is a far better way for comprehending some of the subjects. There is nothing for publication, there are no breakthroughs or changes of policy or ideas, but I think, in my personal view, that there is a better understanding and viewing of the situation and the position of both sides, so, from my point of view, it was a good idea for me to come here and have this useful series of meetings."

Asked whether there existed opportunities for a direct dialogue between the two countries, Niemitz said that this was something to be discussed between the two countries, but that he had not discussed this. The task that was assigned to him by the President of his country was to talk with both sides in order to clarify the concepts, and thus to examine and explain the other positions. If the two countries wanted to talk with each another, that would be something that they would have to agree upon.

"There are some aspects of the relations between the two countries that were reconsidered with the mediation of Mr. Cyrus Vance, which is a normal and acceptable method, and I would like to say that the leaderships of the two countries are approaching the problems with seriousness. And that is how most of the problems can be solved."

The next question was whether there had been any progress in the discussions. Niemitz replied that he was not going to talk about what had been discussed and the word "progress" for this kind of discussion was irrelevant. "I talked with both sides," he said, "about their positions, and that is all I can say for now."

As we heard, Mr. Niemitz is leaving Macedonia today. Whether intentionally or unintentionally there have not been scheduled new consultations in Athens, so he is leaving for New York, where, as we know, Macedonian Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and his Greek counterpart Karolos Papoulias will go next week for indirect discussions with the mediation of Mr. Cyrus Vance, the special envoy of UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali.

Institute Reports on Economic Performance

AU1306123194 Skopje MILS-NEWS in English 13 Jun 94

[Unattributed report: "Statistics Information"]

[Text] The State Statistics Institute reports a 8.6 percent productivity decrease in April as compared to the same period last year. The April inflation is 2.4 percent, and living costs rose by 2.6 percent. The number of employed citizens in March was 405,610, with an average wage 7,497 denars. There were 180,644 unemployed, or 0.8 percent more than in the previous month. In the first four months of the year, the total exports fell by 13.1 percent in comparison to last year (the exports totalled $233.7 million), while imports increased by 8.7 percent (total of $261.8 million). Public consumption goods are mostly imported (the import of these goods increased by 85.5 percent).

Kucan Discusses Relations With Croatia

AU1106145594 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 94 pp 10-11

["Exclusive" interview with Milan Kucan, president of the Republic of Slovenia, by Vlado Zagorac; date and place not given: "I Will Come To Improve the Political Atmosphere"]

[Text] Milan Kucan, president of the Republic of Slovenia, should visit Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on Tuesday [7 June]. This will be an unofficial meeting of the two heads of state, like the one held in Brdo near Kranj in October 1992, when Mr. Kucan and Mr. Tudjman agreed that it would be useful to meet at least once a year. Instead of that, it came to a break which has lasted for almost 20 months now, and during which a series of unsolved questions between the two states has appeared.

We asked President Kucan to give an interview for VECERNJI LIST immediately before his visit to Croatia. We asked him to refer primarily to the relations between Slovenia and Croatia, but also to other important issues.

[Zagorac] Can you tell us something about the relations between Slovenia and Croatia during the period in which you have not met with President Tudjman?

[Kucan] We should in any case go back into the history of our relations in order to see that they can be divided into two parts. Our cooperation was excellent during the period when both Slovenia and Croatia fought for their independence. Although we knew that the situation in Croatia was more difficult, and that that fact might affect the materialization of Slovene ambitions, we still required that the Croatian right of self-determination be implemented in the same way as ours. Since independence was achieved, our cooperation has deteriorated, but I do not think that there is a plausible reason for it. It is true that the conditions in Croatia are different from those in Slovenia, but this does not justify the present situation. I think that Slovenia has much understanding for special problems Croatia has, but this understanding has its limits, too, simply because the burden of unsolved problems has become heavier than the understanding for the more difficult conditions in which Croatia lives.

There was a period of time during which there had been no political dialogue whatsoever between Slovenia and Croatia; relations were then resumed only on the level of governments and ministries. In other words, there has been no cooperation on the level of presidents for a long time, so that I think that the understanding of problems and the interest to solve them has been considerably reduced. What is even more important is that the mutual confidence which is necessary if we want to solve problems has significantly fallen, too. I support the political dialogue and I think that it is not only good, but also necessary to talk; the attitudes, interests, and arguments of the other side have to be known in order to be able to search for solutions. If there is no dialogue, only short-term solutions, or no solutions at all, can be expected.

[Zagorac] Relations between states are usually defined as being on a high, low, or medium level. Where would you put the Slovene-Croatian relations on that scale?

[Kucan] It cannot be claimed that they are on a high level. They are far below the level which is necessary in order to solve the existing problems on the onehand , and our vital interests on the other hand. I have noticed the lack of political will; there have been numerous opportunities which allowed us to start solving our problems, but they have simply not been taken. Chances have often been missed because of egoistic political interests of both states and because of the ambition to solve all problems at once. It is in my opinion, however, impossible to solve all problems at once because they are too complicated and too sensitive. Since this approach has not borne fruit, I think that we should now decide to solve problems gradually. Priority has to be given to those problems which have to be solved in order to normalize life along the Croatian-Slovene border, and economic life in general. The Slovene Government has proposed such an approach, and I hope that we could reach a solution more easily in this way.

[Zagorac] Is Slovenia ready to make special efforts for the improvement of the present situation?

[Kucan] I would like to repeat that the present situation is contradictory to the vital interests of both states, so that it is only logical that it must be changed, and it can be changed only if both sides are ready to change it. This means that alternatives to old solutions and attitudes have to be found, without giving up each state's own principles, though. A way for the materialization of interests of both sides has to be found in order to enhance the mutual respect which is necessary in the search for a solution. I think that comments on internal circumstances in other states only harm the positive atmosphere. The assessment was made, for example, that Slovenia belongs to those countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea in which communists are returning to power, and which are characterized by rifts between coalitions. As far as I am concerned, I think that this is a Slovene matter. I think that Slovenia does not assess the situation in other states and that it does not interfere with internal political matters of other states. It leaves it to the citizens of those states to realize whether their regime is democratic or not.

I think that I can generalize and say that there is an unhealthy competition between Croatia and Slovenia, as it can be seen between the former Eastern European states, for example, since they are trying to confirm their European affiliation by exaggerating their own and diminishing the achievements of the others in the field of transformation, which is certainly a demanding and a long-lasting process. Expressions such as, "compared with others, we have the advantage...," or "we have achieved much more than others," can often be heard.

To whom do they want to prove this? The international community knows very well what they have achieved. They cannot prove such a thing to their neighbors because this only causes suspicion and misunderstanding. In other words, this is only used for political conflicts in domestic politics.

If I look at Slovene-Croatian relations in the light of what I said before, I still think—although I have just made a very pessimistic statement—that the circle of our bilateral relations has not been closed yet. It must only be established whether there is political will and readiness in both states to solve problems in the atmosphere of mutual understanding. Mutual respect has to be encouraged, and the starting point of the search for solutions has to be the assumption that the interests of both states have the same value.

[Zagorac] Can it be expected, and is it realistic to expect international help in the sense of an arbitration or similar in solving problems between Croatia and Slovenia? When I say this, I primarily have the problem with the border in the Bay of Piran in mind.

[Kucan] The international community has certain institutions of "preventive diplomacy," which should enable peaceful solutions to conflicts when it is impossible to achieve a solution through bilateral cooperation. These instruments are even being enlarged now. If we fail to reach an agreement about the border in the Bay of Piran, there is the possibility of international arbitration. I think, however, that this would harm the prestige of both Slovenia and Croatia, because it would mean we cannot find a criterion or a combination of criteria for the definition of a state border and solve the problem ourselves. International institutions can apply the same criteria as we, they do not have any additional.

[Zagorac] Have Croatia and Slovenia reached the point at which such help is necessary?

[Kucan] The question is whether our two states have exhausted all possibilities which could enable us to solve the problems ourselves. If there are no further possibilities, it could be considered to cede the responsibility to an international institution. The same is true of arbitration.

[Zagorac] Does this mean that we still have not tried everything?

[Kucan] I think so. That is why we have problems. The old attitudes have simply not changed. If no solution can be found with these attitudes, it is obvious that other approaches have to be looked for.

There is the tendency to simplify this complex issue and reduce it to single problems such as the border crossings at Raskrizje, Sveta Gera, or the Bay of Piran, but these are not real problems and difficulties. Furthermore, if emotions are added to the whole thing, the picture can easily become blurred. The biggest problem is that the economic relations between Slovenia and Croatia have been deteriorating for a long time already. Economists usually claim that cooperation is made impossible by politicians.

This means that we are in fact confronted with two sorts of problems, the border issue and economy. It is bad that border issues have not been solved yet. This harms the sovereignty of both countries, since this is a condition for a legitimate status in international associations. But as long as there is no solution, the best thing would be to accept the situation as it is and look for new solution in the meantime. It is bad to try to change the present situation by imposing things on the other side. This creates suspicion and diminishes the possibility to reach a long-term solution. If one of the international criteria for border determination is applied, it should be possible to draw the border at those places where it is controversial from the point of view of any side.

[Zagorac] What in your opinion are the elements of force applied by either side with the aim to change the present situation?

[Kucan] It is certain that felling of trees in the area of Sneznik is a one-sided measure, since the property of citizens of the other state is made use of. Take, for example, the construction of the border crossing facility in Secovlje by the Croatian side. It is being built on ground which can be assumed to belong to Slovenia. These things cannot contribute to a better understanding. In my opinion, these are some of the unnecessary one-sided measures; the present situation should remain unchanged until final solutions are found. If no solution can be found to a problem, it is better to apply alternatives as temporary solutions. Could not Plovanija, for example, be used as the alternative border crossing for Secovlje, and is it not possible that the Bay of Piran is under Slovene supervision as it has been by now? I would like to repeat that these could be temporary solutions until final solutions are found.

If there is not this minimum of will, people have the feeling that there is no readiness to solve problems, or that both sides are incapable of finding a solution. Life is already requiring certain regulations, and the unsolved border, economic, estate, and other issues inevitably affect the intensity of economic relations. This is what I have in mind when I say that politicians disturb the cooperation of economists. If there is no good will, if there is no agreement on a free trade zone, or on investments, if there is no anti double tax treaty, in short, if there is no basic legal infrastructure for the regulation of economic relations, people will look for illegal possibilities. This affects the economic power of both Slovenia and Croatia. This also affects their integration into Europe.

[Zagorac] There are countries in the world in which economists are quicker than politicians, but this seems to be impossible here; our economists are waiting for politicians to prepare the situation for their activities.

[Kucan] Yes, they are, but I still think that economic relations have not been completely frozen yet. This is good.

[Zagorac] This is true, but their scope and value have been considerably decreasing.

[Kucan] There are well-founded grounds for this situation, but politics cannot be the excuse for everything.

[Zagorac] What is the position you would like Slovenia to achieve in the international community? After the idea about a confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had been confirmed, it was heard that Slovenia might join that association. Are these expectations realistic?

[Kucan] I would like to stress that Slovenia already has its recognizable position in international life, which it would still like to improve, though. It is a member of the Council of Europe, it has signed the agreement on cooperation within the Partnership for Peace, it has signed the agreement on cooperation with the European Union, and it has started negotiating on its associate membership in the EU. I hope that the EU Commission will formally approve of these negotiations in the meeting of the EU ministers in June. Slovenia has been invited to join the Treaty on Stability, it is a UN member, and a member of international financial institutions. It lives a normal international life. As a young state it has difficulties with the confirmation of its rating in international life. Since it is aware of the fact that it cannot live alone, and does not want to live alone, it is therefore trying to make contacts with the world, but by trying to establish international contacts it is confronted with the danger of losing its still not very recognizable identity. I would say that the most important Slovene task is to make sure that its identity does not get lost in the search for economic, political, defense, and other connections with the world.

Regarding Yugoslavia and, I would say, "exotic" thinking of certain poor, superficial, and ignorant "experts" on the political situation in the Balkans and on the history of the Slovene, the Croatian, and other peoples in the former Yugoslavia, on the reasons for its collapse, and on the founded wish of Slovenia and Croatia for independence and their improvised ideas about the creation of a third Yugoslavia—I can say that this is not a realistic project for Slovenia.

As far as the confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, this is probably a realistic interest of these states, but Slovenia does not have any formal relation to that confederation, and it does not want to have one. Slovenia's interest is to cooperate with all European states, including the European southeast, the Balkans, and, naturally, all the states which arose or will arise from the former Yugoslavia. When everything normalizes, the quality of the cooperation will be significantly different from the one we had when we lived in one state. These relations will be neither better nor worse than they were as long as we lived together. They will be determined by interests.

[Zagorac] There are opinions in Europe that Slovenia could join Europe more easily in association with some other countries.

[Kucan] This is how those people think who do not want to face complicated problems and who want to make things easy for themselves. The case of Yugoslavia proved, however, that this makes things more difficult. Every country is a separate matter. We were in "one package" with Croatia when this was necessary, we even insisted on it, but we are two separate states now. If we regulate our bilateral relations, we shall both be able to reach what we want more easily, and that is Europe, without being in "a package."

[Zagorac] There were opinions in European political circles that Slovenia was lucky because it was taken as the example of a peaceful disintegration .

[Kucan] I did not feel the benevolence of such a judgment in my work. I do not know whether this judgment is realistic. It is true that Slovenia supported a peaceful disintegration of Yugoslavia. We made efforts and concrete proposals, also together with Croatia, but they were all strictly rejected by Belgrade and the federal leadership at that time. Our proposals were similar to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but they applied them in a much better way, without bothering the international community with their disintegration.

[Zagorac] Slovenia has lately been confronted with demonstrations and similar forms of political life outside the parliament.

[Kucan] I think that the scandals we have been confronted with lately are a part of the democratization process in all countries in transition. These phenomena are more or less normal, although they are not desirable in countries with a parliamentary democracy. The scandals in Slovenia have had a positive effect, too. They have contributed to the awareness of the real value of a parliamentary democracy, of human dignity and rights. Their most important effect is, however, that they have made people aware of the necessity to use and respect the instruments of the constitutional state since this is the basis of democracy.

[Zagorac] To what extent did these events affect the reputation of Slovenia in the world?

[Kucan] We have been much more concerned on how this might affect our reputation in the world than the world itself. We have our idea on how the transition process should go and know that it is affected by such phenomena, but this is not of great interest for other states. What is important for them is that Slovenia makes sure that it will carry out its economic and political reforms, that it will respect human rights and grant rights to its minorities, that it is ready not only to materialize its rights in the international community, but also to take over responsibilities. These are the basic elements for political judgments. To my knowledge they have so far been more or less positive regarding Slovenia. There have been suggestions to make certain improvements in Slovenia, but generally speaking they have been positive and benevolent.

[Zagorac] During the preparations for this meeting with President Tudjman, there arose the question in Slovenia about different powers of the two presidents according to the respective constitutions. There were even rumors that it would be better to organize a meeting between Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Drnovsek (Slovene prime minister), or between Tudjman, Valentic, Kucan, and Drnovsek. Are these differences an impediment to successful negotiations?

[Kucan] I think that all contacts are useful, regardless of the fact whether they are organized between two or four people. It is important that it comes to negotiations and that they are continuous. It is important to bring arguments and solve problems, because this improves the confidence in the other partner. I do not underestimate the problem of the formal power of the president. This is a problem. The Croatian Constitution introduced the presidential system in contrast to the Slovene, which is a typical parliamentarian system with clearly defined and very restricted powers of the president, but this is no reason why the political dialogue on that level should be given up.

Regarding my negotiations with President Tudjman, I can say that they can represent a serious effort for the creation of a favorable negotiating atmosphere. In other words, we shall not solve concrete problems, but we shall try to define them and express our political will that they be solved. Concrete solutions will have to be offered by our governments and other institutions. Apart from that, bilateral relations will be only one of the topics discussed. They can, however, best be discussed in a broader, in the European context, for example, if we know that Slovenia and Croatia want to join the European Union and other political, economic, and defense associations. With the burden of unsolved bilateral problems we shall not be able to join European associations, though. This can best be proven by the example of bilateral difficulties Slovenia has with Italy. This problem could slow down the Slovenian integration into Europe.

[Box, p 10]

Unpleasant and Worrying

[Zagorac] A new, very unpleasant chapter has been opened in the relations between Slovenia and Italy.

[Kucan] This is a very unpleasant and worrying matter. Mr. Drnovsek has recently said that our relations, including the problems regarding the estate cases of those people who chose one of the two citizenships, were solved by the Ossimo Agreements. Slovenia insists that it is the legal successor to the agreement signed between Yugoslavia and Italy. Slovenia was recognized the status of the legal successor of Yugoslavia by the Italian government. Whether the confidence and the political atmosphere will improve remains to be seen. In any case, this has to be the will of both states. I think that it is contradictory to the logic of contemporary democratic relations in the international community to make bilateral matters a condition for Slovenian integration into multilateral associations, as this is the European Union, for example.

[Box, p 11]

Markovic and the Attack Against Slovenia

[Zagorac] Ante Markovic has appeared in Slovenian media with the opinion that "there was an agreement between the Slovenian leadership and Serbia about a forged attack against Slovenia." Is this true?

[Kucan] If he had really made that statement, I am very surprised. I cannot imagine that a man like Ante Markovic would make statements without any arguments. It would be better for him to think about his responsibility for the things which have happened in Yugoslavia. As the federal prime minister he had the possibility to contribute to the process of peaceful disintegration of Yugoslavia at the moment when it was clear that it was impossible to save it. It would be good to remind him of the conversation President Tudjman and I had with him in the Villa Weiss [in Zagreb] on 29 November 1990 about his possible future role in the process of peaceful disintegration. He refused such a possibility then. This is true. The Slovene agreement with Serbia he mentioned is simply not true. I do not know who made such an agreement. It was not me, this is certain.

Biographic Information on New Interior Minister

94P20868A Maribor VECER in Slovene 1 Jun 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "A. Ster Proposed"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Andrej Ster was born on 12 June 1958. He graduated from the Ljubljana Law School in 1982. From 1983 to 1990 he served as a deputy in the Slovene Assembly. At the same time he was employed as the secretary of internal affairs and a member of the Executive Council of the Kranj Community. In the present government he has held the post of the state secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Federal

Army Issues Statement on Depot Explosion

LD1406085694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0250 GMT 14 Jun 94

[Text] Belgrade, 14 Jun (TANJUG)—The situation is under control and there is no danger for the population, the information service of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff reported after a fire broke out which caused an explosion in the Lisicji Potok army ammunition depot Monday evening.

The statement sent to TANJUG early this morning says: "During a storm over Belgrade, at around 2330 last night, lightning hit a depot containing explosives for army drills.

"Fire spread to the depot building, setting off the explosives. No casualties have been registered so far.

"The situation is under control and there is no danger of the explosions spreading. Residential and other buildings and the population are not threatened.

"Top-ranking officers of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff are on the spot, headed by [Chief of the General Staff] General Perisic. During the night the scene of the incident was inspected by the head of the Belgrade local authorities, Nebojsa Covic," the statement issued by the information service of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff says.

Simic Comments on Lilic Statement, Cease-Fire

AU1406100994 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Interview with Deputy Federal Prime Minister Zeljko Simic by Radio Valjevo correspondent Mirko Stojkanovic in Valjevo on 13 June—recorded]

[Text] [Begin recording] [Stojkanovic] Deputy Federal Prime Minister Zeljko Simic said this evening at the [Socialist Party of Serbia] gathering in Valjevo that this is a crucial time for resolving the (?economic) crisis and particularly the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] can no longer view the world—unfair though it is—through the sights on a gun; it is time for it to intelligently and wisely realize its strategic interests—sovereignty, territorial integrity, and citizens' liberties. Neither the people nor the FRY political leadership will accept any supporters of the war option. This was a chance to ask the deputy federal prime minister just how close we are to peace, what the agreement on the cessation of hostilities recently signed in Geneva means, and what are the things that on one hand bring us closer to, and on the other hand take us farther away from the so desired peace?

[Simic] I would like to be extremely direct toward your listeners and would say that we have taken a step forward, because the coming month is going to test the behavior of all three sides involved in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the clear hope that the Yugoslav leadership is investing in the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs with the hope that it will consistently adhere to the obligations taken in Geneva, and thus show the international public that all of Serbhood [svekoliko Srpstvo] favors peace rather than war, while the Muslim side—which in the meantime has received immense support, both military and political—is the side—and I am now going to quote Mr. Alija Izetbegovic—that will never agree to peace, but will pursue the realization of its centuries-long dream of creating a fundamentalist state on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina [sentence as heard]. Therefore, I believe that this is a very important moment—both tactically and strategically speaking—for the FRY and for all of Serbhood, since the one-month cease-fire—under the patronage of UN secretary general's special envoy Yasushi Akashi—is extremely favorable because it allows the political positions and options of all three sides involved in the war to crystallize, and on the other hand enables the international public opinion to form a balanced attitude toward Yugoslavia, and allows the full expression of the truth about the foreign policy orientation and the Yugoslav leadership's authentic option.

[Stojkanovic] The press is reporting that the armed conflicts have been subsiding since the day the cease-fire went into effect, but Alija Izetbegovic has told the Bosnian radio that the Muslims—if the West does not help them to resolve the situation to their advantage—will use a secret weapon. He then mentioned the alliance with the Muslim countries against the West. Does this take us farther away from peace?

[Simic] No. On the contrary, I believe that in a certain sense this exposes—the term is perhaps harsh but it is fitting—Mr. Alija Izetbegovic's position which the West has been covering up for a long time. Therefore, it has been covered up from the very beginning of the civil war, or more precisely, since the Lisbon Conference which was held before the civil war broke out, and when the Muslim side was offered a settlement which was far more favorable than any of the ones that followed. Of course, I am not gloating over this statement, but I assess it as being politically very significant because it exposes the intentions of the Muslim leadership under Alija Izetbegovic, who, using the language of ultimatum, continues to threaten. Moreover, he is now threatening his recent or current allies, in a way that cannot be well received by the international public.

[Stojkanovic] Mr. Simic, how would you assess the situation that developed around FRY President Zoran Lilic's statement in Novi Sad, that millions of FRY citizens cannot be hostages of any political leader, either in the FRY, the Srpska republic, or the republic of Serbian Krajina. This statement was later followed by several statements, so we could even say that this statement was to the disadvantage of the Srpska republic negotiating team in Geneva. Is there danger of a conflict developing between the two leaderships—the Srpska republic one and the FRY?

[Simic] FRY President Zoran Lilic's statement was an extremely precise, direct, and I believe, politically extremely wise. There was no way it could damage the Bosnian Serbs' negotiating position in Geneva. In fact, it could only strengthen it, insofar as the problem of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been artificially connected with Yugoslavia's position. It has been artificially connected with it insofar as the sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia without any valid reasons. However, if this is the political reality, then we must say that the interests of the people—therefore, the interests of all of Serbhood—are above any willful actions of any politician. There can be no comment on this. The fact that the FRY president included himself among the potential people who could—through their actions—disturb the strategic goals of both this country and all of Serbhood, speaks for the fact that there was no way that he could have been attempting to fan or inspire any type of conflict. The statement was given principally, with the aim of sobering both the public and certain significant political individuals, warning them that they could not place their personal interests, or even their will, above the interests of primarily one state that has its foundations, that is strong, that will be reborn after the economic revival, that is on the way to being reintegrated into the international community; therefore, no one can play with this. [end recording]

Serbia

Seselj: Milosevic Planned Karadzic Defeat

AU1006162294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 2

[Report by M. Mikuljanac: "Vojislav Seselj—'Milosevic Wants To Remove Karadzic'"]

[Text] The unification of the Srpska republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina with Yugoslavia is not in Slobodan Milosevic's interest as that would mean having 1.5 million voters out of whom not even 100,000 would vote for him, Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party, said at a news conference yesterday.

Seselj claims that Milosevic had constructed a plan (supported by the West) for a four-month truce in Bosnia, so that he could organize elections during that time and, with the help of the State Security Service, secure Karadzic's defeat at them. However, when it became clear to him that Karadzic cannot be defeated at elections "even with tricks," Milosevic decided in favor of a one-month truce and uninstitutional methods in order to replace Karadzic, Seselj said.

The Radicals have nevertheless said that they support any kind of truce, even a one-month one, although, according to them, one should insist on a permanent cease-fire and a separation at the achieved front lines.

Seselj sees the recent statement by [FRY President] Zoran Lilic at the recent Trade Union meeting in Belgrade as proof that a showdown between Milosevic and Karadzic is in the offing. "With that statement, Lilic has weakened the Serbs' negotiating positions in Geneva, so now he should be careful lest he experience [Dobrica] Cosic's fate, as he has also been violating the Constitution," Seselj said and added that "there is absolutely no doubt that Lilic is in fact Milosevic's mouthpiece."

Yesterday, the Radicals also distributed to journalists photocopies of ("top secret") orders on handing over weapons belonging to the Yugoslav People's Army's to the former Bosnian Territorial Defense. According to these documents (and Seselj claims that he has many more such papers), in September of 1991, Generals Nikola Uzelac and Zivan Mircetic approved of several hundred pieces of infantry weapons and the appropriate quantity of ammunition being given over to territorial defense commands in Bosanska Krupa, Cazin, and Velika Kladusa. Seselj claims that these documents prove a direct involvement of the League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia in arming the Muslims just before the war broke out.

Life of Belgrade Residents Viewed

94BA0295B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 May 94 pp 28-29

[Article by Gordana Igric: "Belgrade: Newcomers and Old-Timers: Sam Plays It Again"]

[Text] *Belgrade at night is reminiscent of Casablanca in the 1940's. Rich refugees and local "businessmen" drown their shady profiteer dealings in whiskey.*

The watchman at a parking lot in downtown Belgrade, a refugee from Gorazde, loudly interprets the Serb right to the city that was once 70 percent Muslim, complains that he was not permitted to sing Serb songs there (Tito forbade it) and that he sacrificed great wealth for that. Now he is annoyed at the people of Serbia, who are only looking out for their own. He says that he lived only for a Greater Serbia, but now people look at his wife and children askance when they pick up their refugee packet. The people of Serbia do not know what true Serbhood is.

At that, a master electrician rushes out of the lobby.

"You are still crying for Tito. How is it that I sang Serb songs and because of that slaved to make an honest living? And you could have but did not want to. And I assume that you earned your wealth honestly, with your own two hands? There are bombs falling on your city while you pontificate to me. What kind of people are these?" the man from Sumadija says, throwing up his hands. "They prefer Greater Serbia and Belgrade to their own Bosnia and their own neighbors."

The tense atmosphere on the street, on a day when bombs were falling on Gorazde, is simply a reflection of the cold war being waged by newcomers and old-timers, two afflicted and divided worlds. People from the war zones have brought to ethnically indifferent Belgrade the dream of a Greater Serbia and of ethnic purity, while to the people of Belgrade their Serbhood seems a bit clumsy and silly. The fabric of wartime Belgrade is being eaten away by different dialects, customs, economic expectations, patriotism, and cash-based patriotism.

In the Hands of New "Owners"

The old Belgrade is no more. The new, xenophobic one throws a Molotov cocktail at the Committee for Refugees, beats up street cleaners who do not have Serb surnames. Instead of bohemians, there are "skinheads," newly formed bullies, cruising around the city. In the morning, this sort of warning appears on the door of a building: "Do not tempt your fate. They can beat you up because they find you at home, they can rape your wife, mistreat your children—if you do not lock your front door."

Belgrade at night is irresistibly reminiscent of Casablanca, a big waiting room where very rich refugees and local "businessmen" drown their shady profiteer dealings in whiskey. The new owners of the city, arriving from the battlefield, have little in common with Bogart. Belgradians who managed to survive the communist invasion in 1945 and the decades of influx from rural areas bristle at this "new class" that is feeding the animosity toward all newcomers.

Luxury cars (with registration from the war zone), Rolex watches, mistresses in white fox coats—these are status symbols of the "foreign element" in the heart of Belgrade. Special shops, chains of coffee shops, bought-out boutiques, money spent mercilessly—this is the smell of the new Belgrade.

At the nighttime bar "Princ," four "businessmen" run up a bill of 800 German marks [DM] in one night. A tip of only DM200 for the waiter. The "Hyatt" or "Plavi Jahac" are cult locations. Nightclubs are split into those where drinking is "fear-based" and where patrons buy on informal "credit" payable every month. At "Promocija," a waiter who tries to collect a bill gets a pistol held to his head, and the bill is not paid. The outline of a pistol inside a jacket serves as a sign to the waiter at "Princ" that he should not approach that table. Young policemen drink free of charge, which is how the owners pay for their protection. Everyday patrons drink on credit and pay at the end of the month.

The war has given the city a Colombian air. According to lawyer Rajko Danilovic, an old Belgradian, it all began back before the war, when hand-picked criminals were doing the political police's dirty liquidator work abroad. When the war began, they offered their services to the regime and pillaged the battlefields under the guise of patriotism. Now they are seriously counting on recognition and a "reward for service."

"Some of them continue to lay waste to the war zone, while others are involved in the trade in arms or fuel, together with the 'white collars' and wealthy refugees. With the state's consent, a new establishment is being born with foreign exchange and contacts with commercial banks. The dominant role in this symbiosis is played by newcomers who are 'coping'; without them, there is no 'business' in Bosnia. Thus, they are a sort of lobby, dazzling their fellow citizens with symbols of success. Belgradians are not easily impressed."

Citizens and City-Haters

"Plavi Jahac" brings together "young Bosnia." The same guests come every day, each spending DM100 daily. The people here are Karadzic's children, snipers from Sarajevo, smugglers of alcohol and cigarettes, but also cosmopolitan Bosnian youth.

Natasa Markovic, a journalist and the owner of "Plavi Jahac," longs for the old Belgrade and refuses to believe that the "occupation" will last.

"Belgradians have closed themselves off in their apartments and in privacy, while nationalistic madmen and city-haters roam the heart of the city. This is most of all a war of civilization. I am frightened of the city-haters. I was sitting in 'Plavi Jahac' with one of the well-known TV editors from Pale when I was 'promised' that in a few years Sarajevo would be an 'ecological city'—a cornfield. Now I know for sure—that is the dream of the city-haters. I know that they would do the same thing to Belgrade if they could. I am torn when I look at the young people in the bar, with their roots severed, but I also get mad when they say that they have 'given everything for the Serb cause' and that they are our 'liberators.'

Zora Cavic-Ilic, a translator and member of a diplomatic family from precommunist Belgrade, comments with agitation:

"No one is happy. Only those who are naive, like children. Those who caused this war should have foreseen the animosity. We, the old Belgradians, live closed off, attentively following what is happening from a distance. That is also how we reacted to the Germans and to the Partisan 'liberators.' We maintained our integrity. We have learned to survive and, like dolphins, to pass our experience on to our children through our genes. But the squalor enters every pore. It is in the air, our language is contaminated by it, there is horrible cursing, and people talk as if they are shouting from two hills. TV offers mediocrity and vulgarity as the universally applicable style, impudently imposing ignorance and vulgarity. And things could get worse.

"But," he warns, "a certain obstinacy has been awakened in me, an obstinacy to preserve myself like a rare animal. I will not accept a city of dirty cars, dirty shoes, and greasy hair."

Walking on the same street with the old Belgradians is Rosa E., a 50-year-old refugee from Sarajevo. A prominent high school teacher, she lives in an attic with her son, cleans other people's apartments, and when people scowl at her on the bus because of her different dialect she closes her eyes and the past returns: world travel, a weekend place on Korcula, two luxurious apartments in Sarajevo, crystal, and furs. Everything has been lost for good. She says that she will nevertheless return to Grbavica, to a vacated Muslim apartment. Here she has no roots.

An 80-year-old woman from Sarajevo, a former editor of PROSVETA who barely survived the first wartime winter in Bosnia, understands and loves Belgrade, and talks about Karadzic and Mladic as war criminals, as the biggest enemies of the Serb nation.

At the other refugee extreme, a 20-year-old disabled veteran from Brcko, with one leg missing, is embittered toward the opposition, Vuk Draskovic, and the peace movement. And also toward the Serbians, the degenerates of the Serb tribe. Enthusiastically he says: "After the war in Bosnia is over, we will come here; someone must teach you what Serbhood and Orthodoxy are."

"I had thought that the invasion of Belgrade was over, but we are experiencing it all anew," summarizes Rajko Danilovic. "The ones in 1945 acted like victors, with a right to city life, our property, and pretty Belgrade women. The new ones do not resemble the old ones, because they are experiencing defeat instead of victory. They bear the stamp of guilt."

What will tomorrow bring?

According to one poll conducted in Belgrade, 70 percent of those questioned feel that the coming year will be better, because it cannot be any worse.

Predrag Simic, director of the Institute for International Policy and Economics, said this to THE NEW YORK TIMES: "Serbs in Serbia no longer regard Bosnian Serbs as victims. How can you sympathize with people like General Mladic and others? They are people who should be pitied. We increasingly regard them as people who are dragging us into misfortune. Antiwar sentiment has gained a great deal of strength here."

However, pessimists expect only more misfortune once the war is over and accounts are settled. In their opinion, some disoriented people will return, but also arriving in the "waiting room" will be new people from impoverished Knin or "liberated" Zvornik. It is believed that Belgrade will never rid itself of criminals and profiteers. In the future, they will become influential and respected citizens of Belgrade, industrialists or politicians with clear positions in the establishment. They will decide the fate of the meek citizens who do not have pagers and revolvers.

Montenegro

Djukanovic Meets With Albanian Prime Minister

LD1306151394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1446 GMT 13 Jun 94

[Text] Podgorica, 13 Jun (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic met Albanian Prime Minister Aleksandar Meksi in Durres today.

According to a statement issued by the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two prime ministers discussed bilateral relations and pointed out the importance of continuing the dialogue and the need for improving goodneighborly relations and cooperation, which are vital for the stability of the region.

The resolution of the Yugoslav crisis was also discussed, and the need was stressed for a peaceful and just solution to the conflict based on the consensus of all warring sides. Future bilateral economic, cultural, scientific, and other cooperation was also discussed.

The Montenegrin side was also represented by Deputy Prime Minister Krunoslav Vukcevic and Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic.

Kosovo

Political Climate in Kosovo Examined

94BA0295A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 94 pp 25-27

[Article by Perica Vucinic: "On the Scene: Kosovo Canards"]

[Text] *The Albanian businessman pays taxes to two states, in general he is a merchant or manufacturer and has more money, while the Serb businessman is most often an intermediary between the Albanians and the state, for which he takes a commission.*

After the blanket assessments to the effect that the crisis of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo with the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav authorities and that it will also end there, the political prognosis according to which "Kosovo's turn is coming up" is becoming increasingly widespread. This latter notion is convincing, if for no other reason because of the passage of time and the weight and ripeness of the problem. The fact that the time to solve the problem of the southern Serbian province is coming up is indicated by the visit to Belgrade and Pristina arranged by Douglas Hogg, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, on 5 and 6 May. The British diplomat departed. Speculation by commentators, based primarily on his comment that Albanians must be given broad autonomy within the framework of Serbia, has already run full course. Hogg's visit also served as an agent for circulating "information" about how negotiating teams of the Serbian authorities and of the Kosovo Albanians have already been formed. This "information" is refuted by the very "composition" of the negotiating teams, which contain, for example, the deputy prime minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Zeljko Simic, and the chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Kostunica, who cannot reconcile himself with the authorities.

Reports on the negotiators presented by Radio Cologne and the Pristina Albanian-language weekly KOHA, which were also carried by Belgrade media, are classic "canards" from a journalistic viewpoint. Their motivation, however, is purely political in nature and contains the message that it is time to move beyond the deadlock once and for all.

This is because after Hogg's visit, which provoked a bit of political agitation, Kosovo is returning to its prior state, which means that the unrecognized, self-proclaimed republic of Kosovo—recognized only by Albania—and the Republic of Serbia are functioning in parallel in the same territory. Moreover, both of them are trying to assert their rights and avoid obligations if they can. The Serbian state has imposed its police structure and left it up to the Albanians to organize autonomous education, culture and sports, social and administrative institutions, and even autonomous tax authorities, but without neglecting to collect the taxes owed to it. The Albanians, although they ignore Serbian administration wherever they can, do not refuse rights to health care and hospital treatment. In the area of national defense, it appears that a tacit agreement has been reached—the Albanians do not join the armed forces of the country that they do not regard as their own, while the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia (VJ) does not need disloyal guardians of territory. That is how two national communities live in parallel in Kosovo. Now and then, they meet only in the area of business interests. And thanks to those interests, at the "Businessmen's Club" in Pristina one can learn from the conversation of a pair of new businessmen, newly rich Serbs and Albanians, that they are fascinated with the flights of "various airplanes and DC 9's and DC 10's" and that in such airplanes "you do not even feel that you are being transported and you can comfortably have drinks on them." They were on the trail of material interest, and in so doing the Albanian is not bothered by the fact that the "Businessmen's Club" is a Serb bar, just as Serbs are not bothered by doing business in Albanian bars. They differ in that the Albanian pays taxes to two legal states, both the "Republic of Kosovo" and the Republic of Serbia. But the Albanian has more money and is generally a merchant or manufacturer, while the Serb, thanks to the absolute domination of Serbs in the bureaucratic structure, is most often an intermediary with the state, and if he holds a position, then he is an intermediary with himself and takes a commission, or a bribe.

Adjustment in Process

In other fields, Kosovo's Serb and Albanian worlds seem irreconcilable. In the Albanian pastry shop "Elida" and the Serb cafe "Donatelo," establishments in the "Boro i Ramiz" sports hall separated only by a corridor, these worlds, relaxing in almost the same atmosphere, regard each other with indifference. But that is a story that has already been told.

The two worlds of Kosovo live their lives in the political cocoons of "the independent Republic of Kosovo" and "unified Serbia." Postponing the political conflict, albeit only conflict in the form of dialogue, gives rise to illusions, but also to tension.

"This is the status quo, a balance of fear, a state of neither war nor peace, and it will continue as long as it suits both sides," says Skeljzen Malici, ex-politician and founder and former chairman of the Social Democratic Party. Malici, who is now a journalist, repeats the theory that the Kosovo war is being waged in Bosnia, that the Serbs in Bosnia, "in fighting for their own ethnic rights, are also fighting for the ethnic rights of Albanians. Because if they had enough territorial jurisdiction in Bosnia, perhaps Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic would agree to a formula of broad autonomy—territorial, political, cultural—and that in practice would lead to independence for Kosovo." The common platform of all significant parties who captured seats in the parliament of the "Republic of Kosovo," which has yet to constituted, is an independent Kosovo, but it appears that a consensus has also been reached on the view that such a thing is unrealistic for now. Such a position can also be heard in the leading party of Kosovo Albanians, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK), which received 76 percent of the votes in the Albanian-only elections on 24 May 1991.

However, mention of the broad autonomy guaranteed to Albanians under the 1974 SFRY Constitution is true heresy, and immediately after the visit by the British Foreign Office official with the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, the DSK Information Center tried to relativize the clear suggestion by the high-ranking guest that the solution for Kosovo should be sought in autonomy on a wide scale and within the framework of Serbia. Dr. Fehmi Agani, the vice chairman of the DSK and Ibrahim Rugova's right-hand man, said in an interview with VREME that the British diplomat is still in the process of adjusting his views. However, there are still no results of that adjustment. Another Albanian ex-politician, Veton Suroi, the founder and former chairman of the Parliamentary Party and now publisher of the weekly KOHA, rejects the solution in the 1974 Constitution, but for entirely different reasons. "We have gone beyond 1974 and must be more creative than Kardelj," Suroi says succinctly.

The definition of Kosovo under the Constitution of 20 years ago as a point of conflict, but also of encounter, between Serb and Albanian interests is an unpleasant framework for talks for the Serb side as well. The chairman of the provincial committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Vojislav Zivkovic, elaborates on the part according to which the province is defined as an integral part of Serbia. "Kosovo is not an open question; rather, the problem is how to persuade the Albanians to sit down and talk. When Europe says, as Great Britain has done, that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, I am convinced that the majority of Albanians will ultimately accept that," says Zivkovic.

The problem with Serb politicians—as indeed with Albanian ones if they are in positions of power—is that their authorities are very minimal, so that the political discourse is reduced to the well-known approach of justifying the national strategies contained in political slogans. With the prefix "ex" they are authentic, but they exert no great amount of political influence.

Momcilo Trajkovic, the former deputy prime minister of Kosovo and then the SPS deputy heading the departmental group on solving Kosovo's problems, and then a renegade from the party and founder of the Social Democratic Party, will say, not without cynicism, that he "cannot believe that Serbian President Milosevic declared that 'there is no problem' with giving autonomy to the Albanians." "Milosevic has no right to say such a thing, and I really doubt that he could have said that publicly. That would have meant the beginning of the end of his authority, which is in fact based on Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija]," says Trajkovic. He believes that the Albanians' contribution to solving the Kosovo problem is to publicly renounce pretensions to a Kosovo republic, while the Serbs should recognize that Albanians "are here in real numbers, in order to create the trust necessary to live together and permit talks on the organization of that life."

Serb Differences

In the last election campaign, Trajkovic ran under the slogan "Vote for the ones who have linked their destiny to Kosovo and Metohija" and lost. The former SPS figure and subsequent social democrat has now linked his destiny to the "Ratar" collective farm in Laplje Selo, where he is director, and it could be said that this latest role suits him. With pride he emphasizes that all 1,100 hectares of the farm have been planted, saying: "That is how to fight for Serb land in Kosovo."

Reflecting on the times to come, Trajkovic says that Serbia has done nothing in this interregnum to keep the Serbs from being outvoted again. He regards the civic state as a solution; however, in order to achieve that, the national state model must be given "free rein." He concludes that this is a process.

The political biography of the current director of the "Ratar" collective is somewhat characteristic of the present-day Serb divisions in Kosovo. Trajkovic, who began his political career in the 1980's by standing up against the "autonomist policy" of the (Serb) Kosovo government, is accused of being an autonomist. He responds in kind, reminding the current holders of power where they were and whom they supported 10 years ago. Thus, the Serb political scene in the province is divided into two types of autonomists, which leads us to the current Serb division into "newcomers" and "old-timers," whereby the "Trajkovic school of politics" corresponds to the old-timers. According to this terminology, the current okrug government is in the hands of the newcomers.

Although it is impossible to strictly categorize the types of political thought, it is indeed possible to establish a fundamental difference. The group designated "old-timers" supports a practical policy that would integrate Albanians into the structures of provincial government. "They must be given something, because they make up 90 percent of the population here. They will participate in government sooner or later, and for that reason there must be a mechanism to keep the Serbs from being outvoted," is the private reflection of one Kosovo politician, a member of the ruling Serb party. His name remains "underground," as does the reflection through which he risks being labeled an "autonomist," i.e., "old-timer."

In the Albanian political bloc there is discord not concerning goals, but rather concerning strategy. No one questions Dr. Ibrahim Rugova's authority, and the strength and influence of his DSK are not questioned either, but there is criticism of his monopoly on power, the attitude of some important Albanian intellectuals outside the party, and the politically passive approach. The most vocal critics are academician Redzep Cosja, an ideologist of the Albanian national question, and Adem Demaci, chairman of the Forum for Human Rights, political dissident and longtime political prisoner, and publisher of the journal FORUM. Demaci is known as a person ready to make political concessions, but also as a harsh critic of the DSK and its structures for their lack of resolve in defending the achieved Albanian institutions that the authorities have abolished: the Albanological Institute, the Kosovo Academy of Science and Art, and Albanian-language newspapers and journals. During Douglas Hogg's visit, Adem Demaci was in Italy, from where he sent word via Television Tirana that Kosovo is relying too much on the foreign element and that it is the duty of "those concerned with politics to seek out and search for various ways to solve the problem. It is not enough to say that our option is this and that, and thus to stand and watch.... I think we have had more than enough of Albanians talking among themselves. It is very necessary that Albanians in fact speak with Serbia, because like it or not, Serbia is a factor with which we must reckon, with which we must come to terms," Demaci said.

"Honorable Solution"

At the DSK congress that will almost certainly be held in late May or early June after several months of postponement, no spectacular changes in the party—and thus in Albanian policy as well—are expected. Almost no attention was given to the report from Tirana that Dr. Ibrahim Rugova and his host, Albanian President Sali Berisha, expressed their support for mediation of the Serbo-Albanian dispute by a third party. That report casts something of a shadow of legitimacy over the maximalist goal of a Kosovo republic. It also holds out the promise that the Albanian side has something to offer other than political maximalism, which "is not realistically feasible at this moment." In the trench warfare—fortunately, only of political options—between an independent Kosovo and a Serbia "that will be unified or will not exist at all," it seems that the real moment is raising an almost purely terminological problem: In what sort of lexical foil should concessions be wrapped while still emerging as virtuous before voters who have been promised the much-repeated slogans in this article.

The chairman of the Kosovo Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Dr. Gazmend Pulja, proposes a federal republic of Kosovo within Yugoslavia as an "honorable solution" that would not threaten the territorial integrity of the FRY and that would allow the Serbs to preserve their political and practical interests. "It is not natural to aspire to a lower level of constitutional structure. Kosovo was a constituent unit of the federation, and the international community cannot accept a curtailment of the rights of 2 million Albanians when 500,000 Montenegrins have a republic," Pulja explains.

Naturally, the shadow of possible war always hangs over Kosovo, but nevertheless it is increasingly pallid. Partially because many, such as Skeljzen Malici, feel that the war option was used up in Croatia and then in Bosnia, partially because the prevalent opinion is that Serbia is not capable of waging war on several fronts, that its wartime ambitions have been exhausted, especially under strong surveillance by the international community, and, among other things, because no one is ready to risk a war that would inevitably spread to the entire Balkan peninsula. In this sense, the possibility of partitioning Kosovo is considered completely superficially to be, by necessity, a war option. Malici thinks that in that case there would clearly be war as an alibi for demarcation. "The Serbs and Albanians could not do that on their own, without international mediation." Skeljzen Malici illustrates the unconvincing nature of the war option by pointing to the military weakness of Albania, as well as the unwillingness of the United States of America to support its militarily weak ally.

Besides the parallel system and parallel life, all in the same territory, the Serbs and Albanians are also demonstrating a common infirmity and inability to sit down at the negotiating table without international mediation. Naturally, this third party would also have to bear responsibility for the results of any concessions, because their political figures are not willing to do so.

Nevertheless, something is changing in Kosovo. Fields left uncultivated for decades are now greener than they have ever been. The "ordinary" Albanians and Serbs regard this land that they are working as their own, and there are no problems whatsoever here; such problems invariably arise when the question of who land in Kosovo belongs to is shifted to the level of politics. Problems also emerge when the state raises an issue like land redistribution, which is already very delicate, because in Kosovo each normal issue has specific Kosovo deviations.

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